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Abstract 
The thesis investigates household economic and behavioural implications of public investments 
funded by communal based wildlife management programmes, such as Communal Areas 
Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. The thesis 
focuses on household education and adaptive capacity production. It further investigates 
determinants of programme stated preferences and behaviour thereof in communal areas of 
Zimbabwe, using the case of Dande communal area in Mbire district. Since its inception in the 
late 1980s, there has been debate over the adequacy of the implementation of the CAMPFIRE 
programme in effecting economic and behavioural change in the respective communities. 
However, most of the assessments focused on household financial gains, poverty reduction and 
inequality. Results show that little financial gains accrue to the respective households, with 
poverty and inequality remaining high. This thesis argues that the main development trajectory 
in communities implementing communally based wildlife programmes such as CAMPFIRE is 
biased towards public capital investment; in the form of infrastructure development and 
respective support for the related services. By design therefore, the programme will have 
positive impact on access to publicly provided goods and services rather than private goods. 
By implication, the study further argues that the programme will therefore have varied 
implications on households’ adaptive capacity components that are closely linked to the 
investment trajectory. Furthermore, there has been mixed feelings regarding the CAMPFIRE 
programme at the local level, varied to mixed decision outcomes regarding stated preferences 
on whether to continue the programme or not. The study attempts to decipher this by 
investigating whether feelings are driven by past wild animal encounters and whether the 
stated programme preferences are in turn driven by the reported feelings or perceptions of 
benefit (utility). The study uses posttest data collected through survey-method-choice-
experimental design complemented by qualitative data collection from wildlife producer 
communities and non-wildlife producing communities in Mbire rural district. I present the 
exploration on each of the issues in three papers included in the chapters herewith.     
The first paper investigates effects of the Communal Area Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE)’s public investment on education production. The 
objectives are to estimate the average treatment effect of the programme on children’s 
participation in formal education and identify the socioeconomic inputs that influence 
education production. The study uses the post-test only control group design and Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) in estimating the impact of CAMPFIRE programme 
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induced changes on participation in formal education of children of school going-age. I use 
propensity score estimation to correct for confounding factors, and to allow for comparison of 
units with similar background characteristics.  
Results show that education production improves by 12 per cent when children are under the 
CAMPFIRE programme than when they are not. However, results from education production 
function show that socio-economic inputs or characteristics are significant factors in 
explaining variation in education production in CAMPFIRE implementing areas than in non-
programme implementing areas. This indicates that the programme design is does not remove 
education disparity between better and less resourced households. Therefore, while public 
investments for the programme improves education production it needs to be re-configured to 
address the skewedness. 
The second paper investigates the average treatment effects on the treated, ATET of community 
based wildlife management programme on resilience, specifically household adaptive capacity 
and its different components. Adaptive capacity denotes the ability of a system to adjust, modify 
or change its characteristics or actions to moderate potential damage, take advantage of 
opportunities or cope with the consequences of shocks or stresses. I use Regression Adjustment 
and Potential Outcome Means (POM) procedures to estimate ATET.  
Results show that the programme’s effect is negative on social, economic and human capacities 
while positive for transformative or physical capacity. The programme however, has a positive 
effect on the overall adaptive capacity. The average social capital index for example is 0.011 
or 1.1 per cent less when households implement CAMPFIRE programme than the average of 
0.061 or 6.1 per cent that would have occurred or obtain if these households were not 
implementing the programme. The human capital capacity index for programme implementing 
households is 0.006, less than 0.076, if they were not implementing the programme. The 
economic capacity index is 0.008 less when treated than the average of 0.068 that would have 
occurred if the programme-implementing households were not under the programme. 
However, on physical capacity the potential outcome would be 0.038 higher than 0.183 if the 
programme-implementing households were not implementing. On the overall household 
adaptive capacity index, the potential outcome is 0.012 higher than 0.388 that would obtain if 
the programme-implementing households were not implementing the programme. The results 
reflect the investment trajectory in the area; a higher proportion of income from the 
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conservation programme has been directed towards public goods provisioning, improving the 
physical capacity of the respective households. Lessons from the results are that impacts of 
investments are a result of the investment portfolio configuration.  
Results of the education production function confirm that the CAMPFIRE programme affects 
the individual components of adaptive capacity variably; negatively on household social, 
economic capacities, and positively on household physical capacity, with no significant effect 
on human capacity and overall household adaptive capacity. Implementing the programme 
significantly improves access to public service for the poor: with no significant change in 
economic and social statuses. Furthermore, the results also show that there are other 
covariates that have significant influence on household capacities, such as having a household 
member out of the country, or in an urban area, being a widow, belonging to some ethnic 
groups such as Karanga, and religious affiliation, for example traditional religion. Having a 
household member in the diaspora for example improves household economic and human 
capacity, while traditional religion tends to have negative effect on all household adaptive 
capacities. The key lesson is that the programme is flexible; policy makers can reconfigure it 
to address critical livelihoods and capacity components as needed. With the active 
participation of local communities, it can therefore be directed to invest in livelihoods 
components that are more preferable.  
In the third paper, I argue that heuristic theory can be used to explain some of the observed or 
stated human behaviour and stated preferences in communities implementing wildlife based 
programmes. Heuristics are feelings generated by encounters, painful or pleasurable, which 
triggers some behaviour traits in the future. The paper aims to determine whether subjects’ 
past encounters with wild animals influence negative affect/feelings; and whether the negative 
affect leads subjects (1) to engage in self-reported behaviours such as poaching and killing of 
wild animals and (2) stated preferences towards community based wildlife programmes. I 
developed two models: a  𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 → 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 → 𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑟 model and a 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 →
𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 → 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 model. The premise is that subjects in wildlife areas experience 
negative encounters with wild animals that are likely to trigger emotions or negative affects. 
The affect likely influence stated or observed behaviour, and stated or revealed preferences for 
wildlife-based programmes. The argument is that affect, anchoring and availability heuristics 
interact to influence people’s preferences of wildlife programmes and their behaviour towards 
wild animal resources in their area. Using both qualitative and survey methodologies subjects 
were asked to describe their feelings towards wild animals, how they relate especially with 
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dangerous wild animals such as elephants, lions, buffaloes and their past encounters with the 
respective wild animals.  
Logistic regression results point to encounters with wild animals being statistically significant 
predictors of negative affect; which in turn is a key determinant of resource degrading 
behaviours such as (self-reported) poaching and killing wild animals in revenge or as a 
deterrent from destroying fields, livestock, killing or injuring people. On the other hand, 
perceptions of benefit and employment in the wildlife industry influence stated preference for 
wildlife-based programmes: and not negative affect. The conclusion is that a considerable 
fraction of decisions by subjects in Community Wildlife-Based programmes can be attributed 
to heuristics; negative wildlife encounters and associated feelings. However, stated 
preferences for wildlife-based programmes are not influenced by negative affect, but by 
expected utility, in this case access to public goods and services. Heuristics can therefore 
compliment the understanding of some decision patterns and behaviour that are seemingly 
inconsistent with economic theories of logic and probability. I therefore propose that working 
towards generating positive markers or anchors about wildlife among subjects can increase 
tolerance of wildlife. This can be achieved for example by instituting wildlife management 
systems that cater for problem animal control to reduce negative encounters, reducing 
evocation of affect and the associated resource degrading behaviours. Furthermore, improving 
benefits or perceptions of benefits can increase preference or willingness to accept wildlife-
based programmes by producer communal people. 
There are many studies on the impact of community based natural resources management, 
including community based wildlife management programmes. However, these tend to be 
limited to issues of household income and food poverty, governance and natural resource 
sustainability. Results of most of the studies show that the impact is largely negative. 
Nevertheless, there is little acknowledgement or reference to the investment trajectory in 
communities implementing the programme, and the associated implications. Furthermore, 
there is little reference to how the programme impacts household adaptive capacities, which 
has become an important tool to sustain livelihoods under changing environmental and 
economic conditions.  
A number of policy implications can be drawn from results of this study. At the onset 
community, based wildlife programmes are demonstrably important in the livelihoods of the 
respective communities. However, programme impact can be enhanced for specific livelihoods 
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or well-being components if there is a deliberate effort to direct the investment in the direction 
of the intended components. For example, an improvement in education production is a result 
of deliberate investment towards education infrastructure and support system. A similar result 
was obtained with reference to adaptive capacity. The programme demonstrably improved 
household physical capacity, which illustrates results of deliberately investing in public capital 
or infrastructure. For example, the district council’s policy is that at least 70 per cent of the 
conservation income goes to infrastructure or public capital development. In view of this, the 
policy has yielded positive results in relation to the policy objective. Other welfare dimensions 
have low ratings because investments by the programme towards the dimensions are 
negligible. Approximately 30 per cent of wildlife income remains to be invested, inconsistently 
towards all the other critical livelihoods dimensions and adaptive capacities such as social 
support, human wildlife conflict mitigation, wildlife protection and other income generation 
investments. Therefore, policy decisions about how income from wildlife business is utilised 
have implications on specific livelihoods or welfare components. This demonstrates that policy 
makers can make deliberate decisions to influence specific livelihoods and welfare components 
through structuring wildlife programmes investment portfolios accordingly.  
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1. Chapter 1: An overview  
1.1 Introduction  
In Southern Africa, a significant proportion of rural communities live around wildlife-protected 
areas, which are vulnerable to adverse climate variability, and more recently climate change. 
In addition, the communities experience livestock predation and crop raids by wild animals 
(Loveridgea et al. 2020, Chigonda 2018, Gandiwa et al. 2013a), over and about the countrywide 
economic challenges (Macheka et al. 2020, Mudzerengi et al. 2020, Makina 2010). In recognition, 
and as early as the 1980s ‘communal’ based wildlife management programmes or policies have 
been proposed and implemented in different forms in Zimbabwe, southern Africa and beyond 
to allow for local participation in and benefit from wildlife management (Tchakatumba et al. 
2019, Taylor 2009, Chhatre and Agrawal 2008, Hutton et al. 2005, ). During the initial stages 
of the communal based wildlife programmes development partners trained and reorganized 
local communities to manage wildlife and income generated thereof. In Zimbabwe, National 
Parks and development partners such as Centre for Applied Social Sciences department at the 
University of Zimbabwe, ZIMTRUST and World Wide Fund for nature (WWF) trained and 
advised resident communities on how to implement the programme (Tchakatumba et al. 2019, 
Jones and Murphree 2004, Child B. 1996). They also showed how the programme would 
improve livelihoods and their capacity to deal with recurrent droughts through generating 
income from wildlife (Murphree 2009, Murombedzi 1999). This enticed a wider range of 
communities to accept and implement the programmes across Zimbabwe and in other countries 
(Hutton et al. 2005).  
After decades of the programme implementation questions have been raised about the 
programme impact on poverty and the natural resources (Jones and Murphree 2004, Murphree 
2009, Taylor 2009, Hutton et al. 2005, Emerton 2001). Evidence show that poverty had 
remained relatively high, together with poaching and human wildlife conflict incidences 
(Gandiwa et al. 2013a & 2013b, Gandiwa 2011), which led Murphree (2009) to retract his 
earlier claim, and assert that the programme is not a ‘panacea for poverty reduction’. However, 
in the majority of impact assessments focus is largely on household income, aggregate poverty 
and governance issues (Shereni and Saarinen 2020, Jones  2007, 2004 & Jones B. 2006), of 




there seem to be no conscious effort in tracking the investment direction within communities 
to inform results of the assessments.    
A series of the communal wildlife programme reviews in southern Africa show that the 
respective communities invest a larger proportion of their income on public goods, specifically 
public infrastructure development (Tchakatumba et al. 2019, Jones 2007, 2004). Inspite of this 
realisation, there has been few assessments directed towards public investment impact. 
Furthermore, there has been no focused assessment on livelihoods and capacity dimensions 
that are directly related to public investment such as education and health. More so none has 
been devoted to understand the nexus between the investment and resilience; specifically the 
transformative capacity dimension of households (Cai et al. 2018, Warrick et al. 2017). In 
addition, despite the benefits, households in wildlife programmes areas continue to experience 
human-wildlife conflicts, and in anecdotal reports, people have expressed disgruntlement about 
the programme (Shereni 2020, Rihoy 2009). In some cases, local communities express outright 
anger about the programme, while other people have reacted through revenge killing which 
degrades wildlife resource (Matema S. 2015, Rihoy et al. 2009). Rihoy et al. 2009 summed up 
that ‘people are not happy’ about CAMPFIRE. Yet at times, the same people speak highly of 
the programme (Tchakatumba et al. 2019), creating a complex scenario regarding programme 
preference; whether people still prefer the programme given their experience of it. This is a 
critical question as the sustainability of conservation programmes also depends on popular 
support (Shereni 2020, Bessette 2020), Dietz et al. 2003, Campbell and Shackleton 2001, Child 
and Graham 1996, Chambers 1983).  
The study therefore attempts to do three things; firstly, to gather evidence on the relevance of 
the programme in relation to household education production. Secondly, gather evidence of the 
programme impact on household adaptive capacity dimensions. Lastly gather evidence to 
understand the nexus between human wildlife conflict and benefits (utility) with programme 
preference. It looks at how human wildlife conflict generates feelings (‘affect’), and how this 
translate into behaviours such as poaching and revenge killing (self-reported). The thesis is that 
community based wildlife management programmes have made important public or 
infrastructural investments (Tchakatumba et al. 2019, Jones 2010, 2004, Hutton et al. 2005). 
This has the potential to improve specific welfare dimensions and specific household adaptive 
capacity components that are closely related to the programmes’ investment trajectory, as 
opposed to aggregate household welfare or aggregate household adaptive capacity. 




households out of poverty (Manjengwa et al. 2012) and adaptive capacity is viewed as critical 
in overcoming the challenges of climate variability and change as well as other shocks such as 
political and economic  (Mayer 2019, Cinner 2018, Cai et al. 2018, Sen 2000). In addition, I 
conceptualise that there are specific programme features that become anchors or pillars for 
evaluation by lay people (Costa et al. 2017, Plott et al. 1987)). The proposition is that human 
wildlife conflict for example triggers negative feelings or affect that compete with expected 
utility (Schulan, A. (2019) ) such as improved access to public goods, to influence people’s 
stated preference of wildlife-based programmes and self-reported resource degrading 
behaviour such as revenge killing and poaching. The study draws its lessons from one of the 
community based wildlife management programme, Communal Areas Management 
Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), implemented over the past three decades 
in Mbire district, Zimbabwe.  
On the first issue, the study seeks to determine the programme treatment effect on poverty for 
households living in wildlife programme areas, with specific reference to education production. 
Poverty is usually measured using the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measure (Villar 
2017, Goerlich 2014, Foster et al. 1984). The approach is a generalised measure of poverty 
normally focusing on the value of consumed goods and services. However, poverty is multi-
dimensional: encompassing education, health, nutrition, freedom, communication and energy 
among others, which are at times brought to a single metric measurement. The composite index 
hide a number of important aspects or linkages (Bessell 2020). However, the multi-dimensional 
approach to poverty allows for interrogation of the different dimensions’ statuses and 
development of targeted strategies to address the respective dimensions (Bessell 2020, Weber 
2011). This study uses education dimension to demonstrate that the CAMPFIRE programme 
is a relevant development instrument with respect to the investment direction on the ground. 
This is against a backdrop that the ‘community’ based wildlife programmes have invested 
substantial proportions of their public generated income into public infrastructure (Jones 2007, 
2004), would have positive impact on education production. I introduced core infrastructure in 
the education production function based on the view that services it produces raises the 
education productivity of households. The study pursues education access and consumption 
effect of infrastructure provision and support services made by the CAMPFIRE programme.     
Education is one key poverty dimensions that has long-term potential of moving people out of 
poverty (Boissiere 2004, Taubman 1975). Education has generally been promoted under 




support. Access to education takes the form of being located within acceptable distance from 
school infrastructure, affordable purchase price or user fees and associated costs to enable 
children to attend school (Coates 2003). Under the CAMPFIRE arrangement, user fees are 
either subsidised or fully met by the programme. In addition, the arrangement also subsidises 
or fully fund school related capital investments (Jones 2007).  
Across the world, a significant proportion of children have been noted to experience different 
levels of education deprivation, locking families into a vicious circle of poverty (Shukla & 
Mishra 2020, Chevalier 2013, and Coates 2003).  Research has shown that less educated 
parents for example are less likely to send their children to school, depriving the children of 
earning high incomes in the future (Shukla & Mishra 2020, Zhu 2020). The first paper thus 
attempts to measure the improvement in education production for children under the 
CAMPFIRE programme.        
On the second issue, the study investigates the impact of community wildlife programmes on 
adaptive capacity dimensions, again based on public (infrastructure) investments made by the 
programme over the past three decades. With increased evidence of climate change in the past 
two decades, mitigation and later adaptation have been prescribed as the main panacea to deal 
with negative impacts of climate variability and change (Moreira et al. 2019, Warrick et al. 
2017, Fussel and Klein, 2006). Following the third assessment report by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), adaptation has become the more favoured approach in 
dealing with climate variability and change to improve and sustain livelihoods. Adaptation has 
become an ‘urgent policy priority’ mainly because most adaptation activities take effect almost 
immediately, while the effects of mitigation may take several decades to manifest (FAO 2019, 
Mayer 2019, and Parry et al. 2007). Adaptation measures are applicable at different scales and 
their effectiveness is less dependent on actions of others (Smith 1996). 
Mitigation and adaptation strategies both require substantial public investments in the form of 
infrastructure to build community and household adaptive capacity (Jones et al. 2019, Parry et 
al. 2007). Meanwhile mainstream development sector has rekindled public investment 
approach owing to the evident failure of private led economic growth and welfare improvement 
in developing countries during the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) era (Baram 2019, 
Garcia-Milà 2018). However, marginal areas implementing community based wildlife 
management have consistently invested in public infrastructure (Jones 2007). The investment 




welfare dimensions that rely on publicly provided infrastructure. Public infrastructure is a 
development trigger as it lowers firms’ and households’ production cost and therefore increase 
profit and welfare respectively. Public investment improves welfare, for example through 
better employment opportunities and access to public services (Sustainable Development Goals 
2019, Anderson et al. 2006). There is convergence or agreement on the importance of public 
investment for both economic growth and welfare improvements.  
Conversely, assessments on community based wildlife resources management done to date 
yield a mixture of results relating to programme welfare impacts. The results pose the danger 
of portraying the programmes as being little worth the effort, yet the evaluations centre on 
aggregate welfare without taking into account that communities invest a larger proportion of 
the income in public infrastructure. What is common is that all assessments acknowledge that 
wildlife programmes have made investments in public infrastructure such as bridges, roads, 
schools and health facilities among others (Tchakatumba et al. 2019, Jones  2004), but not 
much has been done on the relative impact of the investments on relevant dimensions. It is 
therefore worthwhile assessing the impact of the programmes’ public investment on specific 
or relevant welfare dimensions such as education and transformative adaptive capacity 
dimension that with direct link to public investment.  
In the same line of thinking some results from the mainstream development sector show that 
the contribution of public investment to growth and poverty reduction has not always been as 
positive or as significant as expected. Despite the development of increasingly sophisticated 
methods for assessing the desirability of public expenditure during the 1960s and 1970s, large 
increases in public investment in many developing countries between 1974 and 1982 often 
yielded few returns. Reasons for this are however varied, including some unconnected with 
public investments such as decline in the terms of trade especially for developing country 
exports. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that at least one of the reasons was that the methods 
available to assess the desirability of public investment alternatives were flawed, badly 
implemented, or ignored (Sustainable Development Goals 2019, Anderson et al. 2006).  
 
Nonetheless, public investment has once again become important because of the slow rates of 
progress that was experienced toward the targets contained in the then Millennium 
Development Goals, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries (Anderson 2006). There has 
been renewed attention in promoting public investment since 2005, which has also been taken 




(Millennium Development Goals Report 2015, Anderson 2006) has re-emphasised the need for 
a ‘big push’ strategy in public investment to help poor countries break out of their poverty trap. 
The report further argues that, to enable all countries to achieve the then MDGs, there should 
be identification of priority public investments to empower poor people, and these should be 
built into the then MDG-based strategies that anchor the scaling-up of public investments, 
capacity-building, resource mobilisation, among others (Millennium Development Goals 
Report 2015, Anderson et al. 2006). Hence there is value in public investment, improving some 
welfare dimensions and building local capacities to deal with environmental, political and 
economic shocks and stresses; and likely to be true for community based wildlife management 
programmes.  
  
The last issue under investigation is how to explain people’s behaviour and stated preferences 
with regards community based wildlife programmes. The premise is that if communal people 
have accepted the programme and are benefiting from it, then they would tolerate wildlife 
behaviour such as livestock predation, crop raids and wild animals attacking people. 
Furthermore, the decentralisation policy confers wildlife resources to the user community. This 
would mean that they would not engage in behaviours that are contrary to conservation 
principles such as poaching and revenge killing as the wild animals would be their valued asset. 
However, this seems not to be the case in community based wildlife programmes and 
apparently, more complex than the linear relationship utility theory assumes. I therefore borrow 
the heuristic explanatory tools from psychology to understand this complexity. Heuristic are 
feelings generated as a result of encounters, and remains lingering and readily available in 
people’s mind and has the ability to trigger consistent behaviour traits (Pachur et al. 2012).  
 
Heuristics are painful or pleasurable memories generated by experiences or events (Pachur et 
al. 2012). When such memories are triggered reaction or decisions are quickly made based on 
experience. If painful, the decision would be risk averse. Thus in such cases, decisions made 
are inconsistent with expected utility or more specifically preference theory, and is even deeper 
than the mere lack on transitivity (Pachur et al. 2012). Preference theory argues that if indeed 
preferences exist and if the principle of optimization is applicable, then an individual should 
place a higher reservation price on the object he prefers (Fischbacher and Gatcher 2010). The 
behaviour as observed in a number of cases and experiments; however appear to be inconsistent 
with this preference theoretical proposition. The results suggest that no optimisation principles 




whether this is the case with members in communities implementing communal wildlife 
programmes; that their individual experiences with some basic dimensions of the programme 
determine their preferences and probably their behaviour such as poaching and revenge killing. 
People are thus likely to evaluate the programme based on a few basic features of the 
programmes that are easily recalled, rather than the metric calculations of costs and benefits. 
Negative encounters and associated feelings or heuristic are therefore likely to influence the 
resultant resource degrading behaviours such as poaching and revenge killing.  
 
1.2 Research gaps  
From a welfare perspective, the benefits of infrastructure accrue through higher incomes, 
infrastructure utilisation and greater opportunities, but there is uncertainty over the localized 
effects of specific types of infrastructure on the several aspects of social components. Better 
estimates are also needed of the impacts on specific welfare dimensions such as education and 
health, at a fine level of disaggregation such as household and individual level. Multiple 
indicators of social development should be employed to broaden the applicability of results. 
 
Several methodological issues also need to be looked at closely, because what really matters 
for development are infrastructure services, rather than infrastructure stocks. Measuring 
infrastructure services, however, is difficult in the absence of information from market 
behavior, and few authors have attempted to measure the aggregate value of such services. 
Because public expenditures do not necessarily raise the capital stock but may improve its 
quality, aggregate studies that rely on gross measures of the capital stock may have 
underestimated some positive effects such improvements have on social components.  
 
In the context of local provisioning of public infrastructure within community based wildlife 
management areas there is oversight of the contribution of infrastructure to welfare as the 
expectations have been too high. Methodological issues emerge once again where such benefits 
are not assessed relative to similar areas and similar localized units such as households to 
measure the differential effect relative to if the programme was not in place. A treatment effect 
approach would likely yield value in understanding the critical role that public investments 
have made to date.  
 
From a sectoral perspective, the benefits of providing infrastructure stem from its role as a 




public investments bring at the local level. Given the range in the literature, better estimates 
are needed of both productivity and complementarity at a fine level of disaggregation. In the 
majority of empirical studies to date, impacts have been at the national level, smaller at the 
regional level, and lowest at the local level. This suggests that externalities generated by the 
size and complexity of networks are important determinants of positive impacts. 
 
Furthermore, human behaviour is an important feature in sustainable natural resources 
management. An understanding of what motivates the ultimate behaviours that are seemingly 
contrary to conservation is key in coming up with practical solutions to reduce human induced 




1.3 Objectives of the study  
The general objective is to show the impact of public investments funded by community based 
wildlife management enterprises.  
The specific objectives are to: 
i. Investigate the impact of public investments by Community Based Wildlife 
Management programmes on household welfare; with particular reference to education 
production 
ii. Examine the impact of public investments by Community Based Wildlife Management 
programmes on household adaptive capacity to environmental risks. 
iii. Explore and examine the divergence in behaviour and stated preferences for the 
Communal Areas Management Programmes for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) 
by beneficiary community members. 
 
1.4 Research Questions  
i. What is the impact of Community Based Wildlife Management public investments on 
education production? 
ii. What is the impact of Community Based Wildlife Management public investments on 
household adaptive capacity components? 
iii. What are the determinants of beneficiary communities’ behaviour, perceptions of and 






1.5 Description of the study area and sampling  
The study was conducted in Mbire district, northern Zimbabwe. The district occupies the 
eastern part of the Mid-Zambezi valley between longitudes 30º and 31º east, and latitude 15º 
and 16º south. The district is to the east of Mana Pools-Chewore-Sapi wildlife management 
area adjacent the Zambezi River. Mana Pools-Chewore-Sapi wildlife area has been declared a 
world heritage site due to its rich biodiversity (Smith 2014). Mbire district also share its 
northern borders with Zambia and Mozambique, which are important sources of roaming large 
herbivore. Mbire district forms an important wildlife corridor between Manapools-Chewore-
Sapi National Parks estate and Zambia’s Conservation Lower Zambezi National Park and 
Mozambique’s Tchuma Tchetu wildlife area (Map 1 and 2) (Smith 2014).  
 
Mbire rural district is in Mashonaland Central province. The district was formerly part of 
Guruve district, then known as Lower Guruve, Dande communal area or Mbire.  Mbire was 
commissioned as an independent district in 2006 with its district offices located at Mushumbi 
































Map 2: Mbire Rural District Council wildlife areas (source: Mbire Rural District Council Natural Resources Management 
Plan, 2011) 
I selected the district for this study because of its long history in implementing CAMPFIRE 
programme, a Community Based Natural Resources Management, (CBNRM) programme, 
since 1989. In addition, it has also been a world-renowned case study for community based 
natural resources management (Murphree 2009). A few of the implementing wards in the 
district, wards 1, 2 and 11, respectively Kanyemba, Angwa and Masoka, are responsible for 
the successful CBNRM image that the district enjoys, with Masoka originally outperforming 
the other two. Recently income data from wards shows that Ward 2 generating the most from 
trophy hunting. Programme performance and evaluations are usually reported for these wards 
independent of all others.  
The district consists of several ethnic groups: Doma, Korekore, Chikunda, Zezuru and Karanga 
among others. Karanga and Zezuru ethnicities were originally from the Highveld of Zimbabwe, 
first forcibly moved during the colonial period (Dzingirai et al. 2015). After independence in 
1980, there were programmes to eradicate tsetse flies in the Zambezi valley (Dzingirai et al. 
2015). This attracted more people leading to another wave of migration into Mbire district as 
there were increased prospects of cotton cultivation and cattle rearing (Matema 2015, 




settlements away from areas with dense wildlife by the migrants. The Doma and the Korekore 
moved further into wildlife areas as more and more migrants moved in. The last wave of 
migration was triggered by the 2000 land redistribution. This saw the in-migration mainly of 
the Doma and Korekore people who had settled in commercial farms in Mhangura area as farm 
labourers (Matema 2015, Nyamwanza 2013).  
Four wards out of the seventeen wards: 11, 2, 7 and 17, were purposively selected for the study. 
Ward 11, Masoka and ward 2, Angwa are known for having higher wildlife populations, 
elephants and buffalos (Taylor 2009 and Murphey 2009). Map 3 shows the distribution of 
elephant population in 2014. As such there are more hunting activities accounting for higher 
wildlife returns compared to other wards in the district, and were therefore selected as the 
treatment group, . On the other hand, wards 7 and 17 are not implementing the 
programme, and thus selected as the comparison or counterfactual group, . 
 
Map 3: Elephant distribution in Mbire district (Source: Mbire Rural District Council, 2011) 
Wards 11 and 2 are both approximately 50km away from the administrative centre, Mushumbi 
Pools. Ward 11, Masoka is less accessible compared to Ward 2, Angwa because of the many 
streams between it and the district administrative centre. In the rainy season, flooding rivers 
destroy bridges making transport communication difficult. Wards 7 and 17 are located 
relatively close to the district centre. Ward 7 is equally difficult to access because of the bad 




guarantee any hunting attempts. Council data shows that ward 7 and 17 experience occasional 
one day invasions by elephants on their way to or from Mozambique or to or from Mana Pools 
National Park. Wild cats mainly lions also occasionally attack livestock in all the four selected 
wards. Across all the wards hyenas and baboons are permanent problem animals.   
When Masoka community was founded in the late 1960s, there were no roads, no education 
and health facilities. By 1988 when the CAMPFIRE programme started Masoka still had no 
education or health facility and had about 45 households (Pers. Comm, Headman Kanyurira, 
2016). The nearest school and clinic was Chisunga Primary School in Ward 2, approximately 
40km away and schoolchildren had to be weekly boarders if they were to enrol into the school 
system. A few children attended school because most parents could not afford school fees and 
related costs. By 1980, Angwa ward had two schools, namely Chisunga and Chitima primary 
schools constructed by the government, and no secondary school (Map 4).  Angwa ward covers 

















CAMPFIRE programme was first implemented in Mbire district (Taylor 2009, Murombedzi, 
1997, Cutshall 1989). Masoka and Angwa were among the first beneficiaries, and each of the 
wards drew up landuse plans and put aside land for wildlife habitat where no settlements or 
o Angwa sec 
o Mazambara 
o Mupedzapasi 
o Masoka Pri o Masoka Sec 
o Chapoto Sec 
o Community built school 




any other land uses were allowed. The land is leased originally on a five-year term, and now 
on a ten-year term through the Rural District Council to private safari operators (Muyengwa 
2017, Taylor & Murphree 2007, Child 1996). The operators remit on average 50 per cent of 
the value of trophies hunted, previously to the Rural District Council and now directly to the 
respective beneficiary or producer communities. The district Natural Resource Officer reported 
that currently the communities also get a proportion of the daily rates charged to hunting clients.   
An elected ward CAMPFIRE/wildlife committee, now Environmental Sub-Committee, with a 
two-year term manages the income realised on behalf of the community. Financial records and 
Key Informant interviews with committee members show that in the first decade, Masoka was 
realising in excess of USD100, 000 per hunting season and Angwa was getting slightly less 
than USD100, 000. The incomes declined to between USD70, 000 - 80, 000 for Masoka and 
USD40, 000 – 50, 000 for Angwa by 2015 due to a plethora of reasons ranging from reported 
decrease in trophy size, to international ban on elephant hunts. More recently, the income for 
Masoka has gone down to record low of USD40, 000 per hunting season with Angwa now 
getting slightly higher income. 
Ward 7 (Hambe) and Ward 17 (Majongwe) are small with two schools between them, reported 
by the respective school heads to have been built by the government. The schools are also 
sparse and children had to walk long distances to school. Wards 7 and 17 had never been part 
of CAMPFIRE implementing wards. In terms of infrastructure Masoka was worse off followed 
by Angwa; a scenario reported by the interviewees to have changed with the implementation 
of the CAMPFIRE programme.  
To understand the current scenario in relation to access to education, adaptive capacity and 
opinions about wildlife a sample of households was drawn.  The minimum sample size for the 
survey was calculated based on the population size of the four wards using the normal 
approximation to the hypergeometric distribution, and for each sample ward using probability 
proportional to size: 
  (1.1) 





n is the required sample size 
 are the required sub-sample sizes 
N is the population size =2, 928 households 
 is the population size for each respective sample ward or administrative unit 
p and q are the population proportions. (0.5 if not known). 
z is the value that specifies the level of confidence you want in your confidence interval when 
you analyse your data. Typical levels of confidence for surveys are 95per cent, in which case 
z is set to 1.96 and used for this survey. 
E sets the accuracy of sample proportions (0.05 to allow an error margin of 5per cent). 
The calculated minimum sample size is 340 households, distributed as in Table 1-1. The last 
column shows the number of children aged 5 to 16 years in the sample households, which are 
the units of analysis for the first paper. 
Table 1-1: Sample distribution 





children 5 – 16 
years 
All 2, 928 340 401 613 
Treatment Masoka  333 37 72 117 
Angwa  1, 197 139 122 201 
Control Majongwe  829 97 109 151 
Hambe 569 67 98 144 
  Source: Survey data December 2015 
1.6 Organisation of the thesis  
The first chapter gives an overview of the broader objectives of the thesis and the broader context around 
the objective functions. Chapter 2 presents the first paper, followed by the second paper in chapter 3, 
the third paper in chapter 4 and chapter 5 presents the conclusion and recommendations of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 and 3 presents results estimating the impact of CAMPFIRE programme on education 
production and household adaptive capacity using the Cobb-Douglass or education production function, 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATET), potential outcome means (POMs), regression 
adjustment and regression discontinuity. Chapter 4 attempts to explain the relationship between human 
wildlife conflict encounters and programme preference. I develop a model to explore the relationship 
focusing on past human wildlife conflicts as explanatory variables for people’s behaviours and 
preferences. The model borrows the theory of heuristic from psychology, which argues that bad 
encounters shape people’s reactions in relation to images representing or evoking the past bad 
encounters (Schulan 2019). The final chapter presents the conclusion, and associated policy 





    
2 Chapter 2: The Impact of Communal Area Management 
Programme for Indigenous Resources on education production 
in Mbire, Zimbabwe 
By  




The paper investigates the effects of the public investment by Communal Area Management 
Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE)’s on education production. The objectives 
are to estimate the average treatment effect of the CAMPFIRE programme on children’s 
participation in formal education and identify the socioeconomic inputs that influence 
education production system. The study uses the post-test only control group design and 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) in estimating the impact of CAMPFIRE 
programme induced changes on participation in formal education of school going-age 
children. I used propensity score estimation to correct for confounding factors, and allow 
comparison of units with similar background characteristics. Results show that education 
production improves by 12 per cent when children are under the CAMPFIRE programme than 
when they are not. However, results from education production function show that socio-
economic inputs or characteristics are significant factors in explaining variation in education 
production in CAMPFIRE programme implementing areas than in non-programme 
implementing areas. This indicates that the programme design not remove the influence of 
household characteristics in education. Differential access to education is still evident. 
Therefore, while public investments by the programme improves education production, it needs 
to be re-configured to address skewedness between the less and better resourced households. 
 
Key words: Education production, Communal wildlife management, Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated, public investment 
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2.2 Introduction  
This paper investigates the effects of Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous 
Resources (CAMPFIRE) on education production in Mbire district, Zimbabwe. CAMPFIRE 
is a Community Based Wildlife Management programme initiated to spearhead rural 
development including education production. I estimate education production using children’s 
education participation rate.  The objectives of the paper are to (1) estimate the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATET) of CAMPFIRE programme on children’s participation 
in formal education, (2) identify socioeconomic inputs that influence education production and 
(3) estimate effects of socioeconomic inputs on education production in CAMPFIRE 
programme areas. Public Investment Theory guides the study, which argues that public 
investment influences both public and private production (Rajaram et al. 2014). I use post-test 
only group design and propensity model procedure to estimate average treatment effect on the 
treated, ATET; and education production function to identify key socioeconomic inputs and 
estimate their interaction with CAMPFIRE programme in the production of education output 
(Lechner 2015, Nabil et al. 2011, Heckman and Vytlacil 2001). The hypothesis is that 
CAMPFIRE programme improves education production reducing the influence of 
socioeconomic inputs.     
One of CAMPFIRE programme’s socioeconomic objectives is to alleviate poverty through 
non-consumptive natural resource use for communities living adjacent wildlife areas 
(Tchakatumba et al. 2019, Chigonda 2018, Taylor 2009, Murphree 2009). The beneficiary 
communities realise income from ‘leasing’ out land to private safari-hunting operators (Taylor 
2009; Hutton, et al. 2005). Rural District Councils hold land in trust of communities and have 
the Appropriate Authority Status to make contractual arrangements with the Safari operators 
and leasing the land on behalf of the communities, with representation from local level 
councilors. The communities use the realised income benefits to address poverty issues they 
encounter. Poverty issues include food, education, health and communication among others 
(Villar 2017, Goerlich 2014, Weber 2011, Gordon 2006). Across most of Southern Africa 
Community Based Wildlife Management communities invest a larger proportion of the income 
in public infrastructure such as schools, clinics, roads and bridges; and offer social services 
through subsidies, for example in education and health (Tchakatumba et al. 2019, de Vette et 




on education production. Education is an important dimension for poverty alleviation, with 
long term potential of moving people out of poverty, for example through improved potential 
for higher incomes (Potancokova and Goujon 2014, Gordon 2006, Taubman and Wales 1975). 
In Zimbabwe, reports show food insecurity and low school attendance rates in economically 
marginal districts (Jones L. et al. 2010a), yet most CAMPFIRE programmes are implemented 
in such areas. This has raised questions among beneficiary communities, academia and public 
media on relevance of CAMPFIRE programme to households’ welfare such as education 
production and food security, among others (Dzingirai et al. 2015, Dzingirai 1996). The paper 
thus presents evidence for policy decision on relevance of the programme for participating 
households concerning access to education for children, using the case of four sub-district 
administrative units in Mbire district of Zimbabwe. 
The key questions being addressed in this paper are; (1) Do public investments made by 
CAMPFIRE programmes have effects on education production outputs? (2) Which 
socioeconomic inputs influence education production in CAMPFIRE programme areas? And 
(3) To what extent do socioeconomic characteristics affect education production in 
CAMPFIRE programme implementing areas?         
The paper is organised as follows:  
The following section discusses the theory of public investment followed by a discussion on 
the nexus between community based natural resources management principles and the welfare 
of communal households. The following section specifies the model outlining key variables 
used in the analysis and discusses the hypotheses to be tested. Next section outlines descriptive 
statistics before detailed discussion of the results of the impact of CAMPFIRE on education 
production. The last section discusses results and policy implications thereof.  
 
2.3 Public investment theory 
Public investment is financing or capitalisation in goods and services that are publicly 
consumed, characterised by difficulty in exclusion. It can also be viewed as public expenditure 
that adds to the public physical capital stock or capital expenditure in national accounts data 
(Oukhallou 2016, Abdul et al., 2015, Bivens 2012, Anderson et al., 2006). Much public 
investment takes the form of infrastructural outlays: roads, schools, health facilities, equipment 
etc. However, some of the outlays are of a more current form, but contributing to capital 




not only to an individual’s human capital but also to that of society, with benefits that can 
extend for a lifetime (Garcia-Milà & McGuire 2018, Psacharopoulos 2006, Boissiere 2004, 
McAuley 2001, Taubman and Wales 1975). Under such cases, the capital good is less tangible. 
 
Public investment theory started centuries ago. For example, Adam Smith outlined the essence 
of public goods theory more than two centuries ago.  Paul Samuleson, developed Smith’s work 
in more mathematical rigor, and put forward his theory of public expenditure about a century 
ago (Baram 2019). Anderson et al., (2006) notes that early planners who recognized the 
potential for promoting development through public investment include Myrdahl (1957) and 
Hirschman (1958). Anderson et al., (2006) further notes that there was a revival of interest in 
growth theory, beginning late 1980s with the works of Guild (2000), Arthur (1994), Krugman 
(1991), Lucas (1988), Romer (1986), and more recently advocates of the Millenium and 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) (Sustainable Development Goals 2020, Abdul et al. 
2015).  
 
Public investment theory argues that markets have their limits in the provision of public goods 
and services (Oukhallou 2016). The private sector will typically not supply public goods and 
services, as they cannot charge a price for their use because of the non-excludability nature of 
public goods and services. Government, or responsible authorities at local level, through their 
ability to raise revenues from domestic taxation or foreign aid, must therefore provide public 
goods and services (Sustainable Development Goals 2020, Anderson 2006).  
  
Non-excludability concept states that the main function of prices in markets is to ration supply 
of scarce goods to those who can offer scarce resources in exchange.  Excluded would be those 
who cannot pay, or who do not wish to pay. Thus, additional investment can increase quantity 
and/or quality of this rationed amount, benefiting households and firms in the process 
(Oukhallou 2016, Abdul et al., 2015). In view of a firm, its share of profits increases as public 
investment increases, taking the form:  
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑝𝑖, ?̅?𝑘, 𝑥𝑗)     (2.1) 
 
where 𝜋𝑖 is the profit of firm i, 𝑝𝑖 are the prices of the various goods and services produced or 




firm has access, and 𝑥𝑗 is a set of other characteristics which affect  a firm’s profits (Anderson 
et al., 2006). 
 
However, some goods and services are difficulty to exclude others. Economists refer to national 
defense as a classic case in non-excludability because it would be impossible to provide 
national defense to some people and communities and not to others, based on individual 
payments (Abdul et al., 2015, Guild 2000).  When non-payers cannot be excluded, private 
markets generally fail to provide goods or services; and the task rests on the government or 
local authority with jurisdiction over the area. Non-excludability makes market development 
difficult in-spite of the fact that provision of such goods and services would benefit both 
consumers and producers.  
 
On the other hand, non-rivalry is when there is no shortage of the good concerned. In other 
words, there is no marginal cost of allowing additional users. The profit of non-rivalry 
investment accrues to the community in terms of non-market benefits, for example water and 
air quality.  It is difficult to give value to such benefits but it is a conventional aspect of cost-
benefit analysis. In this respect, projects are economically viable as long as they return positive 
net present values to the community at appropriate discount rates even though this might not 
be financially viable (Anderson et al., 2006). 
In addition, most infrastructure investments involve a long lead-time between outlays and 
yields.  Even if the problems of non-excludability and non-rivalry is overcome, private markets 
will not necessarily provide the optimum level because private investors seek a high return in 
the short term. Firms tend to seek investments with short payback periods, short termism.  
Infrastructure projects, because of their capital intensity, are typically slow to yield a return 
(Garcia-Milà & McGuire 2018, McAuley 2001). Therefore, national and local Governments 
make long-term investments than private sector as they do not run the risk and usually raise the 
capital outlay through taxes or public programmes such as community-based programmes. 
Neo-classical investment theory states that the firms focus on maximising profits. Maximising 
profits in each period will yield an optimal capital stock. Infrastructure or public investment 
serves as a direct input into production processes; the production function takes the form of the 
conventional Cobb-Douglas function: 
 





Where 𝑌(𝑡) is the firm’s output,  𝐾 is the capital and 𝐿 is labour all in period 𝑡 
An increase in government public investment increases the firm’s output.  
 
Thus, the introduction of public capital or core infrastructure in the production function is based 
on the view that the flow of services that it produces raises the productivity of private inputs, 
firms or households (Anderson et al. 2006).  
 
At times private sector invests in public infrastructure through government collaboration, for 
example, by forming Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). The purpose of such collaborations 
would be to provide public goods and services. The role of government when private sector 
provides public investments is to guarantee returns to the private sector as the ultimate 
purchaser of the asset (Anderson et al. 2006).  Under community based programmes and 
considering non-excludability and non-rivalry conditions of public goods, public investment is 
a favorite approach to redistribute publicly generated income. 
 
Impact of infrastructure  
The impact of public infrastructure on development can be viewed from two angles (Table 2.1):  
(a) Impact on sectoral development and  
(b) Impact on social development. 
 
Impact on sectoral development 
Public infrastructure contributes to growth by lowering production costs for private firms so 
increases productivity and profits leading to more investment by the private sector, and 
attracting new firms and households (labour) into the area; the crowding-in effect (Table 2-1) 






Table 2-1: Impact of infrastructure investment on development 
Impacts on Sectoral Development   Impacts on Social Development 




Increased output as a result of direct input and  Higher wages through improved productivity 
higher productivity 
Structural and comparative cost changes through  Direct and multiplier effects of infrastructure 
improved technology      construction wages 
 
Complements/substitutes:    Access: 
Reduced costs of production and transactions  Access to markets: cheaper inputs, higher output 
through complementarity     prices, and alternative employment 
Increased productivity of other factors through   improved health, education, and social services 
complementarity      due to better mobility and access 
 
Location:      Consumption: 
Productive amenities attract firms, consumption  Consumption value of infrastructure services 
amenities attract labor 
Induced private investment through lower costs  Environmental improvement 
and higher returns 
Source: Guild (2000) 
If infrastructure serves as a complement to other inputs, private capital is attracted with an 
increasing public investment. If infrastructure is a substitute for privately provided factors, 
higher public investment should lead to lower costs for labour or capital or both. Facilities such 
as roads, which have few close private substitutes, should always be complementary to private 
capital, whereas power and water supplies, which have readily available private substitutes, 
may go either way (Guild 2000). 
 
Impact on social development 
From a social development perspective public investment theory predicts positive impacts on 
growth through improvements in human capital, education and health caused by better 
amenities that infrastructure represents. The benefits accrue through social agglomeration 
economies and higher productivity, which should raise wages. Within the social development 
category, there are also three types of impacts: income effects, access effects, and consumption 
effects. If better infrastructure does improve worker productivity, it is expected that wages will 
increase and attract workers. Higher levels of infrastructure investments may thus be able to 
boost growth rate of labour force and raise regional income, which should translate into higher 
per capita or per household income (Oukhallou 2016, McAuley 2001). 
 
Infrastructure construction is also raise incomes through a temporary multiplier effect on wages 
and materials, and through a permanent expansion of employment opportunities through 
greater accessibility. Better transportation and communications also mean improved access to 
health care, education, and markets for produce and consumer goods especially in rural or less 




improved access to educational and more diverse employment and household asset 
accumulation (Oukhallou 2016, McAuley 2001).  
 
Infrastructure should also advance social development to the extent that it provides services 
that people value. Amenity values of better facilities and access to services attract households. 
Infrastructure services are important consumption items in themselves. For example, better 
roads not only improve access to markets, they also save people time and provide opportunities 
for social interaction across a wider area (Anderson et al. 2006, Guild 2000). 
 
To analyse these effects, one can assume a household utility function of the form: 
 
𝑉ℎ = 𝑓(𝑚ℎ, 𝑝𝑗 , 𝑧𝑘)  (2.3) 
 
Where 𝑉ℎ is the utility of household h, 𝑚ℎ is the disposable income of household h, 𝑝𝑗 are the 
prices of the various market goods and services consumed by the household, and 𝑧𝑘 are the 
fixed quantities of various goods and services consumed by the household that are publicly 
provided. The direct impact of public investment on household welfare is given by: 
 
d𝑉ℎ /d 𝑧𝑘   (2.4) 
 
However, this tend to be smaller, the higher the initial amount of the public good and service 
being provided – diminishing marginal utility. It will also vary according to household 
preferences; some households prefer or value particular goods and services (Guild 2000). 
 
Public investments change the price of various market goods and services used and/or produced 
by firms, and consumed by households; depending on whether it is a substitute or complement 
to other goods and services consumed by households or used by firms (Bivens 2012). The 
impact of a change in the price of a market good or service on household utility is given by:  
 
dV h /dp i.  (2.5) 
 
Some public investments also impose implicit non-income taxes on households; for example, 




move and affects poor resourced households more than better-resourced households (Guild 
2000). 
 
The impacts discussed herewith are consistent with the view of development as improved 
capabilities advanced by Sen (1981). 
 
The discussion in this section shows that impacts of public investment can be analysed at a 
highly disaggregated level. Such an approach allows for differential impact of public 
investment across firms and households, and the ‘indirect’ effects of public investment, which 
arise through changes in the relative price of goods and services. These effects are likely to be 
more significant in practice. 
 
Empirical Studies of Infrastructure and Development 
The empirical studies on these relationships can be viewed from two perspectives. First are 
studies that address sectoral development in terms of productivity of infrastructure, its 
complementarity with private capital, and its effect on firm location. Second are studies that 
address social development in terms of income, access to services, and consumption of 
services. 
 
i. Sectoral development 
The evidence is clear that public capital boosts sectoral development through national and 
regional growth of output, employment, and total factor productivity. Aschauer (1989) first 
showed a very high impact of core infrastructure (roads, power, water, and sanitation). Munnell 
(1990) then showed that the impact of public capital was roughly equal to that of private capital. 
These results show that investment in public capital has a very high payoff with an output 
elasticity of 0.33. An output elasticity of 0.33 implies an annual return of 33 cents’ worth of 
economic activity for every dollar invested.  
 
In the manufacturing sector, Lee and Anas (1992) and Suarez-Villa and Hasnath (1993) find 
that aggregate infrastructure increase firm output and productivity by lowering costs, 
increasing the productivity of other factors of production, and increasing the rate of 
technological innovation. In the agricultural sector studies by Binswanger et al. (1993), Ahmed 






In the second major subset of sectoral impacts, infrastructure interacts with private capital in 
two ways. Scholars argue that if the availability of infrastructure increases the productivity of 
private factors, then it is a complement and should lead to greater private investments. 
However, if infrastructure substitutes for private capital, then investments in infrastructure will 
result in lower private investments. Guild (2000) reports that studies by Aschauer (1989), 
Binswanger et al. (1993), Eberts (1991), Eberts and Fogarty (1987), Looney and Winterford 
(1993), and Pradhan et al. (1990), find that infrastructure provision results in higher levels of 
private investment. 
 
ii. Social development 
The role of infrastructure in sectoral development suggests that its availability may be as 
important to individuals as it is to firms. The impacts of infrastructure on household welfare 
take several forms: income, access to services, and the consumption value of infrastructure. 
 
Households may realize higher incomes through productivity and increased opportunities for 
employment of their labour through better communications and transport. Duffy-Deno and 
Eberts (1989), who find that a dollar’s worth of infrastructure raises incomes about 10 cents. 
Ahmed and Hossain (1990) find higher incomes in developing country regions with better 
access to infrastructure. They demonstrated that the effect is due to increased opportunities for 
non-farm employment, higher wage employment in agriculture, and typically longer duration 
of employment. 
 
Investment in infrastructure projects also raises incomes through direct employment creation 
in construction and operations. Although not strictly long-term development, public works 
programs have often been used as countercyclical tools to counteract recession or accelerate 
growth. In confirmation, Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1989) find significant employment and 
multiplier effects though of limited duration. Rural households benefit through better terms of 
trade for their output and better access to public services. Ahmed and Hossain (1990) and Antle 
(1983, 1984) show positive effects on incomes due to higher farm gate prices for produce and 
attributed this to better transportation, communications, irrigation, and electricity in rural areas. 





The most direct impact on social welfare is through actual use of infrastructure services, as 
they are an important component of household consumption (Bahl and Linn 1992). Better 
infrastructure affects the mobility of individuals and thus their access to education, health care, 
and other social services (Oukhallou 2016, McAuley 2001, Van deWalle 1998). Transportation 
infrastructure in particular has a pervasive effect on access to employment and education and 
thus on alternative income opportunities. 
 
Lagging regions would most likely benefit from investments in social services such as health 
care and education in preparation for eventual expansion of productive capacity. Hansen 
(1965a, 1965b) confirm his thesis in two early studies in Europe. Later studies in the United 
States and Europe by Costa et al. (1987), Cutanda, and Paricio (1994) added further positive 
evidence. These findings have also been confirmed for developing countries by Looney and 
Frederiksen (1981), Ahmed and Hossain (1990), and Looney and Winterford (1993). The 
consensus is that existing disparities in regional development are related to differences in public 
capital. Taken together, these studies imply that infrastructure investments need to be targeted 
to levels of development as well as specific project objectives. They argue that infrastructure 
surpluses will do no good in lagging areas that are unlikely to develop anytime soon. Other 
studies also suggest that infrastructure investment has its largest impact when combined with 
other forms of productive public expenditure, such as effective education and health spending 
(Guild 2000). 
 
2.4 Community Based Natural Resources Management and welfare  
Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) programmes are incentive 
based natural resources management systems. The view that if communities are made to 
economically benefit from conserving natural resources they are more efficient than 
conservation without utilisation or national parks protectionist approach ( Bessette 2020, 
Tchakatumba et al. 2019, de Vette 2012, Hutton, et al. 2005).  
In southern Africa, Governments implemented community based natural resources 
management programmes in response to perceived unsustainable resources utilisation 
(Tchakatumba et al. 2019, Gandiwa 2013a). Earlier scholarship had suggested conservation 
through protecting natural resources from use by people (Hardin 1969). Hardin argues that 
communal natural resources in fragile environments are likely to be degraded as users compete 




a scenario he referred to as ‘the tragedy of the commons’. Hardin therefore suggests that 
governments should put in place strict measures to protect biodiversity. The influence of the 
‘tragedy of the commons’ thinking led to the creation of protected areas, largely national parks. 
Later studies however showed that governments do not have the capacity to monitor all 
protected areas and therefore had failed to harness people’s ‘resource degrading behaviour’ 
such as over harvesting, revenge killing and poaching (Chigonda 208, Murphree 2009). The 
later thinking, common property theory, which encompasses decentralisation, argues that 
people can sustainably conserve common resources when they own, manage, use and 
significantly benefit from the specified resources (Shereni 2020, Mudzengi 2020, Ostrom et al. 
2007, Ostrom 2007, 1992, 1990; Ostrom & Ostrom 1986; Murphree 2009, 2000, 1994, 1990; 
Olsson et al. 2004 and Chitsike 2000).   
In Zimbabwe, community-based wildlife management idea started in response to wildlife 
decline experienced in the 1960s due to increased poaching activities. Commercial farmers 
were shooting on sight and communal farmers using snares to protect their crops and livestock 
from wild animals (Macheka et al. 2020, Child 1996). In addition, the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference on biodiversity conservation encouraged natural resource management systems 
that benefit producer communities, especially those found around protected wildlife areas 
(Caldwell 1996). This led to a shift in wildlife policy in Zimbabwe, starting with the 1975 Parks 
and Wildlife Act (Taylor 2009, Lindsey et al. 2011). The Act allowed private commercial farm 
owners to utilise wildlife on their properties commercially. This culminated into the 
establishment of private wildlife conservancies (Mudzengi 2020, Lubilo 2018, Cumming 
1990). The approach saw an increase in the number of wildlife, and the concept was adapted 
for communal areas hence referred to as ‘Communal’ Areas Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) (Biggs 2019, Taylor 2009). The programme started in 
areas with high-value wildlife, targeting communities through their responsible Rural District 
Councils. To have rural communities engage in wildlife business, interested Rural District 
Councils apply for Appropriate Authority status from the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife 
Management Authority, now Parks and Wildlife Authority (Mudzendi 2020). As a pre-
requisite, the Rural District Councils  are to commit to transfer the wildlife management and 
benefits to sub-district administrative units such as wards or villages, referred popularly as 
producer communities as they live with and promote production of wildlife.  By 2009, 57 of 
the 63 rural district councils were implementing the programme at different intensities and for 




In Mbire district, former Lower Guruve CAMPFIRE programme started to be implement in 
1988 (Taylor 2009, Muchapondwa 2003). Ideally, under CAMPFIRE arrangement, elected 
committees manage realised income. Households in participating communities benefit either 
directly or indirectly. Direct benefits take the form of cash dividends and food, such as meat 
from trophy hunting, problem animals or meat quota. Indirectly households and individuals 
benefit by access to education and health services. Cash dividends were popular at the 
beginning of the CAMPFIRE programme (Tchakatumba et al. 2019, Taylor 2009, Hutton et al. 
2005). However, communities increasingly invested larger proportions of wildlife income in 
public infrastructure because of increasing population sizes in beneficiary communities. 
Household cash dividends became insignificant (Hutton et al. 2005). More so, as public funds 
distribution of benefits is more prudent by investing in public goods and services (Jones   2007, 
2004 & Jones B. 2006).   
Empirical studies in Southern Africa demonstrate the varied impact of the community based 
natural resources management programmes. In Zambia for example, Bandyopadhyay and 
Tembo (2010) determine the impact of community based wildlife management and 
participation in community institutions on food consumption expenditure. Results show that 
gains for living in Game Management Areas were large but unevenly distributed and that the 
gains accrue mainly to the relatively well-resourced households. They also show that 
infrastructure does not necessarily translate into short-term household level gains. In Namibia 
Riehl et al. (2015) and de Vette (2012) find mixed effects of CBNRM programmes at the 
household level. They find that CBRNM programmes have positive effects on malaria 
prevention, negative effects on school attendance and household wealth, and no effect on 
diarrhoea prevalence. In Zimbabwe, a number of socio-economic evaluations such as  Harrison 
et al. (2014) and Muchapondwa (2003) find little evidence of community based natural 
resources management impact on poverty reduction.   
Public investment theory purports that investing in public goods has a positive impact on the 
welfare of individuals, increasing access for less resourced people (Wilhelm and Fiestas 2005), 
and therefore addresses the equity challenges. From the Theory of Change perspective and 
supply-demand theory (Baram 2019, Rockett et al. 2008) I envision that: ‘if a community 
participates in community based wildlife management and invests in public infrastructure such 
as schools and related social support and related expenditure, individual costs are lowered and 
demand for education services increase: leading to increased access and utilisation of public 




There has also been pressure to increase public investment in developing countries to improve 
less resourced people’s welfare (Rajaram et al. 2014, Anderson et al. 2006). Anderson et al. 
(2006) explore the possible micro-economic effects of public investment, on household 
income, poverty and income distribution. Their findings show that public investments have 
positive impact on household welfare, though there is no clear agreement on the extent or scope 
(Garcia-Milà & McGuire 2018). 
 
2.5 CAMPFIRE Treatment Effect on education  
Treatment effect literature evaluates policy or programme impact or effect on population of 
interest. It investigates average impact of policies or programmes that have partial participation 
at some point (Heckman and Vytlacil 2001). This creates a natural experimental design where 
one part is affected and the other is not. This can therefore be manipulated to assess the impact 
of an intervention or programme. In this case there would be  a treatment group that is affected 
or participating in the programme and a comparison group or counter-factual that is not 
participating, which can be used as a control group (Heckman and Vytlacil 2001; Lechner 
2015). One can therefore answer how policy or programme induced changes affect specific 
aspects of the population of interest. Thus, we can use the estimated response to the variation 
in observed policy changes to produce internally valid estimators.  
Assume: 
  is an education outcome (education participation) that an individual experience 
when s/he participates in a programme such as CAMPFIRE. 
  is the education outcome (education participation) experienced when an 
individual does not participate in the programme.  
The programme impact would therefore be the difference in outcomes of variable X when 
participating and not participating. The estimator:  
    (2.6) 
Where the  is taken across the population of interest. 
However, because one cannot observe the same individual at the same time participating and 




sample to the average of non-participating/comparison/counter-factual or control group that is 
not in the programme, as specified below. 
Thus, one can consider average treatment effect on the treated, ATET: 
   (2.7) 
Where  is a binary indicator of programme impact that equals 1 if an individual participates 
and 0 otherwise. ATET captures the effect of the programme on those who actually 
participated. If it were possible to observe outcomes for a representative sample of members 
of N individuals randomly selected from the population of interest, the average treatment effect 
would be: 
  (2.8) 
 
Post-test only control group design for community based natural resources management 
Post-test control group design is used were impact of a treatment is observed after some time. 
I use the post-test only control group design for this paper, to consider the impact of the 
CAMPFIRE programme induced changes on school-going-age children’s participation in 
formal education. Outcomes are observed after more than two and a half decades of the 
programme implementation. The population is sorted into treatment and comparison groups 
were the treated are the sub-district units (wards), that are implementing the programme, and 
the comparison group are the wards that did not implement the programme. The design suits 
well into experimental design as the individuals or households in the two groups differ only in 
terms of programme implementation that targeted sub-district administrative units with high 
value wildlife. The characteristics of households in implementing and non-implementing wards 
are largely the same. For example, environmental conditions, ethnicity, etc are more or less the 
same, from which similar households can be discerned. Furthermore, treatment and control 
groups are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. That is no household belongs to both subgroups 
and every household belong either to one or to the other group.  





Where EP indicates the level of participation of the child in formal education; i, is the school 
going age child from the treatment or comparison population (CAMPFIRE or non-CAMPFIRE 
wards respectively).  
We evaluate whether public investments by the communal areas management programme for 
indigenous resources (CAMPFIRE) programme have had an impact on children’s school 
participation rate.  Anecdotal evidence from education reports generally show that participation 
and enrolment rates are lower in marginal, ‘CAMPFIRE’ wards compared to non-CAMPFIRE 
wards in Mbire district (UNICEF 2015).  Traditionally there has been less infrastructural 
investment by pre and post-independence governments in most marginal areas. However, when 
the CAMPFIRE programme started there have been huge public investments by the programme 
in education, health and road infrastructure over and above government support. (Jones   2004). 
Post-independence government supported the initiative but in a similar manner across the 
country.  The expectation is that with the implementation of the programme the enrolment rate 
and therefore participation in education for children of school going age has over the years 
either matched or exceeded non-CAMPFIRE wards in the district.      
We therefore observe EPi for random samples of size N1 from CAMPFIRE implementing 
wards and N0 from non-CAMPFIRE wards. The estimator is:  
     (2.9) 
Thus, the programme impact is estimated by the difference in mean outcomes between the 
treatment and comparison groups after application. The post-test only control group design can 
yield an unbiased estimate of treatment impact (Heckman and Vytlacil 2001, Lechner 2015).  
However, there are always within and between group heterogeneity or selection bias making 
simple comparison of means less robust. To correct for confounding factors I use propensity 
score estimation to allow comparison of units with similar background characteristics,  
(Austin 2011).  
  
∆𝜇 = 𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 + 𝑆𝐵           (2.10) 
 
Where: 




𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 is the average treatment effect on the treated 
𝑆𝐵 is the selection bias 
The propensity score theorem states that the outcome is independent of treatment given 
background characteristics: 
 𝑌1𝑖 , 𝑌0𝑖 ⊥ 𝐷𝑖|𝑃(𝑋𝑖)    (2.11) 
or 
𝐸𝑃1𝑖 , 𝐸𝑃0𝑖 ⫫ 𝐷𝑖│𝑃(𝑋𝑖)   (2.12) 
 
Where:  is outcome when treated, 𝐸𝑃1𝑖  is education production when in a CAMPFIRE area 
 is outcome if not treated, 𝐸𝑃0𝑖  is education production if not in a CAMPFIRE area. 
 Selecting into treatment 
Expected causal effect on the treated would therefore be: 
𝐸[𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1]  (2.13) 
or using the law of iterated expectation: 
𝐸[𝐸[𝑌1𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑃(𝑥𝑖) − 𝐸[𝑌0𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑃(𝑥𝑖)]|𝐷𝑖 = 1  (2.14) 
Treated and untreated units are matched using background characteristics,  – propensity 
score. Propensity score model allows regrouping observations into strata of similar background 
characteristics or propensity scores, and means for each stratum is calculated. I use nearest 
neighbour matching to group/stratify the sub-samples around generated propensity scores 
(Austin 2011). To estimate the average treatment effect across the entire sample I weigh the 
average for each stratum: 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 ≈ ∑ 𝜇𝑌1𝑠𝑠 − 𝜇𝑌0𝑠  (2.15) 
 𝜇𝑌1𝑆 Average for treated sample,  
 𝜇𝑌0𝑆 Average for the untreated sample 
We match the treated group, children living in CAMPFIRE programme areas with a non-





2.6 Education production function and CAMPFIRE  
Education production function is an application of the economic concept of the cobb-douglas 
production to the field of education (Coates 2003, Hanushek 1995, Gyimah-Brempong and 
Gyapong 1991, Bowles 1970). It relates inputs affecting education production or output. I adapt 
the same approach and include community based natural resources management as a fixed 
input in the production function to see whether it influences children’s participation in formal 
education. In addition, I argue that the programme has an effect of making socio-economic 
characteristics of children less important in the production of education, as the programme 
takes over the role of parents through public provision of education. I presume therefore, that 
socio-economic characteristics of parents, level of education or wealth, for example (Gyimah-
Brempong and Gyapong 1991) are premised to be important variables for non-participating 
communities compared to communities participating in community based wildlife 
management programme. Thus, I apply the model to treatment and comparison groups to see 
if changes caused by the programme affect the role of parent characteristics on education 
production. I consider education as a production process in which inputs such as community 
resources for example fees, infrastructure (X), and household socioeconomic characteristics 
(Z) factors to produce education outputs, participation EP. 
The education production function thus takes the form of:  
    (2.16) 
Or in stochastic terms: 
   (2.17) 
 Where education participation is a function of observed (covariates) and unobserved (random 
disturbance) factors. 
I assume that each observed value of  is the sum of observed variables, and unobserved 
captured by the random term, . The equation attempts to estimate unknown parameters,   
and . Running the model for the treatment and comparison group or controlling for 
treatment/comparison gives the contribution of each covariate to changes in education 




Using Shapiro-wilk and Shapiro-Francia test for normality, education production variable was 
not normally distributed.  The data was normalised by squaring the education production (Table 
2-2).   
Table 2-2: Shapiro-wilk and Shapiro-Francia tests for normal data 
Variable: squared 
education production Observations W/W' V/V' z Prob>z 
Shapiro-wilk test 613 0.9959 1.659 1.228 0.10971 
Shapiro-Francia test 613 0.99605 1.706 1.202 0.11462 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The model then takes the form:   
 𝐸𝑃𝑖
2 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥 + 𝛽𝑧 + 𝜀  (2.18) 
2.7 Hypotheses 
Wards with high value wildlife are coming from a relatively worse-off position, but after almost 
three decades of benefiting from the programme the hypothesis is that they have reached or 
surpassed education production level that would obtain if they were not subjected to the 
CAMPFIRE programme treatment. Thus, (1) school-going age children participation in 
education is higher when treated to CAMPFIRE programme than when not treated, or at the 











𝑖=1 |𝐷 = 1  (2.19) 
Where  is education production output for children when they are subjected to CAMPFIRE 
programme and  is education production output for children if they are not treated to the 
CAMPFIRE programme.  Alternatively:  
The null hypothesis is that CAMPFIRE has an effect on children’s school participation and 











𝑗=1 ≥ 0  (2.20) 











𝑗=1 < 0  (2.21) 
I further hypothesized that (2) socio-economic characteristics are less important in influencing 




education subsidies associated with the treated group. Thus, we expect the co-efficiencies of 
the socioeconomic characteristics to be zero.     
 𝛽1 = 0|𝑋1    (2.22) 
Where are socioeconomic characteristics such as parent education, household income, 
household size, gender of household head, and child sex, and   is the contribution of 
socioeconomic characteristics to child participation in formal education for the treatment or 
counterfactual group.  
2.8 Research methods 
The dependent variable is the measure of school participation by children aged 5 to 16 years. 
There is no specific continuous variable measuring the level of participation in formal 
education for individual children of school-going age. I developed a tentative measure 
extending the years in school concept from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics ( Potancokova 
and Goujon 2014;Stukel and Feroz-Zada 2010; Perelman and Santin 2011; Rothstein 2008; ). 
Years of schooling are used for population of age 25 and above to calculate the average years 
of schooling for a given population. I extended the concept to children of school-going age for 
basic education in the country, 5-16 years in Zimbabwe. Basic education in Zimbabwe is 
covered in 12 years; 1 year for grade 0, 7 years to complete primary education and 4 years to 
complete lower secondary education. I conceptualise full participation in education as enrolling 
into education at the right age and proceeding in the right grade-for-age throughout the 
schooling period (Potancokova and Goujon 2014). Non-participation entails being of school 
going age but never attended/enrolled into formal school.  
Variation in participation would come through dropping out and repeating, and is catered for 
as years in school are calculated by the number of years expected to complete each grade rather 
than the actual years spent in school. A child for example who is 10 years old is expected to 
have spent 6 years in school and should be in grade 5; 1 year in grade 0 at age 5, and 5 years 
transiting from grade 1 through to 5. However, if he/she is in grade 4 after repeating, the child 
is considered to have spent five years in school, instead of six. In terms of participation the 
child would be at 5/6 or 0.83 point out of the possible 1 as he has spent 5 years in school instead 
of the 6 years expected at his or her age. From this conceptualisation, one can calculate the 
relative participation in education for an individual school-going age child using the child’s 
age (for expected years in school), current grade or grade child dropped out of school system 




years that the school-going age child is expected to have been in school at his or her current 
age.  
The expected years in school, for the current grade is the number of years the child is expected 
to have completed each grade. Table 2-3 shows the number of years expected to complete each 
grade/form, and the official age for each grade/form in Zimbabwe. 
Table 2-3: School level by years to complete and official age 
School level Grade/form  Years to complete level Official age for grade/form 
Pre-primary (Grade) 0 1 5 
Primary (Grade)  1 2 6 
2 3 7 
3 4 8 
4 5 9 
5 6 10 
6 7 11 
7 8 12 
Lower secondary (Form) 1 9 13 
2 10 14 
3 11 15 
4 12 16 
(Sources: Adapted from Zimbabwe Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education 2013) 
Thus the individual child’s participation in education would be the official years to reach 
current grade ( expressed as a proportion of expected years in school for the child’s age (




|5 ≤ 𝑎𝑖 ≤ 16  (2.23) 
Where  is the age of an individual child  
The education participation scale varies between 0 and 1, with 0 representing a child who is of 
school-going age but has never enrolled into school system, and 1 a school-going age child in 
the correct grade for her/his age. In exceptional cases a score above 1 shows a child of school 
going age who is a year or more above his/ her grade for her age; younger than the official age 
for the grade in which s/he is in.th conceptualisation allows comparison of children of different 
ages. 
Data for the paper was collected using the survey method. Appendix D and E show the 
individual question items that were administered . Table 2-4 shows education inputs, household 




Table 2-4: Education production inputs 
Household social characteristics Household economic characteristics Community economics 
Child sex (0=female, 1=male) Salaried agric industry (0=No 1=Yes) Primary school fees (USD) 
Child age 
Salaried non-agric industry (0=No 
1=Yes) Secondary school fees (USD) 
Orphan 
Salaried wildlife industry (0=No 
0=Yes) Cross a river to school (0=No 1=Yes) 
Double orphan Number of cattle Distance to school (m) 
Household resident period (years) Number of donkeys 
Cross wildlife area to school (0=No 
1=Yes) 
Household size Number of goats  
Household head sex (0=female, 
1=male) Number of poultry 
 
Household head years in school    
Ethnicity   
Religion 
Marital status of household head 
  
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Social characteristics consisted of household demographics such as sex and marital status of 
household head as well as household size. It also includes child related characteristics as 
possible determinants of participation in formal education. Economic characteristics centred 
mainly on asset accumulation such as livestock units owned.  
Ethnicity has affects demand for education. The assumption is that different ethnic groups have 
different encounters with education systems and therefore collected ethnic affiliations of 
children’s household.  Religion was premised to have an influence in a number of household 
decisions including children’s participation in education. The hypothesis is that religion 
influences parents’ decisions on whether to send and support children’s education. 
At community level, determinant factors collected were mainly user fees, distance to school 
and presence of other physical barriers such as rivers and wildlife. Key informant interviews 
were also conducted with school authorities. Data on historical income for CAMPFIRE 









Table 2-5 shows income that the two sample wards generated between 2009 and 2015. It was 
reported that at least 60 per cent of the income in wards 2 and 11 was invested in public 
infrastructure. The council reported that it was in a bid to push to 75 per cent the proportion 
that has to go to public investment. 
Table 2-5: CAMPFIRE income by ward (USD) 
Year Ward 2 (US$) Ward 11 (US$) 
2009 * * 
2010 * 84, 361.00 
2011 45, 000.00 92, 360.00 
2012 40, 000.00 84, 326.00 
2013 47, 000.00 73, 000.00 
2014 50, 000.00  72, 000.00 
2015 40, 000.00 53, 000.00 
 *figures were not available 
Source: Survey data December 2015: Ward CAMPFIRE committee financial record books – Treasurers  
In CAMPFIRE communities, school structures are easily constructed and maintained with no 
direct cost on parents. Meanwhile non-CAMPFIRE communities were struggling to invest in 
infrastructure. School heads interviewed reported that schools in both CAMPFIRE and Non-
CAMPFIRE areas get the same support from the government, for example through the School 
Improvement Grant (SIG) that is funded by UNICEF or from other interested organisations 
such as Campaign for Female Education (CAMFED) programme targeted at assisting 
disadvantaged girls. The government, depending on school enrolment, for example, directly 
employs all teachers. School development committees are responsible for any extra staff.  
Key informants at schools in CAMPFIRE wards reported that they get financial support from 
CAMPFIRE programme to run day-to-day school activities. Of particular note is support 
towards sporting activities. Schools in CAMPFIRE areas, wards 2 and 11, reported that they 
submit their budgets to their respective CAMPFIRE committees and would usually get the 
financial support they need. In addition, all schools in CAMPFIRE wards get funding from 
CAMPFIRE for extra labour costs. CAMPFIRE income, for example, pays for the general staff 
such as guards.  The community also use CAMPFIRE income to subsidise education. In 
Masoka for example education costs are fully funded and children do not pay school fees. In 
Angwa, Ward 2 school fees are lower than in the control wards. CAMPFIRE income also 
supports children who excel at O level, who wish to proceed to ‘A’ level, and further to 




level income sources to support infrastructural development and welfare of school children. 
Parents have to contribute towards any school related infrastructural projects. The government 
through the Public Works Department mainly sponsored most infrastructures in Non-
CAMPFIRE wards. Informant interviewees reported that parents directly fund any other local 
level contribution.         
 
2.9.2 Descriptive statistics 
Masoka and Angwa sub-district units, from which the treatment sample was drawn, started 
implementing CAMPFIRE programme in the late 1980s. Table 2-6 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in the education production model and variation between 
treatment and comparison groups. The level of significance is based on an unequal variance t-
test between means.  
Table 2-6: Children's social characteristics 
Variable Full sample  
Non-
campfire Campfire Sig. 
Social characteristics 
   
 
Child sex (0=female, 1=male) 0.47 0.44 0.50 .047 
Child age 10.41 10.51 10.31 .753 
Orphan 0.05 0.07 0.04 .000 
Double orphan 0.04 0.06 0.03 .000 
Household resident period (years) 25.45 18.18 32.73 .046 
Household size 5.73 5.67 5.78 .664 
Household head sex (0=female, 1=male) 0.82 0.81 0.84 .019 
Household head years in school  6.33 7.23 5.43 .307 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The sample has significantly more girls than boys. Non-CAMPFIRE areas have significantly 
higher proportion of girls than boys compared to CAMPFIRE areas. There is also a 
significantly higher proportion of orphans and double orphans in Non-CAMPFIRE areas than 
CAMPFIRE areas. All the other social characteristics are similar between comparison and 
treatment samples.  
Table 2-7 shows sample children’s ethnicities. Proportions of different ethnic groups are 
significantly different between Non-CAMPFIRE and CAMPFIRE areas. CAMPFIRE areas 
have significantly higher proportion of Doma and Korekore ethnicities, meanwhile Karanga 




Table 2-7: Ethnicity of sample children 
Variable Full sample  
Non-
campfire Campfire Sig. 
Ethnicity 
   
 
Doma 0.09 0.05 0.13 .000 
Karanga 0.07 0.13 0.02 .000 
Korekore 0.56 0.47 0.65 .000 
Zezuru 0.12 0.20 0.04 .000 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Table 2-8 shows the religious affiliation of sample children’s households. 
Table 2-8: Religious affiliation of children’s households 
Variable Full sample  
Non-
campfire Campfire Sig. 
Religion 
   
 
Apostolic 0.30 0.44 0.16 0.000 
Christian gatherings 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.000 
Muslim 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.000 
No religion 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.000 
Pentecostal 0.14 0.17 0.11 0.000 
Protestant 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.745 
Roman catholic 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.721 
Traditional 0.28 0.10 0.46 0.000 
 
The religious affiliations significantly differ between CAMPFIRE and Non-CAMPFIRE areas. 
Non-CAMPFIRE areas have significantly higher proportions of Apostolic, Muslim, 
Pentecostal and households that claimed to have no religious affiliation. CAMPFIRE areas 











Table 2-9: Household and community economic characteristics 
Variable Full sample  
Non-
campfire Campfire Sig. 
Household economic characteristics     
Salaried agric industry (0=No 1=Yes) 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.000 
Salaried non-agric industry (0=No 1=Yes) 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.000 
Salaried wildlife industry (0=No 0=Yes) 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.000 
Number of cattle 2.69 4.92 0.45 0.000 
Number of donkeys 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.014 
Number of goats 4.73 6.07 3.39 0.000 
Number of poultry 5.24 5.19 5.29 0.713 
Community economics 
   
 
Primary school fees (USD) 10.28 12.28 8.27 0.000 
Secondary school fees (USD) 31.61 45.82 17.41 0.000 
Cross a river to school (0=No 1=Yes) 0.56 0.36 0.75 0.000 
Distance to school (m) 3379.61 3487.14 3272.08 0.170 
Cross wildlife area to school (0=No 1=Yes) 0.56 0.37 0.75 0.000 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Availability and direct cost of education significantly differ between CAMPFIRE and non-
CAMPFIRE areas for both primary and secondary education. In CAMPFIRE areas, a 
significantly larger proportion of children cross wildlife area or a river to get to school. 
However, the distance to school is similar in CAMPFIRE and non-CAMPFIRE areas, with an 
average of approximately 3 km.   
2.9.3 Impact of living in CAMPFIRE area on education production 
On average education, output for sample children is 63 per cent of full production. Thus, 
children in the sample are not participating fully in education (Table 2-10).  The non-treated 
sub-samples have the highest and lowest education output; Hambe ward has the highest and 
Majongwe ward has the least.  
Table 2-10: Children's participation level in education by ward 





Treatment  Masoka 0.63 117 0.321 0.103 
 Angwa 0.62 201 0.343 0.117 
Comparison Hambe 0.67 144 0.340 0.116 
 Majongwe 0.60 151 0.305 0.093 
Total 0.63 613 0.329 0.108 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
On average, the treatment group has slightly less education production compared to the 




more in education compared to children living in CAMPFIRE programme implementing 
wards.  
I tested the variance in education participation for the sample children using the T-test 
procedure and a test value of 1 representing the expected attendance rate for each child. Results 
show that attendance is 0.628, which is significantly lower than 1 with a standard deviation of 
0.329 and a standard error of 0.013.    
To test whether there are differences in children’s participation in education between children 
living in CAMPFIRE areas and those in Non-CAMPFIRE areas, the Leven’s Test for equality 
of variance (Table 2-11) and regression discontinuity (Table 2-12) were used. Results show 
that there are no significant differences in education participation between treatment and 
comparison group. The null hypothesis is therefore plausible; that education participation rate 
of children living in CAMPFIRE programme implementing areas is equal to or greater than 
that for children living in non-CAMPFIRE programme areas.   
Table 2-11: Test for equality of education participation means between children living in CAMPFIRE areas and Non-
CAMPFIRE areas 
 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Table 2-12: Participation rate in education, regression discontinuity 
Participation 
rate in education Coefficient 
Standard 
error t P>t 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
CAMPFIRE -0.010 0.027 -0.36 0.722 -0.062 0.043 
Constant 0.633 0.019 33 0 0.595 0.671 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
However, the above conclusion assumes that treatment and control groups are homogenous. 
Treatment and control populations are in fact heterogeneous. Groups with different 
characteristics would respond differently to the same treatment. Using regression adjustment, 
other confounding factors were controlled. These include children’s age, sex, parent education, 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
        
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Participation 
rate in 







Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed 2.095 0.148 0.356 611 0.722 0.010 0.027 -0.043 0.062 




ethnicity and household asset ownership that seem to be different between the treatment and 
control groups. The sign for campfire becomes positive, indicating that there are other 
confounding factors affecting children’s participation in education.   
In order to correct for this heterogeneity, the treatment and control sub-samples were matched 
using propensity score matching procedure. The propensity score model was first estimated 
using the treatment dummy variable campfire, where  if treated and  otherwise. 
To match the following variables were used: sex of child, whether they cross wildlife area or 
river going to school, household ownership of goats and poultry and distance to school. The 
model is robust at 95% confidence level and the balancing property of the propensity score is 















Table 2-13: Internally homogenous groups 
 Matched groups     





Participation rate in education 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.69 0.74 0.75 
Number of cattle 3.85 3.23 2.95 1.08 0.97 2.29 
Number of donkeys 0.40 0.03 0.30 0.18 0.16 0.16 
Number of goats/sheep 8.00 4.12 4.57 2.12 4.17 4.12 
Number of poultry 7.98 4.94 5.79 3.71 6.69 5.46 
Child age (years) 11.55 11.29 11.84 9.96 10.27 10.88 
Distance to school (km) 5,088 2,639 4,526 3,684 2,506 3,335 
Education expenditure (USD) 46.13 30.41 40.38 14.72 18.29 27.24 
Residence period (years) 19.70 22.61 23.74 45.10 22.99 27.36 
Household size 5.83 5.43 5.87 6.27 5.49 5.72 
Head Years In School 5.54 6.73 6.18 5.91 6.60 6.33 
 Proportion 
Girls  62.50 53.19 62.30 53.76 38.71 52.34 
Orphan 5.00 6.30 6.60 3.20 2.15 4.67 
Education assistance 14.29 6.79 6.67 12.22 19.78 11.46 
Diaspora 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 
Urban 17.50 21.28 16.39 12.90 30.11 20.33 
Head sex: female 35.00 24.11 13.11 9.68 13.98 18.22 
Doma 0.00 3.55 3.28 17.20 12.90 8.18 
Karanga 5.00 12.77 9.84 2.15 4.30 7.48 
Korekore 70.00 47.52 60.66 50.54 64.52 55.84 
Zezuru 15.00 15.60 16.39 8.60 1.08 10.98 
Apostolic 62.50 33.33 24.59 22.58 23.66 30.37 
Christian gatherings 0.00 1.42 0.00 7.53 13.98 5.14 
No religion 2.50 13.48 9.84 5.38 3.23 7.94 
Pentecostal 12.50 9.22 21.31 9.68 15.05 12.62 
Roman Catholic 0.00 0.71 1.64 3.23 2.15 1.64 
Traditional religion 7.50 19.15 31.15 36.56 27.96 25.47 
Wildlife wage labour 7.50 6.38 3.28 10.75 20.43 10.05 
Non-Agricultural wage labour 40.00 25.71 42.62 32.97 44.09 35.06 
Cross river  10.00 10.64 78.69 97.85 86.02 55.61 
Cross wildlife area 7.50 17.73 32.79 54.84 80.65 40.65 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The five internally homogenous groups have the following characteristics (Table 2-13). The 
sub-groups 1 to 5 have propensity scores of 0.08, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 respectively. Group 1 
has more livestock units and on average has longer distance, 5km to cover to get to school 
compared to all other groups. The group also has the highest per capita expenditure on 
education, USD46.13 per year and has the least residence period, approximately 20 years. The 
group also has the highest proportion of female-headed households. However, approximately 
10 per cent of the children in group 1 cross a river or wildlife areas to get to school.  
On the other end, groups 4 and 5 have the least livestock ownership, though group 5 is second 




education. Group 4 has the longest resident period, 45 years. Groups 4 and 5 have the highest 
proportion of children who cross-rivers or wildlife area to get to school.        
In comparing group means across strata between treatment and control groups, more treated 
groups have higher mean participation rate (Table 2-14). In three out of the five groups, 
children living in CAMPFIRE areas participate more in education than similar children living 
in Non-CAMPFIRE areas.   





Mean participation rate Mean participation rate  Mean difference  
1 0.817 0.727 0.090 
2 0.820 0.754 0.066 
3 0.783 0.815 -0.032 
4 0.685 0.705 -0.020 
5 0.756853 0.598214 0.158638 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Running Average Treatment Effect of the Treated using nearest neighbour matching, ATETND 
all 318 treated observations were successfully matched with 174 observations from the control 
group/ Non-CAMPFIRE areas. ATET results show that there is 12.3% higher education 
production under treatment compared to if they are not treated or under the programme (Table 
2-15).  
 
Table 2-15: Average Treatment on the Treated using nearest neighbour matching, ATETND 
Children in 
treatment. 
Children in control 
matches. ATT Std. Err. t 
318 174 0.123 0.074 1.666 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
In other words, compared to children with similar socioeconomic background characteristics 
living in Non-CAMPFIRE programme areas, children living in CAMPFIRE areas participate 
more in education. The conclusion is that if the programme were not implemented one would 
expect children participation in education to be significantly lower. Using this evidence 
CAMPFIRE programme has a positive and significant causal effect on school participation or 
education production. The hypothesis that the programme increases education production for 




However, while the matching procedure has shown that the programme might be working in 
improving access to education for children living in CAMPFIRE areas compared to if the 
programme was not implemented; it does not show the effects of other confounding inputs and 
interaction between covariates and treatment. Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) was 
run to estimate interaction of CAMPFIRE with socioeconomic and school inputs in the 
production of education. FGLS is a procedure to estimate unknown parameters in a linear 
regression model (Greene 2002). It is a more efficient method compared to Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). However, heteroscedasticity cannot be ruled out, as outliers are unavoidable. 
This is catered for by using FGLS, estimating hhat=exp(ghat) then running the WLS using 
weight 1/hhat.(Greene 2002). 
  First, I ran the correlation test of all inputs against education production output. The following 
inputs are significantly correlated with education production output (Table 2-16): 
Table 2-16: Education production inputs correlation test 
Education inputs  Corr. Coefficient Sig. 
Child sex -0.103 0.011 
Child age 0.322 0.000 
Karanga 0.078 0.054 
Pentecostal 0.072 0.075 
Protestant 0.089 0.027 
Traditional -0.103 0.011 
Household head schooling years 0.101 0.013 
Number of cattle 0.078 0.055 
Number of donkeys 0.088 0.029 
Number of goats/sheep 0.133 0.001 
Number of poultry 0.182 0.000 
Number of hoes/axes 0.232 0.000 
Number of ploughs 0.142 0.001 
Livelihoods: wildlife 0.079 0.052 
Livelihoods: salary 0.134 0.001 
Livelihoods: sell wildlife -0.154 0.000 
Primary age -0.196 0.000 
Secondary age 0.196 0.000 
Cross river to school -0.076 0.089 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The education production was tested to find if it is normally distributed. Figure 1 shows that it 















The education variable was standardised by squaring and when tested using the Kernel density 
estimation the result yielded a normal distribution curve (Figure 2). 
Figure 1: Kernel density estimation - education participation rate (Sources: Survey 



















The inputs are regressed and using BETA procedure to transform the coefficients into z-
standard units to weigh the importance of each input in education production function. The 
hypothesis is that socioeconomic inputs do not affect the production of education and therefore 
the estimate would be 0. The full models are presented in Appendix A, Table 86, and include 
all the possible socioeconomic and school inputs. The results show that when all the covariates 
are included the model can explain 46 per cent of education production variation.  
The model with all covariates shows that implementing CAMPFIRE programme increases 
education production by approximately 12 per cent. The importance of CAMPFIRE location 
is positive and significant. The second important factor is ethnicity and shows that children 
whose parents are of ethnicities other than Doma are more likely to participate in education. 
Religion has no effect on the production of education while ownership of goats and poultry 
contributes significantly. Of the school inputs interrogated, crossing wildlife area to get to 





school reduces education production by approximately 11 per cent. If specific location effect 
is included, Masoka has the highest effect, increase education production by 48 per cent or 
0.998 in z-score units.   
However, if only variables with significant correlation to education production are included the 
model explains approximately 16 per cent of the education production or output (Table 2-17).   
Table 2-17: Education production model of covariates that are significantly correlated to squared education production  
Education Participation Rate Coeffient 
Standard 
error 
t P>t Beta 
Campfire 0.062 0.029 2.150 0.032 0.157 
Distance to school 0.000 0.000 1.570 0.118 0.091 
Cross river to school -0.028 0.022 -1.310 0.191 -0.071 
Primary fees 0.008 0.003 2.920 0.004 0.222 
Secondary fees -0.001 0.000 -2.120 0.034 -0.150 
Child sex -0.043 0.018 -2.390 0.017 -0.108 
Child age -0.012 0.003 -3.860 0.000 -0.189 
Cross wildlife area -0.084 0.022 -3.800 0.000 -0.209 
Education expenditure 20015 0.001 0.000 3.430 0.001 0.183 
Number of goats 0.001 0.001 1.740 0.082 0.089 
Number of poultry 0.005 0.001 3.240 0.001 0.160 
Employment 0.123 0.041 3.020 0.003 0.144 
Constant 0.705 0.070 10.060 0.000   
Education output: children education participation rate   
R-square=0.183, Adjusted R-squared=0.159 n=420  
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
 
Table 2-18 shows results for models with varying covariates with normalized education 
production (squared education production). The results show that if the model includes 
all variables without standardizing education production the model explains 26 percent of 
the variation in education output. However, when education production variable is 
normalised and all variables are included in the model approximately 22 percent of 
variation is explained. On the other hand, when programme variable (CAMPFIRE) is 
excluded from the model and the education production is normalized 20 percent of the 









Table 2-18: Education production model results  
    
 Model parameters EduPart  squared EduPart squared eduPart square EduPart 
Number of obs  425 425 425 425 
F( 32,   392)         5.67 6.92 6.43 12.52 
Prob > F               0 0 0 0 
R-squared          0.3163 0.2637 0.2467 0.183 
Adj R-squared  0.2604 0.2213 0.1995 0.159 
Root MSE            0.17199 0.24819 0.25071 0.255 
variables all var. all var. campfire var excl corr. Var 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Table 2-19 shows the marginal effects of each of the covariates on education production if the 
model is run for each sub-sample. Results show that school input and socioeconomic inputs 





Table 2-19: Socioeconomic inputs in education production by treatment and control sub-samples 
 
       Treatment  Control  
Squared Education 
participation rate 
Masoka Angwa Hambe Majongwe 
Coeffient Coeffient Coeffient Coeffient 
School inputs     
Distance to school 0.000 
(2.230) 
 9.49e-06  
(5.42e-06) 
 1.1e-04  
(1.46e-05) 
 3.68e06  
(8.84e-06) 
Primary fees - - -  0.014  
(0.028) 
Secondary fees -  4.9e-04  
(0.022) 
 02.1e-04  
(0.002) 
 4.4e-04  
(0.001) 
Cross river  -0.133**  
(0.052) 
 -0.051  
(0.042) 
 0.063  
(0.048) 
 -3.73e-04  
(0.038) 
Cross wildlife area  -0.107*  
(0.056) 
 0.004  
(0.034) 
 0.022  
(0.151) 
 -0.034  
(0.038) 
Household socioeconomic inputs     
Child sex (Male =1)  -0.016  
(0.042) 
 -0.032  
(0.028) 
 0.003  
(0.032) 
 -0.081*  
(0.038) 
Child age  -0.023***  
(0.007) 
 -0.019***  
(0.005) 
 -0.009  
(0.005) 
 -0.007  
(0.007) 
Education expenditure 2015  0.003***  
(0.001) 
 0.002**  
(0.001) 
 0.001*  
(0.0005)) 
 0.001  
(0.000) 
Number of goats -1.2E-05 
(0.004) 
 0.009**  
(0.003) 
 -2.78e-05  
(0.003) 
 0.001  
(0.001)  
Number of poultry  0.005  
(0.004) 
 0.003*  
(0.002) 




Employment (wildlife)  0.182***  
(0.054) 
 0.036  
(0.064) 
-  -0.024 
(0.191) 
Constant 0.714***  
(0.127) 






Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.137 0.033 
R-square 0.486 0.300 0.144 0.184 
Adjusted R-square 0.43 0.236 0.005 0.094 
Observations 93 122 94 111 
* denotes 10% significant level, ** the 5% level and *** the 1% level. Standard errors are given in parentheses.  
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The school input and socioeconomic characteristics significantly explain 43 percent of 
education production in Masoka and 24 per cent in Angwa. For example, in Masoka crossing 
a river or wildlife area to get to school reduces education production by 13 per cent and 11 per 
cent respectively while it has no effect in Angwa and both control groups.  Children’s age 
significantly explains variation in school participation rate in Masoka; an increase in children’s 
age by one year reduces school attendance by 0.02. Parents’ expenditure and employment 
increase children’s school participation in Masoka. In other wards, these variables do not 






2.10 Discussion and conclusion 
Results show that the treatment and comparison wards differ in income disposable to 
communities. CAMPFIRE programme implementing wards have significantly large amounts 
of community income, above USD40, 000 for Masoka and above USD50, 000 for Angwa per 
hunting season accruing from the CAMPFIRE programme hunting activities. Non-CAMPFIRE 
wards have none. The ethnic composition significantly differs between the CAMPFIRE 
programme implementing and Non-CAMPFIRE wards. There are a significantly larger 
proportion of minority Doma people in the two CAMPFIRE sample wards. Religion, 
household and community economics also vary across the sample. With surprisingly Non-
CAMPFIRE wards significantly better resourced than CAMPFIRE wards. 
Within this context, results show that children participation in education is generally low across 
the sample for both CAMPFIRE and Non-CAMPFIRE wards. A simple comparison of children 
participation in education shows no significant difference and likely to send a wrong message 
about the impact of CAMPFIRE on education production. Sometime scholars use simple 
comparisons (means) and raise questions about the significance of the programme in rural 
development. However,  using ATET impact assessment procedure shows that if children with 
similar demographic and socioeconomic characteristic are compared, , children in CAMPFIRE 
programme implementing wards have a higher participation rate in education than their 
counterfactual; though there is variation across the matched strata.  
Further attempt was made to try to explain variation in school participation within CAMPFIRE 
programme implementing areas. Using Feasible Generalised Least Squares to estimate 
interaction of CAMPFIRE with socioeconomic and school inputs, results show that about one-
half of the variation in education output or participation is explained. It shows that living in 
CAMPFIRE area increases education production by approximately 12 per cent compared to 
similar children living in areas that are not implementing the programme. CAMPFIRE 
programme has the highest impact in Masoka. However, there are variations within 
CAMPFIRE communities. , Variation in household resources or accumulated assets explain 
observed variation in education production.   
In contrast in Namibia Riehl, et al. (2015) find that the rate of growth in school attendance in 
Conservancy areas is significantly lower compared to children living outside conservancy 
areas, 45 per cent less likely to increase. They further concluded that presence of conservancy 




(Bandyopadhyay and Tembo 2010) they conclude that indirect benefit of community based 
natural resources management public infrastructure investment has not yet been realised. 
However, the source of the data they use is not designed to take cognisance of conservancy 
distribution and different households are used between the two periods they analyse. Results 
here are slightly different possibly, as the case used for this study has had a long period 
implementing the programme.  Mbire realises relatively higher incomes from hunting 
activities. It has more specific arrangements to subsidise education: making it less expensive. 
The other possible source of difference might be that the case studied here is of one district and 
better performing sub-district administrative units. Including less performing sub-district 
administrative units may possibly yield different results. Results for this study is similar to 
findings by Shereni (2020) and Tchakatumba et al. (2019) in Zimbabwe based on people’s 
perceptions. People reported benefits from infrastructure investments. However, the point here 
is that better performing CBNRM programmes improve education output if investments are 
directed towards public infrastructure  
Bandyopadhyay and Tembo (2010) find that living in community based natural resources 
management areas; Game Management Areas in Zambia has substantial welfare gains though 
the distribution was skewed. This study also points at the skewed distribution of community 
based natural resources management gains for children living in CAMPFIRE areas.    
The hypothesis was that participation in education for children living in CAMPFIRE 
programme-implementing areas is equal to or higher than children living in comparison areas. 
Results show that children living in CAMPFIRE areas participate more in education compared 
to similar children living in Non-CAMPFIRE areas. The interpretation therefore is that the 
presence of CAMPFIRE programme is responsible for the increase in school participation rate 
of children.   
In addition, socioeconomic and school inputs have significant influence in the production of 
education in CAMPFIRE programme implementing areas. Children’s sex, age, direct cost of 
education and household asset ownership such as livestock, are significant inputs with positive 
influence in the production of education in CAMPFIRE programme implementing areas. In 
addition, school inputs such as user fees, rivers and wildlife prevalence have negative influence 




The implications of the results are that continued support of the programme, specifically to 
improve its impact on the less resourced households can yield better results on education 










3 Chapter 3: The impact of community based wildlife 
management on rural household adaptive capacity in Mbire 
district, Zimbabwe  
By  
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3.1 Abstract  
The paper investigates impact of a community based wildlife management programme in 
Zimbabwe on household adaptive capacity. Adaptive capacity denotes the ability of a system, 
such as a household, to adjust, modify or change its characteristics or actions to moderate 
potential damage, take advantage of opportunities or cope with consequences of shocks or 
stresses. The paper uses propensity score matching and regression adjustment to estimate 
programme average treatment effect on the treated/participating households. The paper 
further uses the linear feasible least squares regression model to decipher impact of other 
covariates.   
Results show that the programme has a positive effect on overall adaptive capacity. However, 
the programme’s effect is negative on social, economic and human capacities while positive 
on households’ transformative or physical capacity. The average social capital index, for 
example, is 0.011 or 1.1 per cent less when households implement CAMPFIRE programme 
than average of 0.061 or 6.1 per cent that would obtain if these households were not. The 
human capital capacity index would be 0.006 less than 0.076, if the households were not 
implementing the programme. The economic capacity index is 0.008 less when treated than 
average of 0.068 that would have occurred if the programme-implementing households had 
not implemented the programme. However, on physical capacity potential outcome is 0.038 
                                                          
4 Collen Matema PhD student at the University of Cape Town’s School of Economics, South Africa 
kodzamatema@gmail.com  
5 Edwin Muchapondwa, Professor, University of Cape Town’s School of Economics, South Africa  
edwinmuchapondwa@uct.ac.za  





higher than 0.183 if the programme-implementing households had not implemented. On the 
overall household adaptive capacity index, potential outcome is 0.012 higher than 0.388 that 
would obtain if the programme-implementing households were not implementing the 
programme. The results reflect investment trajectory in the area; a higher proportion of income 
from conservation programme has been invested in public goods provisioning, improving 
physical capacity of respective households.  Lessons from the results are that impacts of 
investments are visible on components that are directly affected by the investment portfolio 
configuration. An aggregate figure will not tell the whole story and without reference to the 
investment configuration, the programme would appear to be less worth.   
  
3.2 Introduction 
The paper investigates effects of community based wildlife management programmes on household 
adaptive capacity using a case study from Zimbabwe. The programme in Zimbabwe, referred to as 
Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), was initiated as a 
rural development approach; first in marginal areas with high value wildlife and then in communities 
elsewhere in the country with worthwhile natural resources (Chigonda 2018, Taylor 2009, Murphree 
2009). The debate for this paper is whether the programme as a policy instrument enhances different 
components of adaptive capacity at the household level.  Adaptive capacity is the ability of systems 
such as households and communities, to absorb or withstand shocks, recover and select livelihoods 
pathways that are more productive under changing environmental, political and economic conditions 
(Lockwood et al. 2015, Jones L. et al. 2010a, and Jones L. et al. 2010b). The hypothesis is that 
CAMPFIRE programme creates an enabling environment to allow households and communities to 
improve different components of Adaptive Capacity (AC), enabling them to improve food security and 
well-being. In Mbire however, a larger proportion of households are categorised as poor, with between 
77 to 89 per cent poverty prevalence (UNICEF 2015).  Furthermore, highest poverty prevalence is 
reportedly in sub-district administrative units that are implementing the CAMPFIRE programme (Jones 
L. et al. 2010a). This has raised questions within academia and policy makers in the country about 
relevance of the programme to rural development (Mbereko et al. 2017). The debate has also been 
raised across southern Africa and other parts of the world where similar initiatives have been 
implemented (Hutton et al. 2005).  
 
Apart from political and economic marginalization, communities living adjacent to wildlife areas in 
Southern Africa are more at risk to climate related shocks and stresses. This is largely because the areas 
experience precarious climate conditions while they are politically and economically weak making them 




the areas are regarded as fragile environments as the soils are mainly sodic and easily degradable (Jones 
L. et al 2019, Cummings 1990). The areas were therefore ‘delineated’ for wildlife production under 
protected areas management approach (Murphree 2009, Taylor 2009, Hutton et al. 2005, Cumming 
1990). Literally, the areas received little government development support due to their marginality and 
perceived low economic potential (Jones   2004). Nonetheless, the areas have been and are home to 
millions of people, previously with no legal access to wildlife resources. These people experience crop 
raids by wildlife, livestock predation and attacks as additional shocks to recurrent adverse climate 
conditions (Macheka et al. 2020). In Zimbabwe poor economic performance since the late 1990s, adds 
to increased vulnerability of these marginal communities (Dekker 2009). The option to implement the 
communal areas wildlife management programme in Zimbabwe allows such communities to utilise 
wildlife legally and economically. The aim of this paper aim is to investigate whether the programme 
increased capacity of the respective communities to deal with climate and economic shocks and stresses. 
This allows policy makers to understand adaptive capacity components that the programme need to 
focus on to improve capacities of these at-risk-communities.  
CAMPFIRE is not explicitly designed with a focus on adaptation, but like any other development 
programme, it is likely to influence households’ and communities’ capacities to adapt to changing 
shocks and trends (Jones L. et al. 2010a, 2010b). Adaptation is increasingly becoming an economic 
necessity as it allows systems to become sustainable under uncertain environmental (Lockwood et al. 
2015) and economic conditions (Makina 2010, Dekker 2009, and Clemens 2005). However, there is 
limited understanding of the impact that community based wildlife resource management systems, such 
as CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, have on household adaptive capacity, or how the programme can be 
directed to support adaptation among communal people. Governments, non-governmental organisations 
and other development practitioners should address how they can enhance the capacity of 
systems/people (Brooks and Adger 2007), and therefore the need to know what matters to people to 
adapt before they can build people’s capacities. 
 
The specific objectives of the paper are to:  
(1) Determine the adaptive capacity levels of sample households. 
(2) Identify the socio-economic inputs or factors that influence adaptive capacity.   
(3) Estimate the CAMPFIRE programme average treatment effect (ATET) on household adaptive 
capacity, and different components of household adaptive capacity. 
   
The Cobb-Douglas production function is used to estimate production of adaptive capacity of sample 
households to deal with recurrent shocks and stresses. Treatment effect theory is further used here to 




regression adjustment and the Potential Outcome Means model procedures have been used to estimate 
CAMPFIRE programme treatment effect on participating households. 
The paper addresses the following key questions around household adaptive capacity: 
(1) What is the adaptive capacity of households in non-CAMPFIRE and CAMPFIRE programme 
implementing areas? 
(2) What are the socio-economic inputs or factors influencing household adaptive capacity? 
(3) Does the CAMPFIRE programme influence household adaptive capacity and different 
adaptive capacity components? 
As a latent construct, adaptive capacity cannot be measured directly, and is context specific (Lockwood 
et al. 2015). Some studies identify indicators of adaptive capacity, and generate indicators from the 
vulnerability and resilience literatures. Indicators are aggregated to produce indices (UN 2018, Aziz 
2015, Sietchiping 2008).  
 
 
This study is guided by public investment theory, which purports that public investment influences 
production; including private ‘household’ production (Rajaram et al. 2014). The hypothesis is that there 
is higher household adaptive capacity if households are treated to the CAMPFIRE programme than if 
they were not. The Theory of Change is that the CAMPFIRE programme allows households and 
communities to build assets that improve respective households’ capacities to positively respond to 
shocks and stresses they encounter.  
The following section discusses literature around shocks and stresses and the economics of adaptation 
to situate the broader discussion.  
3.2.1 Shocks and stresses in Zimbabwe 
Shocks and stresses are environmental, political, economic or social conditions that negatively affect 
systems productivity such as households, communities and countries. Shocks and stresses are external 
to the production system (Thathsarani & Gunaratne 2017). Zimbabwe experiences a multitude of 
shocks and stresses such as economic downturn, climate change, droughts and a plethora of human and 
livestock diseases (Chanza 2018, Clemens & Moss 2005)  
Since the early 1990s, Zimbabwe has been grappling with political and economic challenges 
manifesting in the form of unprecedented hyperinflation, which successively impacted households and 
individuals negatively (Makina 2010, Clemens & Moss 2005). Makina (2010) refers to the period after 
1997 as an economic crisis period. Government decision to redistribute commercial farms was met with 




companies to close increasing the rate of unemployment in the country to record highs. Availability of 
goods and services in the country plummeted to crisis levels affecting even agricultural production, as 
inputs were not accessible (Dekker 2015). The negative impact did not spare wildlife producing areas. 
Previous gains in investments met with supply challenges. However, reports on hunting industry show 
that business remained high but inflation was the more damaging as wildlife producer communities 
were getting their share of proceeds from hunting in local currency, affecting investments negatively.   
Over and above the political and economic shocks and stresses, Zimbabwe, like most countries in 
southern Africa and the world also faced climate related shocks and stress in the form of droughts, 
floods and climate change (Chanza 2018, Unganai 1996). Technically climate change is a 
statistically significant variation either in the mean state of the climate or in its variability, 
persisting for an extended period of approximately 35years (Fussel and Klein 2006, Unganai 
& Kogan 1998, Unganai 1996). Different perceptions over climate change have led to the 
emergence of several schools of thought. One view is that increase in greenhouse gas emissions 
by human activities is causing global warming. The warming trend is viewed as reversible if 
correct measures are taken. Climate change will not manifest itself merely as a gradual change 
in average conditions, but will be characterised by an increase in the frequency and intensity 
of extreme events such as droughts and floods (Parry et al. 2007). This view has been the most 
influential; arguing that disaster is eminent if no action is taken.  
The other school of thought or view is that the warming trend is a normal phenomenon in the 
long term, which would happen with or without anthropogenic influence (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change - IPCC 2007a&b). A third view is that the atmosphere is too complex 
to be studied to produce precise information on future climate trends. However, advocates of 
this view believe in taking action as a precautionary measure (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change 2007a&b).   
Inspite of the different views there is strong evidence in support of a changing climate. 
Zimbabwe’s mean temperature, for example, has been increasing by 0.8°C since 1933. This 
translates to a 0.1°C rise in temperature per decade. On the other hand, precipitation has been 
declining as evidenced by observed national average precipitation from 1900/01 to 1993/94 
seasons (Manatsa et al. 2010). Driest seasons were experienced in the late 1920s to 1949, late 
1950s to 1972 and from 1980 to present (Chanza 2018, Hulme et al. 2001, Hulme & Sheard 
1999, Unganai 1996, Hulme 1992).  On average precipitation has declined 10% over 93 years 
translating to approximately 1% decline per decade. The trend is expected to continue. With 




future scenarios for Zimbabwe and southern Africa were developed using General Circulation 
Models (GCM). Indications are that with the doubling of carbon dioxide gas, which is a major 
component of greenhouse gas emissions, mean air temperature will increase by 2 to 4°C 
(Chanza 2018, Unganai 1996, Hulme and Sheard 1999). This raises concern for developing 
countries such as Zimbabwe which are having problems within the current climate regime and 
whose economy is agro-based and therefore more vulnerable to any negative trends in climate 
(Manatsa et al.  2010).      
Climate change impacts on agriculture have largely been modeled using satellite data and 
countries located within the tropics, including Zimbabwe, are predicted to be hardest hit (FAO 
2019, Tschakert 2007 and Dietz S. et al. 2007). ICRISAT, an international research 
organisation on tropical agriculture, for example, has pegged climate change to cause a decline 
of between 8-30 per cent in grain productivity. This presents a major blow to the then 
Millennium Development Goal 1, and current Sustainable Development Goal 1, on reducing 
extreme poverty. According to Parry et al. (2007), climate change is already happening and 
will continue to happen. This calls for the development of systems that can adapt to the changes 
to lessen the negative impacts thereof. There is general agreement that improving adaptive 
capacity require serious investment especially in public infrastructure. This has seen a shift to 
supporting infrastructure development promulgated by the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) development strategy (UN. 2018).   
3.2.2 Current perspectives on the adaptation concept 
In most marginal areas, access to food is a critical and primary issue. Households struggle to 
create livelihoods strategies sustainable within their environment that ensures continued access 
to adequate food (Sullivan 2005). Success in coping and adaptation attempts is varied within 
and between communities owing to differences in their capacities to deal with stresses and 
shocks (Cinner et al. 2018). Adaptive capacity is the system’s coping capacity (Cinner et al. 
2018, Fazey et al. 2007, Turner et al. 2003 and Adger 2008) or capacity of response (Gallopin 
2006). Turner et al. (2003) distinguish capacity to cope or respond from adaptive capacity. 
They consider both as components of the resilience of a system. As noted by Smit and Wandel 
(2006), some authors apply ‘‘coping ability’’ to shorter-term capacity or the ability to just 
survive, and use ‘‘adaptive capacity’’ for longer-term or more sustainable adjustments. This 
implies that the adaptive capacity is dynamic. Human systems’ components are constantly re-




Adaptive capacity therefore is an evolutionary concept that recognizes that fixed stability is 
unlikely (Cinner et al. 2018). 
Adaptive and coping capacity (both as capacity of response) are therefore the system’s ability 
to adjust to a disturbance, moderate potential damage, take advantage of opportunities, and 
cope with the consequences of a transformation that occurs. Recent scholarship prefer to call 
the whole package resilience (Lockwood et al. 2015). Capacity of response is an attribute of 
the system that exists prior to political, economic, social or environmental shock or stress.  
Adaptiveness has been used to mean the status of being adapted. In this view an adaptive trait 
or an ‘‘adaptation’’ becomes a feature of structure, function, or behavior of the system or 
household and its members that is instrumental or key in securing the adaptiveness (Lockwood 
et al. 2015, Cassidy and Barnes 2012).  
At global scale, and in response to climate change, two fundamental strategies, mitigation and 
adaptation have been proposed (Alberini et al. 2006, Fussel and Klein 2006). Mitigation is the 
process of limiting global climate change through reducing the emission of greenhouse gases 
and enhancing carbon sinks through maintaining forest areas (Fussel and Klein 2006). On the 
other hand, adaptation aims at moderating negative effects of climate change through a wide 
range of system specific actions (Fussel and Klein 2006). Mitigation has received more 
attention than adaptation from both scientific and policy level as reflected by the work of 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Kyoto protocol and 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’s ultimate objective, as stated in Article 2, is the 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system (Parry et al. 1997). Facilitating 
adaptation to climate change is mentioned at a lesser prominent position, although one could 
argue that the level at which humans’ interference become dangerous is in part determined by 
adaptation activities (Parry et al. 1997). The Kyoto Protocol’s efforts to limit the quantitative 
level of greenhouse gas emissions is complemented by less specific provisions to evaluate and 
facilitate adaptation measures (Parry et al. 1997). In addition, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change established by World Meteorological Organization and United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) has the same predicament. Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change is mandated to assess peer reviewed literature on climate change and present 
it in a form that policy makers understand. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is 




Working group1 focuses on the scientific aspects of climate change, Working group 2 assesses 
the impact of climate change and options for adaptation, while Working group 3 looks at how 
to limit greenhouse gas concentrations. However, working group3 has been focusing more on 
climate change impact at the expense of adaptation (Kates & Wilbankd 2003, Kates 1997). 
Practitioners and scholars argue that adaptation is more relevant than mitigation at local level, 
especially in developing countries, and addresses not only climate but also any shocks and 
stress such as political, economic and social shocks and stresses. Instead of dealing with climate 
change per se, it is argued that it is worth helping vulnerable communities adapt to current 
climate variability and future change (Cassidy and Barnes 2012, Huq and Reid 2007). In 
response to perceived impacts of climate change, there has recently been a shift towards 
community-based adaptation.  
Community-based adaptation is a development concept that recognizes the importance of a 
bottom-up approach in solving challenges faced by vulnerable communities. Community based 
adaptations are based on tapping local knowledge to build effective ways of dealing with 
adverse conditions including climate change. 
Adaptation has now emerged as an urgent policy priority, prompting action both within and 
outside the climate change negotiations (Parry et al. 2007). Conventional approaches to 
understanding climate change were limited to identifying and quantifying the potential long-
term climate impacts on different ecosystems and economic sectors. While useful in depicting 
general trends and dynamic interactions between the atmosphere, biosphere, land, oceans and 
ice, this top–down, science driven approach failed to address regional and local impacts of 
climate change, and the local abilities to adapt to climate-induced and other changes. There is 
value to study the convergence between community-based adaptation and community-based 
conservation programmes to understand possibilities of improving community preparedness to 
political, economic, social and environmental shocks and stresses.  
 
The concept of adaptation involves adjustments to enhance the viability of social and economic 
activities and to reduce their vulnerability to shocks and stresses (Cinner et al. 2018, Smit & 
Wandel 2006). Adaptation needs vary across geographical scales (local, national, regional, 
global) and temporal scales (coping with current impacts versus preparing for long-term 




occurred. Anticipatory adaptation takes place before impacts become apparent (Cinner et al. 
2018).  
 
In practical terms, adaptation in motivated by private (individual households and companies) 
or public interest (government; local or central). Planned adaptation is consequence of 
deliberate policy decision, based on the awareness that conditions have changed or are expected 
to change, and that some form of action is required to maintain a desired state. Autonomous 
adaptation involves changes that systems will undergo in response to changing conditions, such 
as climate, irrespective of any policy, plan or decision (Cinner et al. 2018). 
 
3.3 The economics of adaptation 
The concept of adaptation has found its way into almost every sector. It has become a requirement for 
effective economic development at all developmental scales (Thathsarani and Gunaratne 2017). 
Adaptation is also recognized as an integral part of most policies in the advent of climate and other 
changes. Adaptation economists note that assessing adaptation varies from normal economic appraisal 
as it focuses on risks and uncertainties (Troltzsch et al. 2017)  
In economic sense, adaptations are behavioural changes and capital investments that are triggered by 
environmental changes such as political, economic, social and climate change (Mendelsohn 2012, 
Mendelsohn et al. 1996 & 1994). According to economic theory, adaptations are efficient if costs are 
lower than benefits. At the individual, household, or firm level, adaptations are efficient because the 
benefits and costs are borne by the decision maker. The change in behaviour or capital commitment to 
reduce the anticipated harm is part of adaptation. Thus, a set of adaptations that maximize net benefits 
are referred to as efficient adaptations, where benefits are greater than costs. When the results of an 
adaptation decision affect only the decision maker such as the household or firm, the actions are referred 
to as private adaptation. The decisions affect their own welfare. In this case, the decision makers aim to 
maximize their own welfare and therefore chooses actions or adaptations that make them better 
(Mendelsohn 2012). The following example from Mendelsohn (2012) demonstrates how affected 
households and firms make decisions when faced with a shock or stress.  
   
Imagine a utility function (U) that involves goods (X) but also contains climate (C) or any other shock 
or stress. The individual maximizes utility, subject to a budget constraint determined by some income 
(Y): 
 





where P is a vector of prices. Using Roy’s Identity, we can identify a set of demand 
functions for this individual: 
X1 = D1(P, Y, C),  (3.2) 
 
X2 = D2(P, Y).  (3.3) 
The change in behavior because of the change, for example climate (C) is the adaptation. When the 
change makes the household well off, then it is an efficient adaptation. The factors that make the subject 
able to choose adaptation are the indicators of adaptive capacity (Mendelsohn 2012). However, if the 
subject does not know that a new set of behaviour, given available resources will make it better off, 
they may not engage in adaptation. In addition, if the subject does not have the necessary resources to 
undertake or invest in adaptation, then they may not undertake adaptation. There is therefore the need 
to invest in specific or relevant assets or resources that have the potential to make households better 
able to efficiently adapt when necessary (Watkiss 2015). Because the future state of climate is unknown, 
people will be reluctant to make as much adaptations as they would under perfect information 
(Mendelsohn 2012). The following section discusses the concept of adaptive capacity. 
 
3.4 Adaptive Capacity Framework 
There are different approaches to understand adaptive capacity, the more common one being an asset 
based approach. An asset based approach views adaptive capacity as a function of ownership of, or 
access to assets that enhance economic activities in the face of shocks and stresses (Jones L. et al. 
2010a). Assets allow subjects to invest in adaptation activities. Adaptive capacity therefore represents 
subjects’ potential to adapt, rather than their actual actions of adaptation (Engle 2011). However, 
Brooks and Adger (2007) extend adaptive capacity to include actions that lead to adaptation and the 
ability of systems to use resources or assets effectively in pursuit of adaptation. Recent approaches to 
adaptive capacity have added social capital, innovation, subjects’ willingness to adapt and governance 
issues as additional adaptive capacity components (Jones L. et al. 2010, IPCC 2007, Adger 2008). This 
study assesses adaptive capacity as measured from the asset-based approach with an addition of the 
social capital component. The study further argue that public investment by CAMPFIRE programme 
had positive influence on welfare components improving the capacity of the system to adapt to shocks 
and stresses.  While other approaches to adaptive capacity are equally important, they are beyond scope 
of this study. Adaptive capacity development refers to the process of enhancing adaptive capacity, and 
is regarded as a key component of adaptation (Avila-Foucat et al. 2010, Brooks and Adger 2007).      
The asset-based approach view adaptive capacity as comprising of the following components or assets: 
physical resources, human resources, financial, information and livelihood diversity (Lockwood et al. 




assets a household or community has, the more capacity they have to withstand, recover from and adapt 
to changing environmental conditions. However, issues around metric measurement of adaptive 
capacity are still unresolved, owing to context specificity of the concept (Moreira et al. 2019, Warrick 
et al. 2017, Brooks and Adger 2007).  
Physical resources or capacities broadly include natural assets such as land and infrastructure. 
Infrastructure takes the form of built public environment or structures such as roads, health and 
education facilities (Garcia-Milà & McGuire 2018, IPCC 2007). Access to physical resources 
indicates the potential that households have in dealing with shocks and stresses. Human resources or 
capacities are the productive qualities of household members. These include skills that household 
members have, and the number of physically able household members in the productive age range (Ellis 
2000).  In addition, (farming) experience, education level, literacy, proportion of adults and better health 
means more skills available to adapt to shocks and stresses that households may encounter. These 
components are regarded as indicators of adaptive capacity (Lockwood et al. 2015).  
Individuals or households with higher education levels are regarded as being better able to make 
informed decisions in adapting to shocks and stresses. Farmers that are more educated have had better 
access to information and technologies, and are better able to exploit these resources in adapting to 
shocks and stresses (Lockwood et al. 2015). In addition, households that are more literate have better 
quality labour, with better opportunities to attract higher incomes which can be used to finance 
adaptation efforts. Hence, such households are regarded as having higher capacity compared to 
households with fewer literate members (Lockwood et al. 2015). Households with more farming 
experience are also expected to adapt better to climate related shocks as they can draw lessons from the 
past.  
Financial resources are also an indicator of adaptive capacity and represent households’ ownership of 
and access to financial wealth. The assumption is that access to finance makes households better able 
to finance adaptation and recovery mechanisms to climate and other shocks and stresses (Ellis 2000). 
Financial resources include the amount of remittances from family members living outside of the 
community, financial savings (including livestock units in farming communities), and access to credit 
facilities. In farming communities, livestock are a form of savings as they can easily be liquidated to 
finance a wide range of activities or to smooth consumption when production is depressed. Henceforth, 
livestock units are indicative of the amount of financial resources available to farming households to 
finance adaptation processes (Brooks and Adger 2007).  
In addition, having access to information improves decision-making process in the face of shocks and 
stresses. Information is disseminated through trainings, government extension services and having 
access to (climate) information in the recent period to enable timeous decision-making and response.  




broadcast or electronic device, which can be used as a media through which information can be 
transmitted (Brooks and Adger 2007). At community level, this takes the form of having 
communication infrastructure that allows individual households’ connectivity.     
Livelihoods diversity is another key component in adaptive capacity assessment. In farming 
communities, it takes the form of the number of sources of food or income over the recent period; 
representing crop, livestock and income diversity. Diversity has an effect of spreading the risk as 
different diversity components have different sensitivities to different shocks and stresses, and therefore 
strengthens recovery process and options to adapting to changing conditions (Reardon et al. 1988). 
Faced with shocks or stresses households can therefore select from the wide range of diversity 
components by picking on less sensitive and more productive livelihood options.    
The social capital component describes relations of trust, reciprocity and exchange, evolution of 
common rules and role of social networks (Jones L. et al. 2019, Adger 2006, 2000). In the context of 
adaptive capacity, social capital is the ability of a society to act collectively when faced with shocks 
and stresses (Adger et al. 2005, 2001). Ability to act collectively is demonstrated by membership in 
social groups, participation in collective action and reciprocity inside and outside respective 
communities (IPCC 2007). 
In the event of shocks, adaptive capacity components (assets or resources) enable households to reduce 
the magnitude of negative impacts thereof, and allow households to invest in sustainable livelihoods 
that are responsive to changing environment conditions (Ellis 2000). Better-resourced households are 
therefore better able to reduce or mitigate negative impacts of shocks and stresses. Because of its 
community-based approach to development, the CAMPFIRE programme by default is therefore 
expected to have invested in these critical areas improving the different adaptive capacity components, 
which make households and communities better able to deal with shocks and stresses. Brooks and Adger 
(2007) note that adaptation strategies will not be successful unless there is a willingness to adapt among 
those affected. This means that systems or households may have the capacity or resources necessary for 
adaptation, but if the capacity is not translated into action or adaptation, the system will not successfully 
adapt.    
 
3.5  Methodology and research methods  
There is not yet universally agreed standard components and measures of adaptive capacity. Adaptive 
capacity covers a multitude of factors (Selm et al. 2018, Asumanu 2017, Vincent 2007). For the purpose 
of this paper, adaptive capacity shall include selected components shown in Table 3-1 derived from 
reviewed literature on adaptive capacity, and relevance to the study site, identified during the scoping 
study period. The components are social capital, livelihoods diversity, human resources (knowledge 




but form the basis of further studies on adaptive capacity in community based natural resources 
management areas. Table 3-1 also shows how the household adaptive capacity components are 
measured for this study, designed in a way that allows comparison among the sample units or 
households. The approach uses each variable’s maximum value in the sample as a highest possible, and 
compares all other respective units to that value to show the relative capacity. I used equal weighting 
for each major adaptive capacity component. 
Table 3-1: Adaptive capacity components and the respective sub-components 
1. Social capital 
(0.25) 
2. Household economic 
characteristics/ diversity 
(0.25) 
3. Human capital /Knowledge 
and skills (0.25) 







Household share of social 
capital  
 (𝒙 =
𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒙 
𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒎 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆
) 
i) Household participation in 
community organizations   
ii) Collective action  
iii) Social support (within) 








Economic activities (0.125) 
Household share of economic activities  
𝒙
=




i) Participation in agricultural value chains-
crops (0=No 1=Yes)  
ii) Participation in agricultural value 
chains-livestock (0=No 1=Yes)  
iii) Participation in non-agricultural value 
chain (0=No 1=Yes  
iv) Salaried agricultural industry (0=No 
1=Yes)  
v) Salaried non- agricultural industry 
(0=No 1=Yes)  
 vi) Participation in trade (Own formal 
business)   
vii) Receive remittances  
(0=No 1=Yes) 
 
viii) Access to credit facilities  
(0=No 1=Yes) 
 
Household’s share of livestock assets 
(0.125)  
(𝒙 =




i) Share of cattle 
ii) Share of donkeys 
iii) Share of goats 
iv) Share of poultry 
Household share of human capital 
𝒙
=




i) Years of education of household head  
 
ii) Highest years of education in household 
 
iii) Proportion of adults with primary 
education (literacy)  
 
iv) vocational/skills trainings, number of 
respective trainings completed by any 
household member/s 
 
i) Household distance to 
nearest primary school (0 
if +5km, 1 if less than 
5km)  
ii) Household’s distance 
to nearest health facility (0 
if +10km, 1 if less than 
10km) 
 




The study uses household survey method to extract data useful for the measurement of adaptive capacity 
shown in Table 3-1. For this study, I first identified the dimensions of adaptive capacity as suggested 
in literature that might be of significance to rural communities in the study site, and verified them 
through group discussions in the study site. I then developed question items and indices constructs that 
allow empirical measurements of adaptive capacity dimensions at the household level.  
Households were randomly selected from the four purposively selected sub-district units, wards. The 
four wards are in the same district, Mbire and experience roughly the same climate conditions. Two of 
the wards, Angwa and Masoka have been implementing the CAMPFIRE programme for the past three 
decades while the other two, Hambe and Majongwe have never implemented the programme. Four 
hundred and one (401) household heads or their spouses were interviewed and the responses are used 
to construct the relative adaptive capacity of each sample household.  
3.6 Adaptive capacity index construction   
Adaptive capacity (AC) varies between 0 and 1 (0 ≤ 𝐴𝐶 ≥ 1) Where 0 shows that the household has 
no capacity to deal with shocks or stresses that it may encounter; while 1 shows that the household has 
access to resources to deal with challenges that it may encounter. The index for adaptive capacity is 
calculated using equal weighting approach where each component contributes equally to the final 
adaptive capacity index (Thathsarani & Gunaratne 2017, Cassidy & Barnes 2012). Of the four broad 
components shown in Table 3-1, each contributes equally, 0.25 points to the overall adaptive capacity 
index 1:   
𝐴𝐶𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖 + ℎ𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖  (3.4) 
 
Where 𝐴𝐶𝑖 is the household adaptive capacity, 
 𝑠 = the social capital  
𝑑 = household diversity representing the different economic activities that the household engages in 
ℎ = human capital  
𝑝 = physical capital or infrastructure and  
𝑒 = the error term or margin of error 
For each sub-component, the index is obtained by calculating the household share of the variable as 
represented by the variable maximum value within the sample. The assumption is that the highest value 
for each adaptive capacity indicator within the sample represents the maximum possible, and is used to 
compare each household adaptive capacity status.   The following section shows the respective sub-





3.6.1 Social capital: 
𝑠 = 𝑓(𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠3, 𝑠4,   …)  (3.5) 
Or in stochastic terms  
𝑠 = 𝑠1 + 𝑠2 + 𝑠3 + 𝑠4  (3.6) 
 
𝑠 = ∑ (
𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖
𝑉𝑎𝑟.𝑀𝑎𝑥.𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
× 0.0625)𝑛𝑖=1 + ∑ (
𝐶𝐴𝑖
𝑉𝑎𝑟.𝑀𝑎𝑥.𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒







× 0.0625)𝑛𝑖=1   (3.7) 
Where: 
𝑠1 is the household share of group membership (𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖) 
𝑠2 is the household share in participation in collective action (𝐶𝐴𝑖) 
𝑠3 is the household share of community support (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑖) 
𝑠4 is the household share of support from outside the community (𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑖) 
 
3.6.2 Household diversity index 
Household diversity index (d) is calculated from two main components, share of economic activities 
(EA) and share of livestock assets (LA). Household diversity has a maximum contribution of 0.25 or 
25 percentage points to the overall adaptive capacity:    
  
𝑑 = 𝑓(𝑑1, 𝑑2)  (3.8) 
Or in stochastic terms 
𝑑 = 𝑑1 + 𝑑2  (3.9) 
 
𝑑 = ∑ (
𝐸𝐴𝑖
𝑉𝑎𝑟.𝑀𝑎𝑥.𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
× 0.125)𝑛𝑖=1 + ∑ (
𝐿𝐴𝑖
𝑉𝑎𝑟.𝑀𝑎𝑥.𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
× 0.125)𝑛𝑖=1   (3.10) 
Where: 
𝑑1 is the household share of economic activities shown in Table 21 (𝐸𝐴𝑖) 





3.6.3 Human capital  
Human capital for the study is represented by household head’s share of education (Ed) and household’s 
share of skills (Sk).   
ℎ = 𝑓(ℎ1, ℎ2)  (3.11) 
or in stochastic terms  
ℎ = ℎ1+, ℎ2,  (3.12) 
ℎ = ∑ (
𝐸𝑑𝑖
𝑉𝑎𝑟.𝑀𝑎𝑥.𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
× 0.125)𝑛𝑖=1 + ∑ (
𝑆𝑘𝑖
𝑉𝑎𝑟.𝑀𝑎𝑥.𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
× 0.125)𝑛𝑖=1   (3.13) 
Where: 
ℎ1 is the household head’s share of years of education, which is calculated by expressing the number 
of completed years of education of head of household as a proportion of the variable maximum value 
within the sample ( 𝐸𝑑𝑖).   
ℎ2  is the household’s share of skills ( 𝑆𝑘𝑖) 
 
3.6.4 Physical capital 
Share of physical capital is the proportionate access to public infrastructure, measured by whether the 
household is within acceptable distance from the public infrastructure. In this study access to education 
(𝐸𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑖) and health ( 𝐻𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑖 ) were reported to be important and therefore used to measure the capacity 
thereof, as follows:  
 
𝑝 = 𝑓(𝑝1, 𝑝2)  (3.14) 
Or in stochastic terms 
𝑝 = 𝑝1 + 𝑝2  (3.15) 
 
𝑝 = ∑ (
𝐸𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑖
𝑉𝑎𝑟.𝑀𝑎𝑥.𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
× 0.125)𝑛𝑖=1 + ∑ (
𝐻𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑖
𝑉𝑎𝑟.𝑀𝑎𝑥.𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
× 0.125)𝑛𝑖=1   (3.16) 
Where: 





𝑝2  is whether the household is within acceptable distance to the nearest health facility (𝐻𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑖); within 
10km radius (PICES 2014). 
The variables are dummy variables, taking the value of 1 if within acceptable distance and 0 otherwise. 
3.7 CAMPFIRE Treatment Effect on household adaptive capacity 
Treatment effect literature attempts to evaluate policy or programme impact or effect on the population 
of interest. It investigates the average impact of policies or programmes that have partial participation 
at some point in time were participation is only for a sub-population group (Heckman and Vytlacil 
2001). Because of partial treatment, it creates a natural experimental design. Not everyone would be 
affected by the policy or participating in the programme. This can be manipulated to assess the impact 
of an intervention or programme on a number of economic parametres. The design has a ‘treatment 
group’ that is affected or participating in the programme, and a comparison group or counter-factual 
that is not participating. Non-participants act as a control group to see variable level if units/households 
are not under treatment ( Lechner 2015, Heckman and Vytlacil 2001). It can therefore be used to answer 
how policy or programme induced changes affect specific aspects of adaptive capacity. The estimated 
response to the variation in observed policy changes can be used to produce internally valid estimators 
of the impact (Lechner 2015).  
Assume: 
𝐴𝐶𝑖
1 is the adaptive capacity outcome that an individual household experiences when it 
participates in a programme such as CAMPFIRE. 
 𝐴𝐶𝑖
0 is the adaptive capacity outcome experienced when an individual household does not 
participate in the programme 
The programme impact would be the difference in outcomes of the adaptive capacity when participating 




0)    (3.17) 
 
Where the  𝐸(∙) is taken across the population of interest. 
However, we cannot observe the same household when it does and does not participate. The optimal 
would be to compare average treatment effect on the treated sample to the non-





Thus one can consider average treatment effect on the treated households, ATET: 
𝐸(𝐴𝐶𝑖
1 − 𝐴𝐶𝑖
0|𝑇𝑖 = 1)   (3.18) 
Where 𝑇𝑖 is a binary indicator of programme impact that equals 1 if a household participates and 0 
otherwise. ATET captures the effect of the programme on those who actually participated. If it were 
possible to observe outcomes for a representative sample of members of N individuals randomly 






0)  (3.19) 
 
3.8 Household adaptive capacity Post-test only control group design  
The paper uses post-test only control group design and consider the impact of the CAMPFIRE 
programme induced changes on household adaptive capacity. Outcomes are observed after almost three 
decades of the programme implementation. The population is sorted into treatment and comparison 
group were the treated are the sub-district administrative units, wards that are implementing the 
programme, and the comparison group are the wards that are not implementing the programme. The 
design suits well into experimental design as the households in the two groups largely differ only in 
terms of programme implementation as the programme targeted wards with high value resident wildlife. 
The characteristics of the households in implementing and non-implementing wards are assumed the 
same, for example environmental conditions, ethnicity and economic activities. The treatment and 
control groups are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. That is, no household belongs to both subgroups 
and every household belongs either to one or to the other group.  
We define our selection variable as follows: 
𝑇𝑖 = {1, 𝑖𝑓  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒)  (3.20) 
Where T indicates the treatment; i, is the household from the treatment or comparison population, 
CAMPFIRE or non-CAMPFIRE wards respectively.  
We evaluate whether public investments by the CAMPFIRE programme has an impact on household 
adaptive capacity.      
We therefore observe ACi and the different components for random samples of size N1 from 

















Thus, the programme impact is estimated by the difference of mean outcomes between the treatment 
and comparison groups after application. The post-test only control group design yield an unbiased 
estimate of treatment impact (Heckman and Vytlacil 2001; Lechner 2015). The following section 
discusses the regression adjustment and potential outcome means, treatment effect analysis procedure 
used to estimate the programme impact on household adaptive capacity. 
 
3.9 Treatment effect analysis framework  
 
Treatment effects are estimated using various procedures such as social experiments, instrumental 
variables, regression models, matching estimators and stratification. Normal regression compares 
outcomes between units while treatment inferences compare different treatments if applied to the same 
units or in other words, what would happen if the units or individuals were under different exposure 
regimes. Thus, treatment effect estimates the potential outcome, as we cannot observe the same subject 
under treatment and under control at the same time. Therefore, its predictive inference in the potential 
outcome framework. Thus estimating treatment effect requires 1. Getting close substitutes to represent 
the potential outcome, 2. Randomization/experimentation or 3. Some statistical adjustments. Getting 
close substitutes for example allows inference of potential outcome for subjects under treatment and 
controls and therefore estimate the treatment effect (Ghosh & Coffman 2015). Randomisation and 
experimentation allows observed outcomes from a sample to infer about the entire population were 
close matches are chosen prior to the treatment. The approach is based on the idea that it is difficult to 
observe the same unit under different treatments so samples of similar units are compared drawn from 
different treatments.  Furthermore, statistical adjustment, such as regression adjustment is useful were 
similarity between groups is difficulty to get, and were randomisation is not ethical or practical. The 
following section discusses the propensity score matching and regression adjustment analysis 
procedures, which are used to test the CAMPFIRE, programme treatment effect on adaptive capacity. 
 
3.9.1 Propensity score matching  
 
Matching is similar to regression; the difference is that instead of fitting missing data for comparison, 
it matches individuals or units with same covariates. Propensity score matching is a method to reduce 
bias in estimating treatment effect with observational data. Thus propensity score matching is used to 
correct for confounding factors. Propensity scores are generated using background characteristics,  
to get close matches (Austin 2011).  





 ∆𝜇 is the propensity score estimate 
𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 is the average treatment effect on the treated 
𝑆𝐵 is the selection bias 
Propensity score theory states that the outcome is independent of the treatment given background 
characteristics:  
 
 𝑌1𝑖 , 𝑌0𝑖 ⊥ 𝐷𝑖|𝑃(𝑋𝑖)    (3.23) 
or 
𝐴𝐶1𝑖, 𝐴𝐶0𝑖 ⫫ 𝐷𝑖│𝑃(𝑋𝑖)   (3.24) 
 
Where:  outcome when treated, 𝐴𝐶1𝑖  adaptive capacity if under CAMPFIRE programme 
 Outcome if not treated, 𝐴𝐶0𝑖  adaptive capacity if not under the programme. 
 Selecting into treatment 
Expected causal effect on the treated would therefore take the form: 
𝐸[𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1]  (3.25) 
or using the law of iterated expectation it can be expressed as follows: 
𝐸[𝐸[𝑌1𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑃(𝑥𝑖) − 𝐸[𝑌0𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑃(𝑥𝑖)]|𝐷𝑖 = 1  (3.26) 
  
A set of variables were selected using the logistic model to generate propensity scores. The logistic 
model identifies the variables that are associated with the treatment. These are used to generate 
propensity scores for each unit or individual household. After the propensity scores are generated they 
are used to match units across the treatment groups and average outcome of interest can be generated 
for comparison. 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 ≈ ∑ 𝜇𝑌1𝑠𝑠 − 𝜇𝑌0𝑠  (3.27) 




 𝜇𝑌0𝑆 Average for the untreated sample 
The treated group, households living in CAMPFIRE area is matched with a non-treated group, 
households in non-CAMPFIRE area. This yields the outcome if the treated were not treated 
and conversely outcome if the untreated were treated, while in this case we are interested in 
the outcome of the treated if they were not treated. The outcome gives us the treatment effect 
on the treated.  
 
3.9.2 Regression Adjustment and Potential Outcome Means 
 
Regression adjustment represents one of the approaches to estimate treatment effect as pointed out 
earlier (Ghosh & Coffman 2015). However, the procedure uses linear model to fit missing data for 
comparison purposes, or estimating the outcome of treated units if they were not treated. By fitting a 
regression model an estimation of what would have happened to the treated individuals had they not 
been treated could be achieved. In cases where matching on propensity is difficult or less desirable, 
regression adjustment procedure is a more reliable option (Myers & Lous 2013). Regression adjustment 
is the more favoured and efficient option, however if model assumptions are violated it can give biased 
results (Myers & Lous 2013). In this paper, I chose to use regression adjustment to compare the results 
with the propensity score matching methods.  The central question when using the regression 
adjustment is to compare the expected values of potential outcomes of the individual units given 
treatments. The causal effect of exposure is thus defined by differences of potential outcomes 
corresponding to different exposures regimes (Ghosh & Coffman 2015).  
The key identifying assumption that facilitates causal inference under this scenario is:  
𝐸[𝑌0𝑖|𝑋𝑖 , 𝐷𝑖] = 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽   (3.28) 
𝛽 is the vector of regression coefficients. From the equation it can be shown that: 
𝐸{𝑌𝑖(𝐷𝑖 − 𝐸[𝐷𝑖|𝑋𝑖])}/𝐸{𝐷𝑖(𝐷𝑖 − 𝐸[𝐷𝑖|𝑋𝑖])} = 𝛼  (3.29) 
Thus we have the coefficient of 𝐷𝑖 derived from the population regression 𝑌𝑖 on 𝐷𝑖 and 𝑋𝑖  
We therefore adopt the following notation:   
𝑖 index subjects included in the study; 𝑌𝑖 would therefore denotes the response or outcome for subject 𝑖 
; 𝑍𝑖 is the exposure or treatment for the subject 𝑖; 𝑋𝑖 denotes the value of other covariates or conditionals. 
The hypothetical outcome quantities that represent the possible outcomes under different exposure 




𝑌𝑖(z)  (3.30) 
This is the hypothetical outcome for the subject 𝑖 if exposure or treatment is set to 𝑧. 𝑌𝑖(𝑧) is termed 
counterfactual or the potential outcome (Stephens 2016).  
 
If the exposure is binary, then the potential outcomes  
{𝑌𝑖 (1), 𝑌𝑖 (0)}  (3.32) 
denotes the response or outcome which results for individual subject  𝑖 if exposed or otherwise 
respectively. The observed outcome 𝑌𝑖  can be expressed as potential outcomes and observed exposure, 
𝑍𝑖 as follows:  
𝑌𝑖 = (1 − 𝑍𝑖)𝑌𝑖(0) + 𝑍𝑖𝑌𝑖(1)  (3.33) 
In cases where exposure has multiple values then the potential outcomes will be denoted by:  
{𝑌𝑖(𝑧1), 𝑌𝑖(𝑧2) … , 𝑌𝑖(𝑧𝑑)}  (3.34) 
These are the outcomes if the subject is exposed to different treatment levels or options 𝑧1, 𝑧2 … 𝑧𝑑 
respectively. The outcome or response 𝑌𝑖 can thus be expressed in terms of potential outcomes (PO) 
and observed exposure options, 𝑍𝑖 as follows: 
𝑌𝑖 = ∑ 1𝑧𝑗
𝑑
𝑗=1 (𝑍𝑖)𝑌𝑖(𝑧𝑗)  (3.35) 
Where 1A(𝑍) represents random variable for set A, with 1A(𝑍) =1 if 𝑍𝜖A, and 0 otherwise. 
However, if the exposure is on a continuous scale then the potential outcome takes the following form 
representing outcomes for individual i if the subject is exposed to level z which varies in the set ℤ: 
{𝑌𝑖 (𝑧), 𝑧  𝜖 ℤ}  (3.36) 
Stephens (2016).  
But it is not possible to observe more than one potential outcomes for the same subject i; this is a big 
challenge for the treatment effect inference. In a case with binary treatment for example, 
𝑌𝑖(0)  and 𝑌𝑖(1)  (3.37) 
we cannot observe the same subject under different treatments. Hence, regression adjustment inference 
centres on comparing expected values of different potential outcomes (Stephens 2016, Freeman 2008).  
Treatment effects are therefore the differences in potential outcomes relative to varying exposure levels. 
In a binary exposure case, treatment effect would be the difference between potential outcome of the 




𝑌𝑖(1) and 𝑌𝑖(0)  (3.38) 
Regression adjustment estimators run separate regressions for the treated and non-treated samples; 
means of predicted outcomes. Regression adjustment is applicable for randomized controlled 
experiments. The estimates are calibrated using non-parametric models. Each subject has potential 
responses to a number of treatments (Freedman 2008). In this case, only one response is observable 
conditional to the assignment of the subject, as we cannot observe the same subject for the different 
treatments. Other potential responses or treatment outcomes of the same subject remain unobservable 
and therefore will be fitted or predicted using the linear regression model.  
Covariates are then used to compensate for minor imbalances in the assignment groups (Freeman 2008).  
The potential response 𝑌𝜏 where 𝑇𝜖{0, 1, … . . , 𝐾} 
The potential responses for binary treatment are denoted by   𝑌0𝑖 and 𝑌𝑘𝑖 where:  
𝑌0𝑖 is the response for subject i if the subject did not receive treatment and i=1 …n 
𝑌𝑘𝑖 is the response of subject i if the subject receive treatment, where k=1 …K.  
The most common thinking are the scenarios where there are only two levels or binary treatment. There 
are also cases where there are different levels of treatments or doses of treatments. In this study, I 
consider a binary treatment level, which suits well under partial policy application, where one group 
receives treatment, CAMPFIRE programme and the other not.   
We consider:  
The potential outcome means denoted by:  
𝑃𝑂𝑀 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑇)  (3.39) 
 Average treatment effect denoted by: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸(𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖)  (3.40) 
Average treatment effect on the treated denoted by:  
𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖|Τ = 1)  (3.41) 
The response or outcome model would be:  
𝑦0 = 𝑥𝛽0 + 𝜀0  (3.42) 
𝑦1 = 𝑥𝛽1 + 𝜀1  (3.43) 








 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  (3.45) 
𝑦0 and 𝑦1 are not observable; 𝑦, 𝑥, 𝜏 are observed 
Random disturbances are independent  
The estimators are a combination of outcome model and the treatment model. The complete data consist 
of outcome, which would obtain if treated and outcome if not treated. If this were the case, simple 
calculation would yield ATET. However, the observed data has missing data in comparison to the ideal 
complete data and is nonignorable  
In summary the Regression Adjustment (RA) first model the potential response independent of 
treatment, then a conditional expectation is estimated for the treatment and the counterfactual samples 
and lastly the produced estimators are used to calculate the Potential Outcome Means (POM) and then 
the ATE and ATET.  
 
3.9.3  Regression discontinuity  
 
Regression discontinuity dates back to the 1960s as another way of estimating treatment effect (Lee and 
Lemiaux 2010). The procedure is used here to complement the results from propensity score matching 
and regression adjustments procedures or models. Regression discontinuity has been used owing to its 
‘mild assumptions’ in comparison to other approaches yet it also produces more credible results (Lee 
and Lemiaux 2010). The idea behind regression adjustment is that where an intervention selects 
participants based on some cut off points that would have an effect on the outcome of interest for which 
the incentive is being offered. The cut-off point creates a dummy that selects the units into to two 
treatments, those below or outside of the target forming the control and those above or within the target 
forming the treatment group. The regression adjustment can easily be estimated using regression. In 
this case if you want to estimate the relationship between X and Y variable assuming they have a linear 
relationship you run a pure linear regression model. To take account of the discontinuity a dummy 
variable representing the two sides of the variable is added to the linear model.  
𝑦 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑥 + 𝐵2𝐼(𝑥 > 𝑥0) + 𝑒  (3.46) 
In the model 𝐵2 is the coefficient of the dummy variable and is therefore taken to be the programme or 







We hypothesise that the CAMPFIRE programme increases household adaptive capacity significantly 








∑ 𝐴𝐶0|𝑇 = 1
𝑁0
𝑖=1    (3.47) 
Where 𝐴𝐶1 is adaptive capacity of households living in CAMPFIRE implementing areas and 𝐴𝐶0 for 
counterfactual households, living in Non-CAMPFIRE areas. Alternatively  












𝑗=1 |𝑇 = 1 > 0  (3.48) 












𝑗=1 |𝑇 = 1 < 0  (3.49) 
 
3.11 Results 
This section gives the descriptive statistics of the sample variables used in the analysis. The first part 
highlights the reported or stated shocks experienced in the area, which subjects struggle to adapt to. The 
second section reports the status for the different components of, as well as the overall adaptive capacity. 
The last section discusses the results of the analyses showing the treatment effect of the CAMPFIRE 
programme on household adaptive capacity.   
 
3.11.1 Descriptive statistics 
3.11.1.1 Experiences of shocks and stresses 
Results show that Mbire district experiences a number of shocks as shown in Figure 3. The most 
frequently reported shocks are crop raids by wild animals, dry spells, unemployment and floods 
respectively. The pattern is the same across the treatment, CAMPFIRE and counterfactual, Non-
CAMPFIRE implementing areas. However, CAMPFIRE implementing areas experience more crop 
raids than non-CAMPFIRE implementing areas. In non-CAMPFIRE areas, dry spells are the most 
frequently reported shock. There are no significant differences in each shock experience across the 






Figure 3: Experienced shocks and stresses (Sources: Survey data December 2015) 
The shocks were analysed using the relative proportion of shocks that each unit or household reportedly 
experience. The number of shocks and stresses that households reported is expressed as a proportion of 
the number of shocks reported by the sample. This gives an indication of the relative vulnerability of 
the subjects to shocks and stresses:  
𝒙𝒊 = (
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚  𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒙 
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔  𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒚
) 𝑿𝟏𝟎𝟎  (3.50) 
Where   𝒙𝒊 is the household’s relative vulnerability expressed as a proportion of shocks/stresses reported 
in the sample.  
Table 3-2 shows that the treatment group experience a higher share of shocks and/or stresses in the 
district. 
Table 3-2: Mean share of shock experience 
CAMPFIRE mean min max sd 
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.37 0.00 0.71 0.16 
CAMPFIRE 0.41 0.00 0.71 0.14 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
T-test results show that the share of shocks is significantly higher in CAMPFIRE areas than in non-
CAMPFIRE areas (p=0.010). Thus, households in the programme implementing areas are relatively 
more vulnerable to shocks and stresses compared to households in non-implementing areas.  





3.11.1.2 Economic adaptive capacity 
i. Livestock ownership 
The sample households have varied levels of livestock ownership. Households owning poultry have on 
average 5.3 units, followed by goats and sheep (3.9) and cattle at 2.2 units (Table 3-3). Households in 
CAMPFIRE implementing areas have a more poultry units compared to households in non-CAMPFIRE 
areas. However, households in CAMPFIRE areas own less livestock units for shoats, cattle and 
donkeys.    
Table 3-3: Livestock ownership by treatment and ward 
Ward Cattle Donkeys Goats and sheep Poultry 
CAMPFIRE    
Mean 0.43 0.13 3.57 5.42 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 10 6 27 64 
Ward 2 
    
Mean 0.61 0.12 3.07 4.74 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 10 6 20 64 
Ward 11 
    
Mean 0.13 0.14 4.43 6.61 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 2 3 27 32 
Non-CAMPFIRE 
   
Mean 3.97 0.17 4.2 5.19 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 42 5 112 36 
Ward 7 
    
Mean 3.56 0.04 3.24 5.33 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 25 2 25 34 
Ward 17 
    
Mean 4.34 0.28 5.07 5.06 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 42 5 112 36 
Full sample 
   
Mean 2.26 0.15 3.9 5.3 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 42 6 112 64 




An independent t-test was run to determine if there are differences in livestock ownership between 
CAMPFIRE and Non-CAMPFIRE areas. Cattle ownership was found to be significantly higher in Non-
CAMPFIRE areas; 3.97±0.43 compared to CAMPFIRE areas, 0.43±0.11; p=0.000. While there are no 
significant differences in poultry, donkeys and goats and sheep ownership between the two groups.    
ii. Share of livestock 
Compared to the maximum per capita cattle owned in the selected wards, Non-CAMPFIRE wards have 
a significantly higher share (Table 3-4), 0.09±0.01) compared to CAMPFIRE implementing 
households, 0.01±0.002, p=.000. 
Table 3-4: Share of cattle by ward 
Ward Mean share of cattle Min Max 
CAMPFIRE 0.007 0 0.24 
2 0.010 0 0.24 
11 0.003 0 0.05 
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.094 0 1.00 
7 0.090 0 0.60 
17 0.103 0 1.00 
Total 0.054 0 1.00 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
On the other hand, there are no statistically significant differences in the share of donkeys, shoats and 
poultry ownership across the wards and between CAMPFIRE and Non-CAMPFIRE wards  
In our adaptive capacity model, livestock contributes a maximum of 0.125 points. Table 3-5 shows the 
mean state of the livestock contribution to adaptive capacity across the treatment and comparison 
groups. On average, the sample has a capacity below 10 per cent, with Non-CAMPFIRE implementing 
areas having statistically higher capacity compared to CAMPFIRE areas. However, CAMPFIRE 
implementing areas have households with the highest livestock adaptive capacity with approximately 
59 per cent (0.073) contribution to the livestock component of the adaptive capacity sub-index.  
Table 3-5: Mean share of livestock contribution to adaptive capacity by treatment 




Min Max (0.125) 
CAMPFIRE 0.005 0.007 0 0.073 
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.008 0.011 0 0.070 
Both 0.006 0.009 0 0.073 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Support for the accumulation of livestock assets in the CAMPFIRE programme would potentially boost 





3.11.1.3 Livelihoods diversity 
Seventeen (17) individual livelihoods activities that are utilised by the sample households. Each of the 
more diversified households use eleven (11) of the reported livelihoods activities.  The value 11 is the 
maximum possible livelihoods in assessing the share of livelihoods adaptive capacity sub-index. Table 
3-6 shows that on average sample households utilise approximately one-half, ~55 per cent of the 
maximum possible livelihoods activities that a household can potentially utilise.  
Table 3-6: Share of livelihoods diversity 
Ward Mean livelihoods diversity Min Max sd 
CAMPFIRE 0.540 0.364 1.000 0.116 
2 0.538 0.364 1.000 0.119 
11 0.543 0.364 0.909 0.111 
Non-CAMFIRE 0.551 0.364 0.909 0.123 
7 0.554 0.364 0.909 0.123 
17 0.549 0.364 0.909 0.124 
Total 0.546 0.364 1.000 0.120 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Results show that there are no statistically significant differences in livelihoods diversity across the 
wards, and between treated and non-treated sample households.  
For the study, the maximum possible contribution of livelihoods diversity to the livelihoods component 
of the adaptive capacity is 0.125 or 12.5 per cent. Table 3-7 shows livelihoods diversity contribution to 
the adaptive capacity index. On average, livelihoods diversity capacity is approximately 55 per cent, 
i.e. 0.068 of 0.125 maximum contribution possible. There are no statistically significant differences in 
livelihoods diversity adaptive capacity between the treatment and the counterfactual sub-samples. 
 Table 3-7: Livelihoods diversity contribution to adaptive capacity index 
Ward Mean contribution Min Max (0.125) SD 
CAMPFIRE 0.067 0.045 0.125 0.015 
2 0.067 0.045 0.125 0.015 
11 0.068 0.045 0.114 0.014 
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.069 0.045 0.114 0.015 
7 0.069 0.045 0.114 0.015 
17 0.069 0.045 0.114 0.015 
Total 0.068 0.045 0.125 0.015 




The total economic adaptive capacity comprises of livestock and livelihoods diversity components, 
which together contributes a maximum of 0.25 or one quarter to the overall adaptive capacity index; 
Table 3-8 shows the sample’s economic activity contribution to the overall adaptive capacity by 
treatment and ward. 
Table 3-8: Mean share of total economic activity to adaptive capacity index 
Ward Mean share of total economic 
activity (0.25) 
Min Max (0.25) sd 
CAMPFIRE 0.072 0.045 0.141 0.017 
2 0.071 0.045 0.141 0.018 
11 0.073 0.045 0.114 0.015 
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.077 0.045 0.170 0.021 
7 0.076 0.045 0.131 0.017 
17 0.077 0.045 0.170 0.025 
Total 0.074 0.045 0.170 0.020 
 Source: Survey data December 2015 
Non-CAMPFIRE implementing areas have statistically significant higher economic adaptive capacity, 
0.077 ±0.002 (30.60 per cent of 0.25) compared to CAMPFIRE implementing areas, 0.072±0.001 
(28.75 per cent of 0.25), p=0.019. Figure 4 shows that there are deep deficits in economic adaptive 
capacity in both treatment and counterfactual group.  
 
 





3.11.1.4 Social capital 
Social capital consists of households’ participation in social groups, participation in collective action, 
support from within and outside the community. These components have the potential to improve the 
ability of households and communities to mobilise resources, and positively respond to shocks and 
stresses that the households may encounter.  
i.  Participation in groups 
Share of household participation in groups is calculated by comparing the highest number of groups 
that any household in the sample affiliate to; which in this case is 8. Eight (8) becomes the maximum 
possible number of social groups a household can participate in. The more the number of groups a 
household’s members are a part, the higher is its relative capacity to deal with shocks and stresses as it 
can get material, technical or moral support from the group members in case they encounter 
shocks/stresses.  
Table 3-9 shows the mean share of households’ participation in social groups across the target wards, 
and by treatment. The results show that households’ participation in groups is low; 8.9 per cent.  Ward 
17 has the highest share of households’ participation in groups while ward 2 has the least. 
Table 3-9: Mean share of participation in groups 
Ward Mean share of household 
participation in social 
groups 
Min Max sd 
CAMPFIRE 0.051 0 0.625 0.100 
2 0.027 0 0.375 0.061 
11 0.092 0 0.625 0.134 
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.124 0 1.000 0.161 
7 0.088 0 0.500 0.122 
17 0.156 0 1.000 0.184 
Total 0.089 0 1.000 0.140 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
When analysed across treatment and non-treatment households, non-CAMPFIRE implementing 
households participate more in social groups. However, there is less variation in the number of groups 
households participate in within CAMPFIRE implementing wards. Ward 2 has the lowest participation 
rate. Non-CAMPFIRE sample has significantly higher share of social group participation, 12 (1) per 
cent compared to CAMPFIRE sample, 5 (0.7) percent, p=.000.  
The total maximum contribution of group participation to household adaptive capacity index is 0.0625. 
Table 3-10 shows that the sample has an average capacity of 0.006 (9 per cent of 0.0625). It shows that 




Table 3-10: Mean group participation contribution to adaptive capacity 
Ward 
Mean group participation 
contribution Min Max (0.065) sd 
CAMPFIRE 0.003 0 0.039 0.006 
2 0.002 0 0.023 0.004 
11 0.006 0 0.039 0.008 
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.008 0 0.063 0.010 
7 0.006 0 0.031 0.008 
17 0.010 0 0.063 0.012 
Total 0.006 0 0.063 0.009 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The Non-CAMPFIRE sample has a significantly higher group participation rate or adaptive capacity 
sub-index 0.008 (12 per cent of 0.0625) compared to the CAMPFIRE sample, at 0.003 (5 per cent of 
0.0625). Indication from the results show that there is possibly a lack of support of social clubs by the 
programme. Reports show that there had been many activities in the initial stages of the CAMPFIRE 
programme implementation, probably because there was significant financial support from donors 
towards social group formation. However, over the years the financial support has reportedly dwindled 
leading to a steep decline in the number of functional social clubs supported by the programme, and 
consequently a decline in household participation in social groups.  
 
ii. Collective action  
Collective action entails participation of households in community level activities for the benefit of the 
whole community, such as in maintaining public infrastructure as roads and bridges. In the sample, 
collective action was centred on schools, clinics, roads and bridge construction and maintenances. 
Participation in any one of these indicates collectivism. Table 3-11 shows the share of collectivism by 
ward and treatment. 
Table 3-11: Mean share of collective action by ward and treatment 
Ward Mean share of collective 
action 
Min Max 
CAMPFIRE 0.577 (0.495) 0 1 
2 0.648 (0.480) 0 1 
11 0.458 (0.502) 0 1 
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.609 (0.489) 0 1 
7 0.500 (0.503) 0 1 
17 0.706 (0.458) 0 1 
Total 0.594 (0.492) 0 1 




There is no significant difference in the mean share of collective action between households in 
CAMPFIRE and Non-CAMPFIRE implementing communities, p=0.257. Total maximum contribution 
of collective action to adaptive capacity index is 0.0625. Table 3-12 shows the mean collective action 
contribution to adaptive capacity by ward and treatment. Collective action contribution to the overall 
adaptive capacity is relatively higher for non-CAMPFIRE communities. Ward 11 has the least 
collective action contribution, indicating relatively weak bonding among the respective community 
members.  
Table 3-12: Collective action contribution 
Ward Mean collective action 
contribution to adaptive 
capacity index 
Min Max (0.0625) sd 
CAMPFIRE 0.036 0 0.0625 0.031 
2 0.040 0 0.0625 0.030 
11 0.029 0 0.0625 0.031 
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.038 0 0.0625 0.031 
7 0.031 0 0.0625 0.031 
17 0.044 0 0.0625 0.029 
Full sample 0.037 0 0.0625 0.031 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
However, there is no significant difference between the treatment and comparison samples in their 
collective action component contribution to adaptive capacity.  
iii. Social support 
Social support consists of household support from family or non-family members from both within 
(community social support) and outside the communities (outside social support). Social support 
enables community households to respond effectively to shocks and stresses that they may encounter 
through resource transfer from other households or communities.  Social support is some kind of 
cohesion created within and with outside communities, that allows resource mobilisation in dealing 
with recurrent challenges.   
Four types of social support include family, extended family, non-relative same ethnic group and non-
relative different ethnic group. Households that reported the most support got it from three (3) out of 
the four (4) community social support components. Compared to this maximum possible social support 
is very low across the sample, with CAMPFIRE areas experiencing the least share of community 
support 9 (1.00) percent, significantly lower than Non-CAMPFIRE areas, 14 (2.00) percent, p=.0024.  
Contribution of the community social support to adaptive capacity is pegged at a maximum of 0.0625 






Table 3-13: Community social support contribution to adaptive capacity  
Ward 
Community social 
support contribution to 
adaptive capacity 
Min Max (0.0625) sd 
CAMPFIRE 0.006 0 0.032 0.009 
2 0.004 0 0.021 0.008 
11 0.007 0 0.042 0.010 
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.009 0 0.053 0.014 
7 0.008 0 0.042 0.011 
17 0.009 0 0.063 0.017 
Total 0.007 0 0.063 0.012 
  Source: Survey data December 2015 
There is a significant difference between treatment and counterfactual samples; Non-CAMPFIRE have 
significantly higher community social support contribution to the adaptive capacity; p=.001.  
Share of outside social support is significantly different across treatments. CAMPFIRE wards’ share of 
social support from outside of their communities is lower; approximately 9 (1.00) percent compared to 
Non-CAMPFIRE areas, 13 (2.00) percent.  
The contribution of outside social support to the adaptive capacity index is also low. Results show that 
to the allocated 0.0625 points, it contributes only 0.007 points. None treated sample has higher (0.008) 
social support compared to 0.005 for treated sample. 
Social capital contribution to adaptive capacity index is pegged at 0.25 or 25 percentage points of the 
overall adaptive capacity index. The social capital component contribution to adaptive capacity for the 
full sample is 0.06 (or 24 per cent of 0.25 maximum possible). Table 3-14 shows the different social 
capital components contribution to adaptive capacity by treatment.  
Table 3-14: Social capital components contribution to adaptive capacity by treatment 
Social capital component CAMPFIRE Non-CAMPFIRE 
Index (Max. for 
each component 
=0.0625) 
Proportion (%) of 
maximum contribution 
Index (Max. for each 
component =0.0625) 
Proportion (%) of 
maximum 
contribution 
Participation in groups 0.003 4.8 0.008 12.8 
Collective action  0.036 57.6 0.038 60.8 
Within Community support  0.006 9.6 0.009 14.4 
Outside social support  0.005 8 0.008 12.8 
 Max=0.25  Max=0.25  
All 0.05 20 0.063 25.2 




CAMPFIRE areas have statistically lower social capital, 0.049±0.002 (20 per cent) compared to Non-
CAMPFIRE areas, 0.0627±0.003 (25.2 per cent), p=.002. Figure 5 shows that there is a large social 
capital deficit across the sample; CAMPFIRE communities have a deeper social capital deficit 
compared to non-CAMPFIRE areas. 
 
Figure 5: Social capital contribution to adaptive capacity by treatment (Sources: Survey data December 2015) 
This result is supported by the fact that funding of social clubs stopped in the early 2000s when donor 
funding stopped (Tchakatumba 2019). Social clubs used to have direct budget support during the early 
years of the programme and as the economic situation in the country became more and more bleak; the 
programme budget was not adequate to support anything outside of infrastructure development 
(Muyengwa 2017). Muyengwa (2017) further reports that elite capture led to a fall in active 
participation in the programme and any related activities.  
3.11.1.5 Human capital 
The human capital component contributes up to a maximum of 0.25 to the total adaptive capacity index. 
Human capital is composed of household head share of education and household members share of 
skills. Education component contribute 0.125 to the human capital component. Compared to 11 years 
of education regarded as basic in the country, the CAMPFIRE sample has smaller share of household 
head years of education, 0.51 compared to Non-CAMPFIRE sample with 0.62, p=.002  
The most diversified household in the sample was found to have members trained in a maximum of 
three skills categories, and this is used as the maximum possible. Skills training is generally low across 
the sample. Less than one-quarter have vocational training and about one-fifth have natural resources 




There are no significant differences between the treatment and the counterfactual samples relative to 
share of skills (Table 3-15).  
Table 3-15: Mean share of skills by treatment 
Treatment 
Mean share of 
skills 
Proportion (%) of 
maximum 
contribution/ 
capacity Min Max sd 
CAMPFIRE 0.020 16.32 0 0.125 0.030 
Non-CAMFIRE 0.019 15.52 0 0.125 0.031 
Total 0.020 15.91 0 0.125 0.031 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Table 3-16 shows the human capital component, combining share of household head education level 
and trainings received by household members. Non-CAMPFIRE areas have significantly higher share 
of human capital compared, 0.096 to CAMPFIRE areas, and 0.084. Probably members in non-treated 
areas self-support in acquiring skills, as they have to meet all their household needs as opposed to treated 
sample that rely heavily on public income and support from the programme. Human capital component 
contributes one third in CAMPFIRE areas while it contributes about two fifths in Non-CAMPFIRE 
areas, out of the maximum 0.25 points it can contribute; p=0.0232.  
Table 3-16: Mean share of human capital 
Treatment 






capacity Min  Max  sd 
CAMPFIRE 0.084 
33.6 
0 0.25 0.057 
Non-CAMFIRE 0.096 
38.4 
0 0.25 0.061 
Total 0.090 
36.0 
0 0.25 0.059 












Figure 6 shows that CAMPFIRE communities have a larger deficit in human capital capacity. 
 
Figure 6: Human Capital index by treatment (Sources: Survey data December 2015) 
 
3.11.1.6 Access to public service 
Results show that access to education facilities is high across the two sub-samples; about 87 per cent of 
surveyed households live within the prescribed or standard radius of 5 km to the nearest primary school. 
On the other hand, CAMPFIRE communities have higher access to health facilities; 99 per cent live 
within the 10 km prescribed radius compared to 81 per cent for non-CAMPFIRE communities in the 
sample. 
Table 3-17 shows access to education and health combined. The index range from 0-1 with 1 
representing a household that has 100 per cent access (capacity) to both or in other words living within 
5 km radius from the nearest primary school and within 10 km radius from the nearest health facility.  
Table 3-17: Mean share of public service 
Ward 
Mean share of 
public service Min. Max. sd 
CAMPFIRE  0.928 0 1 0.190 
2 0.889 0 1 0.227 
11 0.993 0.5 1 0.059 
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.845 0 1 0.296 
7 0.944 0.5 1 0.159 
17 0.757 0 1 0.358 
Total 0.885 0 1 0.254 




Access to public service contributes 0.25 points (25 per cent) to the adaptive capacity index, with the 
sub-components access to education and health contributing 0.125 each. Table 3-18 shows that 
CAMPFIRE communities on average have a higher capacity or access to public service compared to 
non-CAMPFIRE communities. CAMPFIRE communities have approximately 93 per cent access level 
or capacity. The difference is statistically significant, p=.0005.  
Table 3-18: Public infrastructure service contribution to adaptive capacity 
WARD 
Mean contribution of 
share of public 
service to overall 
adaptive capacity  
Proportion(%) 
contribution/capacity 
level (0.25=100%) Min.  Max. sd 
CAMPFIRE 0.232 92.78 0 0.25 0.048 
2 0.222 88.93 0 0.25 0.057 
11 0.248 99.31 0.125 0.25 0.015 
Non-
CAMPFIRE 0.211 84.54 0 0.25 0.074 
7 0.236 94.39 0.125 0.25 0.040 
17 0.189 75.69 0 0.25 0.089 
Total 0.221 88.53 0 0.25 0.063 
 Source: Survey data December 2015 
Figure 7 shows that access to public service is high across the sample. CAMPFIRE communities have 
higher capacity compared to non-CAMPFIRE communities and the deficit is shallow.  
 
Figure 7: Public service contribution to adaptive capacity (Sources: Survey data December 2015) 
The different components of adaptive capacity were tested using student’s ttest procedure to see if they 
are significantly different between campfire and non-campfire areas. Only physical capital adaptive 
capacity component is significantly higher in campfire areas than in non-campfire areas. The rest are 




Table 3-19: Adaptive capacity components  
ttest by campfire Coef. Std. Err 
Economic capital  -0.010*** 0.002 
Social capital -0.013*** 0.004 
human capital -0.010* 0.005 
Physical capital  0.036*** 0.007 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The following section discusses the adaptive capacity of the sample households.  
 
3.11.1.7 Adaptive Capacity Index (ACI) 
This section summarises the adaptive capacity of the sample households. The adaptive capacity index 
is a measure of the level of potential that a household has, shown by a set of selected components, 
access to public service, human capital, social capital and economic capital.  Table 3-20 shows the 
adaptive capacity index (ACI) of the treatment and control sub-samples. 
Table 3-20: Adaptive capacity index by treatment 
Ward 
Adaptive Capacity 
Index Min. Max. sd 
CAMPFIRE 0.438 0.106 0.727 0.099 
2 0.421 0.106 0.637 0.100 
11 0.468 0.299 0.727 0.088 
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.450 0.137 0.757 0.118 
7 0.445 0.183 0.633 0.102 
17 0.455 0.137 0.757 0.131 
Total 0.444 0.106 0.757 0.109 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The results show that on average the non-CAMPFIRE communities have a higher adaptive capacity 
than CAMPFIRE communities do. However, there is within group heterogeneity. Within the 
CAMPFIRE communities, Ward 11 has the highest adaptive capacity compared to all sub-groups while 
ward 2, which falls within the CAMPFIRE sub-group, has the lowest capacity across all the sub-groups. 
There are no statistically significant differences in adaptive capacity between CAMPFIRE and Non-
CAMPFIRE communities, p=. 427. 
Figure 8 shows the distribution or contribution of each sub-component of the adaptive capacity and the 
associated deficits to reach the desired or optimum level. For both, the deficit level is above one-half. 
The largest contribution to adaptive capacity comes from access to public infrastructure or 




possible; 88 per cent. Social capital contributes the least followed by economic capital and human 
capital respectively.  
 
Figure 8: Adaptive capacity components (Sources: Survey data December 2015) 
Access to public infrastructure in non-CAMPFIRE contribute less (0.19) than in CAMPFIRE 
communities (0.22) (Figure 9).   
 
Figure 9: Adaptive Capacity Index by treatment and sub-components (Sources: Survey data December 2015) 
The following section discusses the results of regression adjustments results showing the treatment 
effect on adaptive capacity. 
  
3.11.2  CAMPFIRE programme Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATET) 
Propensity score matching, regression adjustment and potential outcome means and regression 




























adaptive capacity components. Propensity score matching and regression adjustment analyses were run, 
controlling for confounding factors or covariates such as household ethnicity, marital status, religion 
and whether the household has members in urban or outside the country. Results as discussed in the 
following sub-sections show that the programme effect is negative on social, economic and human 
capacities while positive for transformative/physical capacity. The programme however, has positive 
effect on the overall adaptive capacity. The results from propensity score and regression adjustment 
treatment effect analysis procedures are similar.   
3.11.2.1 CAMPFIRE programme effect on average household social capital 
i. Results from propensity score matching  
To run the propensity scoring the covariates were tested for association with the treatment variable, 
CAMPFIRE, using logistic regression procedure. Results of the test show that the variable campfire is 
associated with variables displayed in Table 3-21. The variables were used to estimate propensity 
scores.  
Table 3-21: Test of association with treatment variable: Logistic regression results 
campfire Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
Traditional 6.382 1.987 5.950 0.000 3.466 11.748 
Karanga 0.127 0.073 -3.580 0.000 0.041 0.394 
Apostolic 0.427 0.126 -2.890 0.004 0.239 0.761 
Widow 0.103 0.055 -4.240 0.000 0.036 0.294 
Sex of household head 0.237 0.110 -3.090 0.002 0.095 0.590 
Christian gathering 16.654 17.546 2.670 0.008 2.112 131.317 
Zezuru 0.399 0.167 -2.190 0.029 0.176 0.908 
_cons 3.833 1.856 2.780 0.006 1.484 9.899 
 
Table 3-22 shows that the propensity score is about 33% in non-CAMPFIRE and 65% in CAMPFIRE 
treatment groups.  
Table 3-22: Summary of probability of selecting into campfire programme 
campfire Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
Non-CAMPF 0.331 0.222 207 
CAMPFIRE 0.647 0.247 194 
Total 0.484 0.283 401 








Table 3-23 below shows results of matching sample households in each treatment on the propensity 
score.  
Table 3-23: Matching results 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Diaspora Unmatched 0.015 0.029 -0.014 0.015 -0.910 
 ATT 0.019 0.029 -0.010 0.022 -0.450 
Urban Unmatched 0.206 0.140 0.066 0.038 1.750 
 ATT 0.204 0.136 0.068 0.052 1.300 
Married Unmatched 0.840 0.744 0.096 0.040 2.380 
 ATT 0.816 0.796 0.019 0.055 0.350 
Divorced Unmatched 0.052 0.039 0.013 0.021 0.620 
 ATT 0.039 0.068 -0.029 0.031 -0.930 
Never married Unmatched 0.015 0.014 0.001 0.012 0.080 
 ATT 0.029 0.019 0.010 0.022 0.450 
Widow Unmatched 0.093 0.203 -0.110 0.035 -3.120 
 ATT 0.117 0.117 0.000 0.045 0.000 
Sex of household 
head Unmatched 0.814 0.787 0.027 0.040 0.670 
 ATT 0.825 0.825 0.000 0.053 0.000 
Foreigners Unmatched 0.072 0.068 0.005 0.026 0.180 
 ATT 0.126 0.126 0.000 0.047 0.000 
Karanga Unmatched 0.021 0.155 -0.134 0.028 -4.810 
 ATT 0.029 0.029 0.000 0.024 0.000 
Korekore Unmatched 0.665 0.469 0.196 0.049 4.030 
 ATT 0.524 0.553 -0.029 0.070 -0.420 
Other ethnicity Unmatched 0.036 0.014 0.022 0.016 1.390 
 ATT 0.058 0.019 0.039 0.027 1.440 
Zezuru Unmatched 0.057 0.159 -0.103 0.031 -3.330 
 ATT 0.058 0.058 0.000 0.033 0.000 
Apostolic Unmatched 0.149 0.430 -0.280 0.043 -6.460 
 ATT 0.262 0.262 0.000 0.062 0.000 
Christian gathering Unmatched 0.072 0.005 0.067 0.019 3.600 
 ATT 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.014 0.000 
No religion Unmatched 0.067 0.092 -0.025 0.027 -0.910 
 ATT 0.126 0.126 0.000 0.047 0.000 
Pentecostal Unmatched 0.119 0.188 -0.070 0.036 -1.940 
 ATT 0.194 0.155 0.039 0.053 0.730 
Protestant Unmatched 0.108 0.126 -0.017 0.032 -0.540 
 ATT 0.204 0.146 0.058 0.053 1.100 
Roman Catholic Unmatched 0.015 0.024 -0.009 0.014 -0.620 
 ATT 0.029 0.049 -0.019 0.027 -0.720 
Traditional Unmatched 0.469 0.097 0.372 0.041 9.140 
  ATT 0.175 0.175 0.000 0.053 0.000 




Using the common support procedure units that had propensity scores that lie outside of the range of 
the control group were excluded (Table 3-24). 
Table 3-24: Common support 
psmatch2: Treatment 
assignment 
psmatch2: common support  
Off support On support Total 
Untreated  0 207 207 
Treated 91 103 194 
Total 91 310 401 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
 Ninety-one (91) households in the campfire treatment group had propensity scores that had values 
outside of the control group range and therefore could not find matches. Thus, 103 households were 
used to match with 207 households in the control group, with no replacement.  
Using the propensity scores, 5 blocks or strata were generated with the indicated lower bound of each 
group (Table 3-25). The balancing property for each group is satisfied, and each block has the same 
mean; in the treatment and control groups, while individual units vary.    
Table 3-25: Number of households in each block 
Inferior of block pscore 
Non-
CAMPFIRE CAMPFIRE Total 
0.045 61 4 65 
0.2 66 30 96 
0.4 41 42 83 
0.6 10 24 34 
0.8 15 94 109 
Total 193 194 387 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Table 3-26 show the within strata variation for each of the adaptive capacity components and between 
treatment and counterfactual sub-groups.    
Table 3-26: Mean capacities by treatment and counterfactual 
Blocks 











mean mean mean mean mean mean mean 
1 0.052 0.067 0.077 0.079 0.080 0.139 0.191 
2 0.068 0.046 0.063 0.056 0.068 0.066 0.167 
3 0.077 0.050 0.070 0.067 0.109 0.085 0.195 
4 0.067 0.056 0.067 0.060 0.065 0.053 0.163 
5 0.044 0.048 0.066 0.057 0.064 0.066 0.208 
All 0.063 0.049 0.069 0.060 0.080 0.070 0.183 





Table 3-27 shows the average treatment effect of the programme on the subjects in the programme 
implementing areas. The table shows that the programme has significant negative effect on economic 
capacity and no impact on social and human capacities. Results also show that the programme 
significantly improves household physical or transformative capacities while it has no impact on the 
overall household impact.    
Table 3-27: Propensity score matching results showing the ATET  
Capacity Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [90% Conf. Interval 
Economic capacity -0.009 0.003 -2.530 0.011 -0.013 -0.003 
Social capital -0.014 0.006 -0.230 0.818 -0.012 0.009 
Human capital -0.010 0.009 -0.610 0.541 -0.020 0.009 
Physical capital 0.038 0.013 2.350 0.019 0.009 0.053 
Adaptive capacity 0.004 0.019 0.400 0.689 -0.024 0.039 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Household economic capacity for example drops by 0.009 points if the subject is under the 
programme while physical capacity significantly improves by 0.038 points.  
 
ii. Results from regression adjustment 
Social Capital 
Table 3-28 shows the Potential Outcome Means of the social capital component. If none of the 
households in the sample were not treated to the programme then the expected average social capital 
capacity would be 0.062. If all households were treated to the programme the expected social capital 
capacity would be 0.051.    
Table 3-28: Social Capital Potential Outcome Means 
Social Capital Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
POmeans       
campfire       
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.062 0.004 15.300 0.000 0.054 0.070 
CAMPFIRE 0.051 0.003 16.910 0.000 0.045 0.057 








Table 3-29 shows the average amount by which social capital is affected by the decision to implement 
CAMPFIRE programme. 
Table 3-29: CAMPFIRE effect on social capital 
Social Capital Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
ATE       
 campfire  
(CAMPFIRE vs Non-CAMPFIRE) -0.011 0.005 -2.170 0.030 -0.021 -0.001 
Potential Outcome mean (POmean)       
campfire Non-CAMPFIRE 0.062 0.004 15.300 0.000 0.054 0.070 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The average social capital if all sample households were under the CAMPFIRE programme would be 
0.011 less than the average of 0.062 that would occur if none of the households were under the 
programme. 
Table 3-30 shows the average amount by which social capital of households under the programme are 
affected by the programme, ATET.   
Table 3-30: Average treatment effect of the treatment programme on CAMPFIRE households 
Social Capital Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
ATET       
 campfire  
(CAMPFIRE vs Non-CAMPFIRE) -0.011 0.007 -1.690 0.091 -0.024 0.002 
Potential Outcome mean (POmean)        
campfire  
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.061 0.006 10.090 0.000 0.049 0.072 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The average social capital in this case is 0.011 less for CAMPFIRE households than the average of 
0.061 that would have occurred if these households were not implementing the programme. Thus the 
programme has a negative effect on social capital.  
Human capacity 
Human capital potential outcome means are lower in the treatment group compared to the 
counterfactual groups (Table 3-31). 
Table 3-31: Potential Outcome Means 
Human Capital Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
POmeans       
campfire       
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.078 0.004 20.350 0.000 0.070 0.085 





Table 3-32 indicates the average treatment effect of the programme on household human capital.    
Table 3-32: ATE of CAMPFIRE programme on household human capital 
Human Capital Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATE       
campfire  
CAMPFIRE vs Non-CAMPFIRE -0.002 0.005 -0.350 0.723 -0.012 0.009 
POmean       
campfire Non-CAMPFIRE 0.078 0.004 20.350 0.000 0.070 0.085 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The average human capital if the full sample were to implement the programme would be 0.002 less 
than the average of 0.078 that would occur if none of the households were implementing the 
programme.   
Table 3-33 shows the average treatment effect on the treated.   
Table 3-33: ATET of CAMPFIRE programme on household human capital 
Human Capital Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATET       
campfire  
CAMPFIRE vs Non-CAMPFIRE -0.006 0.006 -1.020 0.309 -0.018 0.006 
POmean       
campfire  
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.076 0.005 14.220 0.000 0.066 0.087 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The CAMPFIRE programme has a negative effect on household human capital; the outcome is less 
when the households implement the programme than if they do not.  
Household economic capacity 
The economic capacity potential outcome means are lower in the treatment subgroup compared to the 
counterfactual group (Table 3-34). 
Table 3-34: Household economic capacity Potential outcome means 
Economic Capacity Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
POmeans       
campfire       
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.069 0.002 39.160 0.000 0.065 0.072 





Table 3-35 shows the average treatment effect of the programme on physical capacity.   
Table 3-35: ATE of CAMPFIRE programme on economic capacity 
Economic capacity Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
ATE       
campfire  
CAMPFIRE vs Non-CAMPFIRE -0.007 0.002 -2.920 0.004 -0.012 -0.002 
POmean       
campfire  
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.069 0.002 39.160 0.000 0.065 0.072 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
If all households were under the programme they would have less average economic capacity or capital 
by 0.007, than the average of 0.069 if they were not implementing the programme (Table 3-36). 
Table 3-36: Average programme effect on the treated 
Economic Capacity Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATET       
campfire  
CAMPFIRE vs Non-CAMPFIRE -0.008 0.003 -2.810 0.005 -0.013 -0.002 
POmean       
campfire       
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.068 0.002 27.860 0.000 0.063 0.072 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The economic capacity is 0.008 less when treated than the average of 0.068 that would have occurred 
if all households were not under the programme (Table 56).   
Physical or transformative capacity 
Table 3-37 shows the potential outcome means of household physical capital. Potential outcome for 
physical capacity is significantly higher for the treated sub-sample.  
Table 3-37: Physical capital potential outcome means 
Physical Capacity Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
POmeans       
campfire       
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.184 0.008 22.780 0.000 0.168 0.200 
CAMPFIRE 0.223 0.005 47.220 0.000 0.213 0.232 






Tables 3-38 and 3-39 shows the average treatment effect and average treatment effect on the treated 
respectively of the programme on household physical capital. If all households were under the 
programme the outcome would be 0.039 higher than if they were all not under the programme (Table 
3-38).  
Table 3-38: Programme average treatment effect on physical capital 
Physical Capital capacity Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATE       
campfire  
CAMPFIRE vs Non-CAMPFIRE 0.039 0.009 4.120 0.000 0.020 0.057 
POmean       
campfire       
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.184 0.008 22.780 0.000 0.168 0.200 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
On the other hand, the potential outcome means for the treated group would be 0.038 higher under 
treatment than if they were not treated (Table 3-39).   
Table 3-39: Programme average treatment effect on the treated on household physical capacity 
Physical capacity Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATET       
campfire  
CAMPFIRE vs Non-CAMPFIRE 0.038 0.013 2.960 0.003 0.013 0.064 
POmean       
campfire       
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.183 0.012 14.930 0.000 0.159 0.207 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
 
Overall household adaptive capacity 
Table 3-40 indicates that potential outcome means for the treated would be higher under treatment than 
if not treated.  
Table 3-40: Household Adaptive Capacity Potential Outcome means 
Adaptive Capacity Index Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
POmeans       
campfire       
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.393 0.010 40.82 0 0.374 0.412 
CAMPFIRE 0.411 0.009 45.48 0 0.393 0.428 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The potential outcome for non-CAMPFIRE is 0.39 or 39 per cent. That is, if all the sample households 




The potential Outcome means if all households were implementing the programme would have a value 
0.41.     
Associated regression equations are on Appendix B, where the coefficients for the equation labelled 
OME1 is the linear equation used to estimate the treated potential outcome mean, and OME0 estimates 
the non-treated potential outcome mean.   
The average household adaptive capacity if all households were to implement the programme would be 
0.018 points more than the average of 0.393 that would occur if none of the households were under the 
programme or treatment (Table 3-41).   
Table 3-41: ATE Adaptive Capacity 
Adaptive Capacity Index Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATE       
Campfire 
CAMPFIRE vs Non-CAMPFIRE 0.018 0.013 1.380 0.168 -0.007 0.043 
POmean       
campfire       
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.393 0.010 40.820 0.000 0.374 0.412 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The programme increases the average household adaptive capacity by 0.012 points for the households 
currently implementing the programme than if they were not. However, the difference is not significant 
(Table 3-42).   
Table 3-42: ATET of CAMPFIRE programme on household Adaptive Capacity 
Adaptive Capacity Index Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATET       
campfire  
CAMPFIRE vs Non-CAMPFIRE 0.012 0.016 0.780 0.438 -0.019 0.043 
POmean       
campfire       
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.388 0.014 27.250 0.000 0.360 0.415 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
 
3.11.3  Regression discontinuity results 
 
Table 3-43 shows that CAMPFIRE is a significant factor in explaining variation in economic, social 
and physical capitals variation. A unit change in selection to CAMPFIRE reduces economic and social 
capital. However, CAMPFIRE treatment significantly increases transformative capacity. Migration of 




a household member in the diaspora for example increases the economic and human capacities. 
Meanwhile having a household member in an urban area increases the economic and social capital 
adaptive capacity components.    
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3.12 Discussion and conclusion 
 
The paper set outs first to determine the adaptive capacity of the sample households. Results show that 
households experience a set of shocks and stresses including climate and economic. Areas 
implementing wildlife programme experience a significantly higher share of shocks and stresses (41% 
compared to 37%). They also experience additional wildlife related shocks such as crop raids and 




CAMPFIRE implementing communities have a slightly higher adaptive capacity, 45% compared to 
43.8% in CAMPFIRE areas. However, the difference between the overall adaptive capacity of 
households in CAMPFIRE areas and households in non-CAMPFIRE implementing areas is not 
significant, p=.427.  
Significant differences emerge when analysis goes down to the different adaptive capacity components. 
The four adaptive capacity components that are analysed in the paper are human capital, economic 
capital, social capital and physical capital. Physical capital is the only component that is significantly 
higher in CAMPFIRE implementing communities, 88% compared to 76% for non-CAMPFIRE areas.. 
From the regression functional form the CAMPFIRE programme implementation significantly 
increases access to public service such as education and health. The result is particularly important as 
it reflects the impact of the programme on access to public services resulting from targeted investment 
in public goods and services. The programme has made investments in public infrastructure that 
improved the physical capital component of the household adaptive capacity.  
On the other hand, the other three components were found to be significantly lower in communities 
implementing wildlife programmes. Regression results show that the wildlife programme significantly 
lowers the economic and social capacity components while there seem to be no effect on the human 
capital component. The result is a reflection of the investment trajectory in most communities 
implementing wildlife; less than 30 percent of wildlife income has been invested towards livelihoods, 
human and social capital. Thus, there are important components that CAMPFIRE may need to prioritise. 
For example, by increasing the level of investment in the other three components, namely livelihoods, 
human and social capital, might yield improvement in the specific adaptive capacity components.  
In conclusion, the government of Zimbabwe initiated the Communal areas management programme for 
indigenous resources as a rural development instrument. The arrangement allows the engagement of 
private safari operators by communal people through their local authorities. Safari hunting became an 
economic driver to generating income, a proportion of which goes to the producer communities. Past 
assessments show that poverty has remained high (Dzingirai 2015). At the same time, these are areas 
that experience multiple layers of shocks and stresses including economic, political, social as well as 
environmental. This study argues that the assessments did not give due attention to what happens to the 
income that communities generate.  Jones   (2004) notes that across southern Africa a larger proportion 
of the generated income is invested in public infrastructure. This is where the answer lies, why poverty 
has remained persistently high in these marginal areas. The paper therefore sets out to investigate if 
such an investment configuration has had positive impact on the relevant livelihoods components.  
Further interest is how the programme can be a tool to improve household adaptive capacity and related 
components. This is against a backdrop that adaptation has become an important tool for communities 




argument is that CBNRM programmes have the potential to improve capacities of communities to deal 
with recurrent shocks and stresses even though the initial design was targeted at improving wildlife 
biodiversity and reducing poverty (Taylor 2009, Murphre 2009, Hutton et al. 2005). Brooks and Adger 
2007 argue that in building capacities, interventions need to know specific capacities to target; and the 
CAMPFIRE programme has the potential to do that. Results from this study confirm the need to know 
what capacities to address. The impact of the programme has not been uniform across the different 
components of adaptive capacity. This has largely been a result of skewed investment towards public 
infrastructure development (Jones 204). Results show that the programme has significantly improved 
physical capacity of the respective communities through access to and consumption of public 
infrastructure. This demonstrates that governments and interventions can model programmes to address 
specific adaptive capacity or livelihoods components sustainably.  The study supports claims by the 
public investment theory; that investing in public infrastructure improve the consumption of public 
goods and services by households (Rajaram et al. 2014). However, in agreement with earlier studies the 
programme has failed improve other components of adaptive capacity and livelihoods. This is so 
because implementation on the ground has not put required investments towards other capacity 
components. The result is also consistent with public investment theory.  
There has also been a shift from leaving public infrastructure development to market forces (UN 2018). 
Over the life span of the Millenum Development Goals very little infrastructure improvement was 
experienced, leading to rethinking and pushing public investment back to national and local 
governments (UN 2018). This is supported by results from this study that public investment can only 
be sustained through public funds, not private sector as they are profit oriented and therefore interested  
in quick returns. In the context of CBNRM publicly generated income has managed to sustain public 
infrastructure and physical capacity of the respective households and communities.  
The study also shows that CBNRM can play a role in improving adaptation, though depending on the 
investment configuration. Adaptation has become a requirement for effective economic development 
(Thathsarani and Gunaratne 2017). CBNRM makes adaptations to be efficient at the individual level as 
costs are lower than benefits (Mendelsohn 2012). CBNRM allows public infrastructure developments 
to be funded at community level rather than direct contribution from households. 
 







4 Chapter 4: Determinants and implications of the affect 
heuristic on subjects in community based wildlife management 
systems 
By  
Collen Matema7, Edwin Muchapondwa8, Jeanette Manjengwa9 
 
4.1 Abstract 
The objective of the paper is to explain people’s behaviour and stated preferences in 
communities implementing wildlife programmes. The behaviours such as poaching and 
revenge killing of wild animals have emerged to be difficult to explain using expected utility 
theory. This paper argues that heuristic theory from psychology can explain some of the 
observed or stated human behaviour and stated preferences. The paper aims to determine 
whether subjects’ past encounters with wild animals influence the development of negative 
feelings/ ‘affect’; and whether the negative affect leads subjects (1) to engage in self-reported 
behaviours such as poaching and killing of wild animals and (2) to state preferences for 
community based wildlife programmes. Two models are developed; an  𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 →
𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 → 𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑟 model and an 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 → 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 → 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 model, which are  
then applied to subjects in Community Based Wildlife Management context in Zimbabwe.. 
Using both qualitative and survey methodologies subjects were asked to describe their feelings 
towards wild animals, how they relate especially with dangerous wild animals such as 
elephants, lions, buffaloes and their past encounters with the respective wild animals.  
Logistic regression results point to encounters with wild animals being statistically significant 
predictors of negative affect or feelings; which in turn is a key determinant of people engaging 
inpoaching and killing wild animals in revenge or as a deterrent from destroying fields, 
livestock, killing or injuring people. On the other hand, expected utility such as perceptions of 
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benefit and employment especially in the wildlife industry significantly influence stated 
preference for wildlife-based programmes; and not negative affect or feelings. The conclusion 
is that a considerable fraction of decisions by subjects in Community Wildlife-Based 
programmes can be attributed to heuristics; negative wildlife encounters and associated 
feelings. Therefore working towards generating positive markers or anchors about wildlife 
among subjects can increase tolerance of wildlife. Furthermore, improving benefits or 
perceptions of benefits can increase preferences or willingness to accept wildlife-based 
programmes by producer communal people. 
 
4.2 Introduction 
In southern Africa farmers residing adjacent wildlife areas are confronted with problems of 
decisions about livelihoods. Wildlife has been pronounced as a critical and attractive economic 
option for communities in landscapes that have high value wildlife (Taylor 2009, 
Bandyopadhyay and Tembo 2010, Tembo et al. 2009, Murphree 2009, Cumming 1990). The 
areas have low agriculture potential due to erratic climate conditions and in most cases poor 
fragile soils Cumming 1990). At the household level, farmers practise dry land cropping which 
is vulnerable to climate extremes, and to wildlife destruction through crop raids (Harrison 
2016). Thus, harvests are barely adequate to sustain them beyond the four months’ post-harvest 
period. Households also practise livestock rearing which is relatively robust compared to 
cropping but is also vulnerable to predation by wild animals. The scenario logically makes 
wildlife-based livelihoods a better economic option to include in the livelihoods mix (Murphree 
2000, 1994, 1992). Evidence show that wildlife income has improved capital investments in 
the respective areas though with less household level direct income or livelihoods positive 
impact (Jones   2004). The scenario presents an optimisation problem for the farmers who need 
to make decisions on what livelihoods options or mix to pursue, and whether to support 
wildlife-based programmes in their communities or not. I borrow heuristic theory from 
psychology. Heuristics are feelings triggered by past encounter, which influence intuitive 
behaviour (Pachur et al. 2012).  The argument I put forward is that negative experiences trigger 
emotions that override the economic attractiveness of wildlife-based livelihoods option. I 
postulate that emotions contribute to the decision-making process. However, decisions driven 
by emotions are inconsistent with classical economic optimisation or utility theory, but logical 




useful explanation in understanding some of the human decision-making processes and 
decision outcomes.   
 
Many optimisation problems in economics cannot be solved with standard preference methods 
due to discontinuities and the existence of multiple optima. Heuristic optimisation offers a 
credible solution in such cases (Slovic et al. 2004, Tversky and Kahneman 1973). As opposed 
to exact preference methods, which guarantee to give an optimum solution to problems, 
heuristic methods attempt to yield at least a good, though not necessarily optimum solution, 
satisficing (Keller et al. 2006, Evans 2006). Thus, in practical terms people often resort to 
heuristic methods to solve real optimization problems (Slovic et al. 2004, Grether and Plott 
1979). Such cases are more likely to occur in communities implementing wildlife-based 
programmes where multiple optima exist and sub-optimal options are likely to be chosen; with 
decisions influenced partly by emotions, affect.  
 
I use the affect heuristic mental models or experiential mode of thinking, to explain some of 
the seemingly inconsistent human behaviour in community based wildlife management 
regimes. The study helps to understand wildlife beneficiary communities in order to develop 
strategies that allow support of the development of common mental models that are compatible 
with sustainable wildlife management.  The study uses community based wildlife programme, 
Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), 
implemented in Mbire district, Zimbabwe over the past three decades.      
 
The heuristic or experiential mode is intuitive, automatic, natural, and is based upon images to 
which positive and negative affective feelings have been attached through learning and 
experience. This is opposed to the economic theory which is analytic, deliberative, and ‘reason’ 
based (Slovic et al. 2004, Slovic et al. 2002). This paper uses heuristic theoretical framework 
that describes the importance of experiences or encounters. The encounters evoke emotions or 
affect. These emotions or affect become readily available in the mind whenever similar 
encounters are met.  The availability is referred to as availability heuristics. Such emotional 
states become reference points or anchor in guiding judgments and decisions. Affect means the 
subjective quality of goodness or badness experienced as a feeling state (Costa et al. 2017, 
Pachur et al. 2012). Availability is the use of readily available exemplars to make decisions 
concerning the future. The paper hypothesises that subjects in a wildlife landscape are at times 




logically inconsistent but are ‘rational’ from a heuristic point of view. The following three 
hypotheses are tested: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Negative encounters with wildlife influence negative emotions, affect towards 
wild animals 
 
Hypothesis 2. Negative affect, including the associated availability and anchoring heuristics 
determine Resource Degrading Behaviours that subjects in wildlife areas engage in. 
  
Hypothesis 3. Stated Preferences of wildlife programmes are in part driven by past negative 
encounters with wild animals and generated feelings, affect. 
 
The paper does not demean or denigrate the analytic or expected utility theory, but offers an 
alternative explanation to economic behaviours that may seem inconsistent with logic and 
probability theory.    
 
4.3 Analytic-heuristics debate 
There are two broad theories of how the mind works; logic and probability on the one hand, 
representing the classical ‘economic reasoning’, and heuristics on the other, which defies the 
classical economic model. Classical theories in most disciplines such as economics, social 
science, psychology and philosophy are based on the assumption that people are ‘rational’ or 
‘logical’ (Harman 2013, Frank and Goodman 2012, Plott 1987). Since people are regarded as 
‘rational’ they are expected to act and behave according to the axioms of expected utility theory 
and reason according to the laws of logic or probability theories (Oaksford and Chater 2007). 
 
Logic is a theory of perfect human reasoning and inference. Logic focuses on truth 
preservation. Mental logic and associated logic inspired systems view the mind in terms of its 
ability to solve syllogisms and maintain consistency between beliefs (Johnson-Laird 1983). 
Logic sees the mind as an intuitive logician (Schulan 2019, Gigerenzer 1991). Thus, from the 
classical economic view, a decision maker or the economic man is seen as one knowing perfect 
information and ‘rationally’ making choices that bring the most utility. The economic man, 
Homo oeconomicus, is characterised as being motivated by self-interest and capable of making 
‘rational’ decisions. Economic theory of decision making, expected utility theory, was 




1993, Schoemaker 1982). The model predicts how people would behave or make decisions if 
they followed certain axioms of ‘rational’ decision making. The main axioms of the expected 
utility theory are: 
  
1) Alternatives order - Rational decision makers should be able to compare any two 
alternatives 
2) Dominance - Rational decision makers do not adopt strategies that are dominated by 
other strategies  
3) Cancellation - Choice between any of two alternatives depends only on outcomes that 
differ. 
4) Transitivity – Consistence in the decision-making process. If Z prefers A to B, and B 
to C then it logically follows that Z should prefer A to C.  
5) Continuity - Rational decision makers should always prefer a gamble between the best 
and worst outcome to a sure intermediate outcome if the odds of the best outcome are 
good enough, and 
6) Invariance - Rational decision makers should not be affected by the way alternatives 
are presented (Von Neuman and Morgernstern 1964). 
Yet in reality, these axioms seem to be violated with reference to wildlife based programmes.  
 
Probability theory of economic decision making emerged in the mid-17th century, replacing 
‘logical certainty’. Probability theory came in as a more modest theory of ‘rationality’. 
Probability theory acknowledges the fundamental ‘uncertainty’ of human conduct (Plous 
1993). Unlike the logical theory, probability theory portrays the mind as solving a broader set 
of goals, performing ‘inductive’ rather than logical inference. It recognises that subjects to 
decision-making lack full information and that the information contains errors. Decision 
makers are therefore make risky bets rather than inferring true consequences from assumptions. 
Probability theory suggests that the mind is an ‘intuitive statistician’ (Alder 2020, Gigerenzer 
1991), making choices based on the likelihood of future outcomes. 
 
Problem arises when people’s choices could not be explained by either logical or probability 
theories, violating the purported ‘rationality’ (Lieder et. al. 2018). A series of experiments that 
were conducted suggest that at times people’s judgments or decisions systematically violate 
the laws of logic and probability theories. The deviations from the principles of logic and 




considered to be ‘irrational, impulsive, unreasonable and passive’ according to the classical 
economic theory. These problems led researchers to search for alternative explanations when 
such cases are observed. Psychology (heuristics) became relevant in explaining human 
behaviour in such cases (, , Parpart et al. 2018, Pachur et al. 2012, Keller et al. 2006, Tversky 
and Kahneman 1973 & 1982).  
 
Kahneman and Tversky first wrote about heuristics in 1973, directly confronting classical 
economic models of ‘rational’ decision-making. Since then, a field of study called 
‘Behavioural economics’ started to develop. Researchers started to use increasingly cognitive 
psychological techniques to explain deviations of economic decision making from classical 
economic theory. Behavioural economics attempt to understand the process of decision-
making, and whether the assumptions of utility are good estimates of real behaviour (Parpart 
et al. 2018, Pachur et al. 2012, Camerer et al. 2004).  
An unrealistic assumption about “rational decision maker” or economic theory is that rational 
actors make their choices in contexts which give them absolute information and details of the 
present situation, including opportunities and risks about the future (Parpart et al. 2018, Pachur 
et al. 2012, Kahneman 2002). Further evidence comes from research on framing and mental 
accounting. Framing and mental accounting is a process of grouping gains and losses into 
separate mental accounts that affect how decisions are made (Brendl et al. 1998). In mental 
accounting theory, framing means that the way a person subjectively frames a transaction in 
the mind, or, the way that a problem is presented, will determine the perception of utility 
expected (Thaler 1999) and therefore the eventual decision outcome (Parpart et al. 2018, 
Pachur et al. 2012). 
 
Further developments reinforced the importance of subjectivity in decision making using the 
experiential system as the explanation for seemingly ‘irrational’ decision making (Thaler 
1999). The experiential system is assumed to be intimately associated with the experiences of 
affect heuristics. Affect refers to subtle feelings of which people are often unaware. For 
example, when a person responds to an emotionally significant event, the experiential system 
automatically searches its memory storage for related events, including their emotional 
associations or accompaniments. If the activated feelings are pleasant, they motivate actions 
and thoughts anticipated to reproduce the feelings. If the feelings are unpleasant, they motivate 




experiential system is regarded as holistic, pleasure and pain oriented, were behaviour is 
mediated by feelings from past experiences of events. The mind encodes reality from the past 
in concrete images, metaphors, and narratives (Pachur et al. 2012). In support Bechara et al. 
(2000) argues that thought is made largely from images, broadly construed to include perceptual and 
symbolic representations. A lifetime of learning leads these images to become “marked” by positive 
and negative feelings linked directly or indirectly to somatic or bodily states. When a negative somatic 
marker is linked to an image of a future outcome, it sounds an alarm. When a positive marker is 
associated with the outcome image, it becomes a beacon of incentive. Bechara et al. (2000) hypothesise 
that somatic markers increase the accuracy and efficiency of the decision process. So, it is about both 
the frequency of events and how vivid the imprint is on the mind; and therefore how readily 
the image can be retrieved and used as the anchor for decision making.   
 
Furthermore, behavioural economics literature also shows that when loss aversion is combined 
with narrow bracketing of decisions, there is a tendency to take decisions one at a time without 
considering the big picture. Subjects to this view can therefore have contradictions on the same 
issue depending on the context of the discussion. This is evident in asset returns (Benartzi and 
Thaler 1997), labour supply (Camerer et al. 1997) and the reluctance to sell losing stocks or 
properties (Odean 2002, 1998, Genesove and Mayer 2001) where the behavioural outcome 
contradicts ‘logic or rationality’. I presume that behaviour on the short term may be triggered 
by feelings while on the long run will be guided by expected utility or vis-versa which may 
seem illogical from the classical economic theory.     
 
However close analysis shows that there is a lot of rationality in both the classical economic 
and heuristic systems, and Seymour renamed rational system “analytic system” to differentiate 
it from other decision-making systems and revoke the claim that economic theory of rationality 
is the only ‘rational’ system (Slovic et al. 2004, 2002). Heuristics such as affect, anchoring and 
availability appear to be ‘irrational’ because they deviate from the standards of logic and 
probability which are used to assess rationality. Heuristics are reasonable compromises 
between error in judgment and the cost of computation, and hence is ‘resource-rational’. This 
departs from the classical economic view that heuristics interfere with reason; but that 
heuristics are a part of the reasoning process. Furthermore, Bentham (1948) acknowledges that 
utility originated from an affective base, and that modern economics came to view utility as 




principles of rational choice such as transitivity. This serves to acknowledge the importance of 
subjectivity in value judgement and therefore decision making.  
 
The work of Tversky and Kahneman (1973 & 1982) also show the importance of heuristics in 
decision making. They demonstrate how ‘bounded’ rational individuals employ heuristics such 
as availability, representativeness and anchoring to make judgments and how they use 
simplified strategies such as “elimination by aspects” to make choices. The importance of 
affect is being recognized increasingly by decision researchers. Epley and Gilovich (2006) for 
example argue that affective reactions to stimuli are often the very first reactions, occurring 
automatically and subsequently guiding information processing and judgment. Therefore, 
affective reactions serve as an orienting mechanism or an anchor, helping subjects to navigate 
quickly and ‘efficiently’ through a complex, uncertain, and sometimes dangerous situations 
(Epley and Gilovich 2006), and is referred to as intuition. 
 
Further work on decision making recognize that experiential or heuristic, analytic and probability modes 
of thinking are continually active, interacting in what has been characterized as “the dance of affect and 
reason” (Slovic et al. 2004, 2002). Evidence suggests that slow analytic processes may compete 
with fast heuristic processes within contextualized reasoning. From a functional point of view, 
heuristic and analytic processes often seem to compete for control of behaviour (Thaler 1999). 
Thus, none of the systems is superior, none is always the best to use in any situation. Each of 
the systems is rational and combined they become robust in understanding complex decision-
making situations and outcomes. In consequence there is not one determinate equilibrium that 
will obtain; but multiple equilibria mostly occur (Hertwig and Todd 2003). This insight is 
useful as it corrects several misunderstandings concerning heuristics: for example, that 
heuristics are always second-best strategies, that they are used only because of cognitive 
limitations, and that logic or probability is always the best way to solve a problem or come up 
with a reasonable decision.  
 
 
4.4 Anchor, affect and availability heuristic framework  
The availability heuristic is a mental shortcut that helps subjects make decisions based on how 
easy it is to bring something to mind. Availability-by-recall, a heuristic that exploits people’s 
direct experience of occurrences of risks in their social network, conformed to people’s 




middle-aged people by recalling such occurrences among one’s acquaintances (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). In 1973, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman first studied this 
phenomenon and labelled it availability heuristic. In other words, people often rely on how 
easy it is to think of examples when making a decision or judgment. The heuristic thus assumes 
that people infer the distal criterion (i.e., event frequency) by exploiting a proximal cue namely, 
the mental availability of relevant instances (Pachur et al. 2012). There are many situations in 
which the availability heuristic is useful and accurate. For example, it is part of what makes 
people intuitively careful in dangerous situations (Jacoby et al. 1989, Wanke et al. 1995). If 
the subject can think of a similar situation that ended up badly for him/her or someone else, 
then s/he is more likely to be cautious and better protect him/herself (Tversky and Kahneman 
1973). Thus, the availability heuristic relies on immediate examples that come to a subject's 
mind when evaluating a specific topic, concept, method or coming up with a decision. The 
availability heuristic operates on the notion that if something can be recalled, it must be 
important. Subsequently, under the availability heuristic people tend to weigh heavily on their 
judgments toward more recent information, making new opinions biased toward that latest 
news or any information that can quickly be recalled such as unpleasant encounters. 
 
The availability of consequences associated with an action is positively related to perceptions 
of the magnitude of the consequences of that action. In other words, the easier it is to recall the 
consequences of something the greater those consequences are often perceived to be more 
likely to occur. One simplifying strategy people may rely on is the tendency to make a judgment 
about the frequency of an event based on how many similar instances are brought to mind 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1973).  
On the contrary, other studies illustrate that manipulations intended to increase the subjective 
experience of ease of recall are also likely to affect the amount of recall. What campaigns and 
advertisement manipulate to get support, behaviour change and market dominance (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1973). Furthermore, this makes it difficult to determine if the obtained estimates 
of frequency, likelihood, or typicality are based on participants’ phenomenal experiences or on 
a biased sample of recalled information. Tversky and Kahneman suggest that availability 
provides a natural account for the illusory-correlation effect. The strength of the association 





Tversky and Kahneman concluded that people answer questions like these by comparing the 
availability of the two categories and assessing how easily they can recall these instances. For 
example, repeated exposure to vivid violence leads to an increase in people's risk estimates 
about the prevalence say of crime and violence in the real world which subsequently affect 
their decision making.   
 
Affect heuristics on the other hand are the type of feelings that are evoked with reference to 
something. It is closely linked to availability heuristic in that the most readily available are 
those that are linked strongly to emotions of pain first and pleasure at the second level (Evans 
2006). People vividly remember events that have some strong emotional accompaniment which 
have vivid mental images or markers making them readily available in the mind. Thus, affect 
and availability are inextricably bound with affect, triggering the availability of cues. 
Remembered images are associated with affect (Evans 2006). 
 
4.5 Empirical support for the heuristic theory 
Whereas risk and benefit tend to be positively correlated in the world, they are demonstrably 
negatively correlated in people’s minds and judgments. One study by Alhakami and Slovic 
(1994) finds that the inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit of an 
activity is linked to the strength of positive or negative affect associated with that activity. This 
result shows that people base their judgments of an activity, concept or technology not only on 
what they think about it but also on what they feel about it. If they like an activity, they are 
moved toward judging the risks as low and the benefits as high. If they dislike it, they tend to 
judge it as high risk and low benefit. According to this model, affect was demonstrated to come 
prior to, and directs judgments of risk and benefit (Alhakami and Slovic 1994). The conclusion 
is that if affective view guides perceptions of risk and benefit, providing information about 
benefit should change perception of risk and vice versa. For example, information stating that 
benefit is high for a technology such as nuclear power would lead to more positive overall 
affect, which would, in turn decrease perceived risk and the likely adoption of nuclear power 
usage (Alhakami and Slovic 1994).  
 
In another study Finucane et al. (2000) conducted an experiment, providing four different kinds 
of information designed to manipulate affect by increasing or decreasing perceived benefit or 




confirmed. Because by design there was no apparent logical relationship between the 
information provided and the non-manipulated variable, these data support the theory that risk 
and benefit judgments are influenced, at least in part, by the overall affective evaluation, which 
was influenced by the information provided. A second experiment by Finucane et al. (2000) 
finds that the inverse relationship between perceived risks and benefits increase greatly under 
time pressure, when opportunity for analytic deliberation was reduced. These two experiments 
demonstrate that affect influences judgment directly and is not simply a response to a prior 
analytic evaluation. 
In another, the study sought to analyse the role of the availability heuristic in financial markets. 
The researchers defined and tested two aspects of the availability heuristic; outcome and risk 
availability. Outcome availability test looked at availability of positive and negative investment 
outcomes, while risk availability focused on availability of financial risk. On days of 
substantial stock market moves, abnormal stock price reactions to upgrades were observed to 
be weaker, than those to downgrades (Lee et al. 2008). These availability effects were shown 
to be significant even after controlling for event-specific and company-specific factors.  
Similarly, research has pointed out that under the availability heuristic, humans are not reliable 
because they assess probabilities by giving more weight to current or easily recalled 
information instead of processing all relevant information. Since information regarding the 
current state of the economy is readily available, in one study researchers attempted to expose 
the properties of business cycles to predict the availability bias in analysts' growth forecasts. 
They show that the availability heuristic does play a role in analysis of forecasts and influence 
investments because of this (Lee et al., 2008). 
Further work by Dreman et al., 2010 also shows that in effect, investors use availability 
heuristic to make decisions, and subsequently, ‘may be obstructing their own investment 
success’. It was shown that an investor's lingering perceptions of a terrible market environment 
may cause them to view investment opportunities through an exaggeratedly negative lens, 
making it less appealing to consider taking on investment risk. To illustrate, Franklin 
Templeton's annual Global Investor Sentiment Survey in the US asked individuals how they 
believed the SandP 500 Index performed in 2009, 2010 and 2011. Approximately 66 per cent 
of respondents stated that they believed the market was either flat or down in 2009, 48 percent 
said the same about 2010 and 53 percent also said the same about 2011. In reality, the SandP 




percent annual returns in 2011, meaning lingering perceptions based on dramatic, painful 
events were impacting decision-making even when those events are over (Dreman et al., 2010).  
 
Another factor that affects the availability heuristic in frequency and probability is exemplars. 
Exemplars are the typical examples that stand out during the process of recall. One example of 
the availability heuristic and exemplars is a study that showed that seeing a shark in the ocean 
has greater impact on the observers’ memories than seeing a dolphin (Dreman et al., 2010). It 
was shown that if people see both sharks and dolphins in the ocean, they will be less aware of 
seeing the dolphins, because the dolphins had less impact on their memory. Due to the greater 
impact of seeing a shark, the availability heuristic can influence the probability judgement of 
the ratio of sharks and dolphins in the water. 
 
Another example from the investment behaviour is the simple heuristic 1/N rule. It states that 
investors should allocate their money equally to N investment windows and results show that 
there is considerable empirical evidence for this heuristic. Approximately one half of people 
studied intuitively rely on this simple heuristic, and most consider only three or four funds to 
invest in, though criticised as ‘unreasonable’ by behavioural finance. One study compared the 
results of 12 optimal asset allocation policies with the results of the 1/N rule in seven allocation 
problems, such as allocating one’s money to 10 American industry portfolios. The 12 policies 
included Bayesian and non-Bayesian models of optimal choice. Despite their complexity, none 
of the 12 policies could beat the 1/N heuristic on various financial measures (DeMiguel, 
Garlappi and Uppal 2006). 
 
This raised the question about how a heuristic strategy can be better than an optimizing one. 
Results from a number of studies show that the optimization models performed better at data 
fitting, adjusting their parameters to the data of the past 10 or so years, than the simple heuristic 
did, but they performed worse at predicting the future (DeMiguel, Garlappi and Uppal 2006). 
Thus, they over fitted the past data. In contrast, the 1/N heuristic, which does not estimate any 
parameter, cannot over fit. Thus at issue is not computational intractability, but robustness. 
Note that 1/N is not generally superior to optimization or vice versa. The important question 
of when, in fact, it does better predict the future can be answered by studying the ecological 
rationality of a heuristic. Three relevant environmental features for the performance of 1/N are 
known: the predictive uncertainty of the problem, the number (N) of assets, and the size of the 





Slovic et al. (2002) tested the limits of probability dominance heuristic by asking one group of 
subjects to rate the attractiveness of a simple gamble (7/36, win $9) on a 0–20 scale and asking 
a second group to rate a similar gamble with a small loss (7/36, win $9; 29/36, lose 5/c) on the 
same scale. The data were anomalous from the perspective of economic theory, but expected 
from the perspective of the affect heuristic. The mean response to the first gamble was 9.4. 
When a loss of 5/c was added, the mean attractiveness jumped to 14.9 and there was almost no 
overlap between the distribution of responses around this mean and the responses for the group 
judging the gamble that had no loss. 
 
Just as good as reliance on economic theory can fail, affect can also mislead decision makers, 
if it was always optimal to follow our affective and experiential instincts, there would have 
been no need for the rational/analytic system of thinking to have evolved and become so 
prominent in human affairs. There are two important ways that experiential thinking can 
misguide subjects. One results from the deliberate manipulation of affective reactions by those 
who wish to control human behaviours as shown by advertising and marketing. The other 
results from the natural limitations of the experiential system and the existence of stimuli in 




4.6 Logistic Regression Models specification  
The objective is to determine which predictor variables are statistically significant in explaining 
variation in feelings (affect) that subjects have towards wild animals, and whether affect is a 
valid predictor of subjects’ behaviour (resource_degrading_behaviour) towards wildlife.   
Because the response variables are dummy the logistic regression procedure was chosen to test 
the hypotheses that past encounters influence feelings developed towards wild animals, and 
that the feelings in turn influence the type of behaviour that subjects develop in relation to wild 
animals. The logistic regression or logit model is linear in the log. odds of the explained or 








It is also common to interpret the results either by exponentiating co-efficients to yield odds 
ratios, or computing predicted probabilities. If an odds ratio is greater than one that means an 
increase in predictor variable X leads to an increase in the odds that the dependent variable 
equals one; an odds ratio less than one means that the odds of the dependent variable taking 
the value 1 are decreasing with an increase of the predictor variable X. The predicted 
probabilities can be calculated using the formula for the cdf to the standard logistic distribution: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑌 = 1) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2𝑋2)
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2𝑋2)
   (4.2) 
The logistic regression is run first for affect variable as the dependent variable, with the variable 




) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2  (4.3) 
𝑃𝑟(𝐴 = 1) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2𝑋2)
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2𝑋2)
  (4.4) 
Where A is the dependent variable affect and 𝑋1 represents the predictor variable encounter 
and 𝑋2 other confounding factors or disturbances. 
The second model had resource_degrading_behaviour as the dependent variable with affect 




) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 (4.5) 
𝑃𝑟(𝑅𝐷𝐵 = 1) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2𝑋2)
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2𝑋2)
  (4.6) 
Where RDB is the resource degrading behaviour 
We include more explanatory or predictor variables in each model to avoid a biased assessment 
of the impact of the main explanatory variable as a consequence of omitting other explanatory 
variables that are related to it. The variables are dummy education level, sex, marital status of 
the participant and continuous predictor variables household size and livestock units of sample 
households. In addition, another factor that is included is whether the participant resides in an 




for expected utility. The assumption is that expected utility, CAMPFIRE will not be a 
significant predictor of affect for participants’ wildlife resource related behaviour. This is 
against the implicit generalised view that subjects from CAMPFIRE areas would be more 
tolerant of wild animals as they realise a wide range of benefits from the programme.  They are 
less likely to develop negative feelings towards wild animals as a result of negative encounters. 
Furthermore are less likely to end up engaging in resource degrading behaviours such as 
poaching and revenge killing. The assumption is that as long as negative encounters are allowed 
to happen, people’s emotions will be evoked and will promote resource degrading behaviour 
rather than expected utility. This may not reflect stated programme preference which might be 
based on expected utility.     
Hypotheses  
We hypothesise that: 
𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓 → 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 → 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 
𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 → 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 
𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓 → 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 → 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒓 
(1) encounters with wild animals trigger emotions (negative affect) and that  
the coefficient will be greater than 0 
(2) the emotions become the more available features and therefore the main determinant of 
behaviours towards wild animals that will be assumed by subjects. 
(3) Negative affect significantly determines wildlife programmes preference by subjects 
(4) Perceptions of benefit does not influence people’s stated preferences  
Thus, the expectation is that the co-efficiencies of the socioeconomic characteristics to be zero.     
 𝛽1 = 0|𝑋1  (4.7) 
and significantly greater than zero for both predictor variables encounter (𝑋1)  and affect (𝑋1) 
as predictors in their respective models. 
     
 𝛽1 > 0|𝑋1  (4.8) 




(1) Do encounters with wild animals influence participants’ emotions towards wild 
animals, affect? 
(2) Do the emotions, affect influence the subjects’ behaviour towards wild animals 
(whether they engage in resource degrading or resource conserving behaviours)? 
(3) Are preferences for wildlife based programmes influenced by perceptions of benefit or 
emotional encounters with wildlife  
 
4.7 Methodology and research methods   
 
Three hundred and ninety-nine )399) participants were randomly drawn from communities 
implementing CAMPFIRE and communities not implementing the programme. The sample 
had approximately one half of the subjects residing in CAMPFIRE implementing areas and the 
other one half residing in areas which were not implementing the programme but found in the 
same district and likely to hear about the programme.  
The variables were elicited through a survey approach (Appendix D) complemented by in-depth 
qualitative interviews (Appendix E).. To establish the self-generated anchors from which subjects 
make adjustments the participants were asked to answer a series of self-generated anchoring 
questions (Ekman and Friesen 1986), in this case negative affect towards wildlife in general. 
Participants were asked if: 
(1) they or any of their household members have been attacked by wild animals,  
(2) whether they experienced livestock predation or crop raids by wildlife,  
(3) the result of each wildlife encounter,  
(4) whether there were any responses from the responsible institutions.  
After this set of questions, each participant was asked to give their perception of and state their 
preference of the programme and their reaction after each event. The expectation is that those 
participants whose households experienced either human attack from wild animals, livestock 
predation or crop raids were likely to (insufficiently) adjust skewed towards their anchor value 
(negative encounter with wildlife) and therefore likely to have negative perceptions or report 
non-preference for the programme. To establish that negative encounters generated the anchor, 
after each participant’s evaluation of the programme s/he was asked what comes to his or her 
mind first when they hear or think about the CAMPFIRE programme- availability. Almost 100 




comes to mind were crop raids, human attacks and livestock predation. This was in contrast 
with results from participants from non-CAMPFIRE areas where three quarters of the 
participants reported free access to health and education, assistance during drought years, and 
income for public investments. The study directly manipulates the availability of wildlife 
encounter events. Availability works because concrete (and imagined images) come tagged 
with affect (Slovic et al. 2002). Manipulation of such images evoke emotions in participants 
who should, as a result, perceive greater risks than participants who do not experience negative 
wildlife encounters  (Keller et al. 2006a).  
 
It is presumed that negative encounters are used as the anchor value in wildlife-based 
programmes; additional information (usually insufficient) is used to adjust from that value 
upwards. This (insufficient information) was tested by asking participants the amount of 
income that the programme has been generating over the past three years. A small proportion 
of participants had knowledge of the amounts and in the majority of cases they reported 
disproportionately low figures. This was triangulated by qualitative discussions where 
participants were allowed to explain in detail their interaction with wildlife and their evaluation 
of the programme thereafter (Question guide in Appendix E). Indications were that discussing 
CAMPFIRE programme in implementing areas triggers negative emotions that would be used 
as the anchor for further evaluations by lay-people.  
The dependent variable affect was obtained by asking each subject his or her general feelings 
towards wild animals that are found or occasionally visit their communities. The feelings were 
anger, hatred and tolerance. The affect variable was coded 1 if the subject indicates anger or 
hatred, and 0 otherwise. This was later followed by a series of questions about past encounters 
with wild animals. A variable encounter was generated coded as 1 if the participant’s 
household experienced attack from wild animals, crop raids or livestock predation, and 0 
otherwise. The subjects were further asked whether they participate or engage in poaching, 
revenge killing, assist poachers or participate in natural resources management. A variable 
resource_degrading_behaviour was generated coded as 1 if the subject report participating in 
poaching, revenge killing, assist poachers or does not participate in natural resources 
management activities, and 0 otherwise. 






4.8 Descriptive statistics 
4.8.1 Human attacks by wild animals 
Mbire district is well endowed with wildlife with the more dangerous wild animals being the 
more visible. These are elephants followed by buffaloes, crocodiles, hippopotamus and lions. 
These are reported to have been responsible for most of the reported human wildlife conflicts. 
Map 5 shows the distribution of the elephant population in the district based on sightings. 
However, in 2018/2019 cropping season the elephant population was reported in almost all the 
wards in the district, making human wildlife conflict more prevalent across the entire district.   
 
Map 5: Elephant distribution in Mbire district (source: Mbire Land Use Plan) 
To assess human wildlife conflict, each participant in the sample indicated their experiences 
with relation to wild animals in their areas. Table 4-1 shows that about one half of the sample 
participants reported that their villages had experienced human attacks by wild animals. The 
highest proportion of attacks were experienced in villages implementing the CAMPFIRE 
programme. Table 4-1 also shows whether the participant’s household had a member who was 
attacked by wild animals. Results show that about 15 percent of the sample households had at 
least a member who was attacked by wild animals. CAMPFIRE programme areas had the 
highest proportion of households that reported that their household members were attacked by 




Table 4-1: Experiences of human attacks by wildlife in the sample villages 
  Non-CAMPFIRE CAMPFIRE Total 
  Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Injuries in the village caused by wildlife       
Yes 30 16.67 168 87.05 198 53.08 
No 150 83.33 25 12.95 175 46.92 
Total 180 100 193 100 373 100 
Household member attacked by wild animals  
Yes 11 5.34 50 25.91 61 15.29 
No 195 94.66 143 74.09 338 84.71 
Total 206 100 193 100 399 100 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The animals that were responsible for attacking people in the sample villages were  buffaloes 
(20), followed by elephants (19) and snakes (17) out of the 61 cases reported. In non-
CAMPFIRE programme areas there are no cases involving buffaloes and most of the reported 
cases were instigated by snakes. Also, in CAMPFIRE sample areas there are no reported cases 
involving crocodiles even though from the qualitative discussions there were few cases of 
crocodile attacks reported.   
One-half of the wildlife victims reported in the study are participants in the programme. About 
30 and 11 percent were children and spouses of the participants respectively. I hypothesise that 
participants with household members that fell victim to wildlife would use this as their anchor 
for the evaluation and perception of the programme. Memory of this past encounter would 
trigger emotions that also makes such events vivid and readily available in the subject’s 
memory.   
A higher proportion of the reported human attacks by wild animals took place in the season 
prior to the survey (39.3 per cent), followed by cases that happened more than four years (29.5 
per cent). I presume that the period when the attack took place will not have any effect, as the 
emotions that are evoked will be the same. The images are readily available because of the 
emotions that they trigger.  
Approximately one-half of the reported cases in the survey happened as the victims were 
guarding their fields. About a fifth of the cases happened at home and another fifth along the 
way from or to home. The location of the incidences are places were people in these rural 




home or on their way home from the fields and either way they are vulnerable to attack by wild 
animals.  
In the 61 reported cases of wild animals attacking people, 31 of the cases the victims got 
injured, 25 escaped uninjured while the remaining 8 cases the victims got killed. All reported 
8 deaths were in CAMPFIRE programme areas.  
In Mbire there are a number of institutions tasked with assisting communities deal with 
problem animals, especially where there are reported threats towards humans. These 
institutions are the Rural District Council (RDC), National Parks department and community 
game scouts. The response includes scaring and eliminating the problem animal especially 
where it has attacked people. Survey results show that 57 percent of the cases were reported; 
45 percent reported to community game scouts, 5 percent to RDC and 3 percent to Parks. Four 
cases of human deaths received assistance with burial, three cases of injuries got medical 
assistance, and two cases got some assistance with money. Personal communication with the 
RDC revealed that they at times help when they have the money but that in the majority of 
cases the Rural District Council face financial problems and end up failing to assist. The largest 
proportion of the cases went unreported because the participants reported that from experience 
there would be no responses.  
Participants reported that the attacks on their household members or themselves evoked 
emotions; anger and hatred towards the different institutions tasked with the responsibility of 
protecting communities from such eventualities (Table 4-2). These include RDC, National 
Parks and even community game scouts and safari operators for CAMPFIRE implementing 
communities. The same emotions were also reported to have developed towards the animal 










Table 4-2: Feelings evoked by wild animal attacks on humans 
 Non-CAMPFIRE CAMPFIRE Total  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Feelings triggered towards responsible institutions by animal attack on humans   
Anger 3 27.27 29 58 32 52.46 
Hatred 2 18.18 17 34 19 31.15 
Tolerant 1 9.09 3 6 4 6.56 
Fear 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Feelings towards the animals just after the attack  
Anger 10 90.91 39 78 49 80.33 
Hatred 3 27.27 27 54 30 49.18 
Fear 1 9.09 12 24 13 21.31 
Tolerant 1 9.09 2 4 3 4.92 
Feelings towards the animals now 
Angry 7 63.64 32 64 39 63.93 
Fear 3 27.27 21 42 24 39.34 
Hatred 3 27.27 16 32 19 31.15 
Tolerant 1 9.09 2 4 3 4.92 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Table 4-3 shows that in the majority of cases the victims of wildlife self-reported engagement 
in behaviours that are inconsistent with conservation.  
 
Table 4-3: Self-reported behaviour  
Behaviour  Non-CAMPFIRE CAMPFIRE Total  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Revenge killing 9 81.82 32 64.00 41 67.21 
Nothing 1 9.09 15 30.00 16 26.23 
Poaching 0 0.00 2 4.00 2 3.28 
Assist poachers 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
4.8.2 Crop raids  
The majority of survey communities experience crop raids by wildlife, 93 per cent of respondents 
reported that they experience crop raids in their villages. All households in CAMPFIRE programme 
areas reported incidences of crop raids in their communities. Approximately 65 per cent of the 
households reported that crop raiding by wild animals happen every cropping season in their village 
while 14 per cent reported that it is a daily phenomenon in either the fields, garden or stored grain.    
In CAMPFIRE implementing communities, elephants are the main crop raiding animals (90.8 




implementing communities. Crop raids across all the communities were reported as a seasonal 
occurrence (Table 4-4). 
Table 4-4: Crop raiding animals 
Crop raiding animal 
(324) Non-CAMPFIRE CAMPFIRE Total  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Buffalo 0 0 65 35.14 65 20.06 
Elephants 58 41.73 168 90.81 226 69.75 
Baboons 68 48.92 132 71.35 200 61.73 
Birds 83 59.71 16 8.65 99 30.56 
Wild Pigs 13 9.35 87 47.03 100 30.86 
Elands 36 25.9 1 0.54 37 11.42 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
In the majority of cases, crop raids are severe leading to serious food shortages. Over 90 per 
cent reported food shortages because of crop raids. Approximately a third of the respondents 
reported experiencing financial problems because of cash crop raids with about 18 per cent 
reporting incurring debts or failing to service debts because of crop raids. Table 4-5 shows that 
a larger proportion of respondents felt indifferent towards raiding wild animals. About 18 per 
cent are tolerant of crop raiding animals with a larger proportion of non-CAMPFIRE 
respondents being more tolerant to crop raiding animals than CAMPFIRE respondents.  
  
Table 4-5: Reported Feelings as a result of crop raids (Multiple response) 
Feelings towards wild 
animals after crop raids 
Non-
CAMPFIRE CAMPFIRE 
            
Total  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Hatred 51 36.69 49 26.49 100 30.86 
Angry 99 71.22 145 78.38 244 75.31 
Tolerant 31 22.10 28 15.13 59 18.21 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Table 4-6 shows reported responses by subjects after they experienced crop raids. A larger 
proportion of respondents reported that they engaged in revenge killing after their crops were 
raided. A larger proportion of respondents in CAMPFIRE programme implementing 






Table 4-6: Resultant behaviour after the crop raids  
Resultant behaviour after crop 
raids Non-CAMPFIRE CAMPFIRE Total  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Revenge killing 53 38.13 80 43.24 133 41.05 
Poaching 6 4.32 1 0.54 7 2.16 
Assist poachers 6 4.32 0 0 6 1.85 
Not participating in NRM 13 9.35 4 2.16 17 5.25 
No effect 56 40.29 98 52.97 154 47.53 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
The expectation is that respondents from CAMPFIRE communities would not engage in 
revenge killing as they derive income and other benefits from the programme. However, this 
is expected from a heuristic point of view as the response is driven more by feelings rather than 
expected utility.   
 
4.8.3 Livestock predation 
Table 4-7 shows that the majority of villages in both Non-CAMPFIRE and CAMPFIRE 
programme areas in the sample experience livestock predation. Approximately 96 per cent of 
respondents reported that their villages experience livestock predation; meanwhile two-thirds 
reported that their households experience livestock predation.  
Table 4-7: Experiences of livestock predation in the respondents' village  
Livestock predation in the 
village Non-CAMPFIRE CAMPFIRE Total  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Yes 195 96.06 184 95.34 379 95.71 
No 8 3.94 9 4.66 17 4.29 
Total 203 100 193 100 396 100 
Did household experience livestock predation 
Yes 133 64.56 125 64.77 258 64.66 
No 73 35.44 68 35.23 141 35.34 
Total 206 100 193 100 399 100 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Livestock predation frequency are reportedly high across the sample villages. Two fifths of the 
households reported that there is at least a report of livestock predation each year, about a sixth 
reported that predation happens every growing season while another sixth reported that it 
happens every month in their village. Approximately 12 per cent of the households reported 
that livestock predation in their villages is experienced every week while about 7 per cent 




Goats and poultry are the main victims of predation by wild animals.The main predators are 
hyenas, baboons and lions respectively (Table 4-8). Sixty-eight per cent of the reported 
household predation cases took place within the year.  
Table 4-8: Livestock attacked and the predators  
Livestock attacked Non-CAMPFIRE CAMPFIRE Total  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Goats 71 53.38 81 64.8 152 58.91 
Poultry 49 36.84 87 69.6 136 52.71 
Cattle 70 52.63 1 0.8 71 27.52 
Sheep 14 10.53 2 1.6 16 6.20 
Donkeys 2 1.5 3 2.4 5 1.94 
Livestock predators 
Hyena 103 77.44 32 25.6 135 52.33 
Baboon 10 7.52 77 61.6 87 33.72 
Lion 17 12.78 34 27.2 51 19.77 
Jackal 3 2.26 26 20.8 29 11.24 
Cheetah 0 0 11 8.8 11 4.26 
Crocodile 0 0 1 0.8 1 0.39 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
About one-half of respondents reported predation cases at the homesteads, followed by kraal 
(livestock pen) and grazing areas respectively. However, over 63 per cent of the cases were not 
reported. Twenty-one per cent of the cases were reported to the local problem animal control 
unity, 14 per cent to Rural District Council and 10 per cent direct to National Parks department.  
Approximately 90 per cent of the reported cases did not receive attention because most cases 
are not reported. In two thirds of the cases respondents expressed anger and hatred towards the 
institutions responsible for problem animal control.  
The assumption is that if people live in harmony with wildlife then they tolerate wild animal 
behaviour. Logically their feelings would not swing to hatred and anger, which might trigger 
resource degrading behaviours such as revenge killings. Table 4-9 shows that the largest 
proportion of people in areas where wildlife is found are angered by the predation behaviour 
of wild animals. About a third develop hatred for the wild animals that are involved in 
predation. Only a sixth of the people tolerate wildlife behaviour as their feelings are not 





Table 4-9: Reported feelings towards predators 
Reported feelings 
towards predators soon 
after the incident Non-CAMPF CAMPFIRE 
            
Total  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Angry 84 63.16 96 76.8 180 69.77 
Hatred 45 33.83 34 27.2 79 30.62 
Nothing 21 15.79 20 16 41 15.89 
Sorry 1 0.75 3 2.4 4 1.55 
Reported feelings towards predators now 
Angry 78 58.65 86 68.8 164 63.57 
Hatred 43 32.33 32 25.6 75 29.07 
Nothing 21 15.79 25 20 46 17.83 
Fear 6 4.51 2 1.6 8 3.10 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Table 4-10 shows that close to one half of people whose livestock was attacked by wild animals 
are not triggered into undertaking resource degrading behaviours such as revenge killing, 
poaching, assisting poachers and non-participation in natural resources management activities.  
 
Table 4-10: Reported behaviour towards wild animals after predation 
Reported behaviour after livestock 
predation  Non-CAMPFIRE CAMPFIRE Total  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Nothing 55 41.35 61 48.8 116 44.96 
Revenge killing 56 42.11 54 43.2 110 42.64 
Poaching  9 6.77 6 4.8 15 5.81 
Non-participation in NRM 7 5.26 2 1.6 9 3.49 
Assisting poachers 7 5.26 1 0.8 8 3.1 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
For communities struggling to pull themselves out of poverty, high incidence of damage by wildlife 
contributes to animosity toward protected areas and wildlife, and opens the door for people to engage 
in revenge killing to get rid of problem animals and poaching for both income and consumption. 
 
4.8.4 Stated preferences 
Table 4-11 shows that a larger proportion of respondents in non-CAMPFIRE areas want the 
programme in their areas based on the reports they have heard about the programme. In contrast 
approximately 70 per cent of respondents from CAMPFIRE programme areas reported their 




were the programme has been fairly successful and the community relatively small, about one 
half reported their dislike of the programme. In Ward 2 where the population is large and 
income from CAMPFIRE less than that of Ward 11 approximately 80 per cent of respondents 
expressed their dislike of the programme. In non-CAMPFIRE areas reports about the 
performance of CAMPFIRE programme were mixed.     
 
Table 4-11: Stated preference of the CAMPFIRE programme 
Status Prefer CAMPFIRE I don’t prefer CAMPFIRE Total  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
CAMPFIRE 59 31.05 131 68.95 190 100 
2 24 20.17 95 79.83 119 100 
11 35 49.3 36 50.7 71 100 
NON-
CAMPFIRE 96 42.17 70 57.83 166 100 
7 55 69.62 24 30.38 79 100 
17 41 47.13 46 52.87 87 100 
Total 155 43.54 201 56.46 356 100 
Sources: Survey data December 2015 
Respondents from non-CAMPFIRE programme areas envied the programme as they have 
heard that their peers were sending their children to school free of charge. Some have heard 
about the abundant wild meat that is distributed to households while others heard about people 
being killed by wild animals.  
One-third of the sample households in CAMPFIRE areas reported that they benefited through 
education subsidy for their children. The majority of households in Ward 2 reported that they 
did not benefit from education subsidy for their children. Thus, there is possibility that the 
benefit stream that accrues to households has a bearing on the eventual behaviour of people 
towards wildlife and wildlands. 
Three-fifths of the respondents, and also three fifths of each of the two wards prefer education 
subsidy to cash dividends. This indicates that a larger proportion do understand the implications 
that the more the cash dividends the less would be the education support, so prefer that income 
from CAMPFIRE be directed towards education subsidy than cash dividends. Thus, the 
question is can this also have influence over people’s behaviour towards wildlife and wildlands 
as opposed to the wild animal encounters that the households may have experienced.  
A larger proportion (58 per cent) of respondents reported that they prefer health subsidy to cash 




Ward 11 and 57 per cent in Ward 2. This indicates that they do value the public investments as 
it enables them to access health services. I presume that this preference will also influence 
positive environmental behaviour as there is a public health investment trend across the sample 
CAMPFIRE wards.  
In reference to whether respondents felt that they can sponsor their children’s education without 
support from CAMPFIRE, a larger proportion (60 per cent) in Ward 11 reported that they 
cannot while in Ward 2 70 per cent of respondents reported that they can sponsor their 
children’s education without assistance from the CAMPFIRE programme. This reflects the 
relative historical role of the programme in education production in the two wards. In Ward 2 
a number of public education investments have been made, however the ward has a large 
population size rendering the impact less widespread. In Ward 11 the population size is 
relatively small yet they get far more income from the CAMPFIRE programme compared to 
Ward 2; hence their investment in education has higher impact.      
The trend in access to health is the same as with education. Respondents from Ward 2 feel that 
they have the capacity to sponsor their own health without assistance from the CAMPFIRE 
programme. In Ward 11 three fifths or 60 percent of respondents feel that they cannot have 
better access to health services without the CAMPFIRE programme. In addition, a larger 
proportion of respondents felt that they can have better access to food without the CAMPFIRE 
programme. However, in Ward 11 about one half of the respondents felt they cannot have better 
access to food without the programme.  
Given the choice to choose between the CAMPFIRE programme and agriculture the largest 
proportion of respondents indicated that they prefer agriculture. Reasons from the qualitative 
interviews reports were that they have more control over agricultural proceeds compared to 
CAMPFIRE proceeds. There has not been demonstrable evidence to convince households to 
entirely depend on the programme for all household demands. 
For the CAMPFIRE households it is unanimously agreed that agriculture is the more valuable 
livelihood compared to the CAMPFIRE programme. Only 5 per cent of respondents felt that 
the CAMPFIRE programme is more valuable than agriculture.  It therefore follows that any 
investments that also support agriculture are likely to be most welcome.  
The following section discusses the implication of benefits and encounters on people’s 
behaviour towards wildlife. Living in harmony with wildlife entail that even when the wild 




4.9   Affective heuristics results 
 
To understand the influence of household encounters with wild animals on participants’ 
feelings towards wild animals, participants were asked their general feelings towards wildlife 
found in their areas. A participant was categorised as having affect if s/he indicated that s/he 
has hatred, anger and fear towards wild animals found in their areas. Table 4-12 shows that the 
largest proportion of the sample participants had negative feelings towards wildlife in their 
areas.  The feelings towards wild animals were significantly different between participants 
from CAMPFIRE and non-CAMPFIRE communities. Above 85 percent of participants from 
CAMPFIRE areas had negative feelings towards wild animals compared to 60 percent in non-
CAMPFIRE communities.   
Table 4-12: Sample participants' feelings towards wild animals 
Negative affect (hatred and 
anger) 
Non-
CAMPF  CAMPFIRE  Total  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
0 85 41.26 28 14.51 113 28.32 
1 121 58.74 165 85.49 286 71.68 
Total 206 100 193 100 399 100 
Pearson chi2(1) =  35.135   Pr = 0.000 - Source: Survey data December 2015 
In trying to understand the source of the feelings the affect was analysed relative to reported 
encounters with wild animals; whether they have had their household members attacked, 
whether they experienced crop raids and livestock predation by wild animals. Results show 
that almost all participants who reported that their household experienced human attack by wild 
animals had feelings of hatred or anger towards the wild animals. About two thirds of 
households who did not experience attack from wild animals also reported feelings of hatred 
or anger towards wild animals (Table 4-13) having experienced human attack in their villages.  
Table 4-13: Affect by household experiences of attacks by wild animals 
Negative affect (hatred and 
anger) 
Household experienced attack by wild animals 
 
 No  Yes  Total  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
0 112 33.14 1 1.64 113 28.32 
1 226 66.86 60 98.36 286 71.68 
Total 338 100 61 100 399 100 




When analysed using household experiences of crop raids the pattern is slightly different. A 
small proportion of participants that did not experience crop raids also have negative feelings 
towards wild animals (Table 4-14). Meanwhile a larger proportion of households that reported 
experiencing crop raids have negative feelings towards wild animals. About 15 percent of 
participants whose households experienced crop raids are tolerant of wild animals.  
Table 4-14: Affect by households’ experiences of crop raids from wild animals 
 Household experiences of crop raids from wild animals 
Negative affect (hatred  
and anger) No  Yes  Total  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
0 63 84 50 15.43 113 28.32 
1 12 16 274 84.57 286 71.68 
Total 75 100 324 100 399 100 
Pearson chi2(1) = 141.0511   Pr = 0.000 - Source: Survey data December 2015 
Table 4-15 shows that feelings towards wild animals is significantly different between 
households that experience livestock predation and those that do not. About two thirds of 
participants whose households did not experience livestock predation have negative feelings 
towards wild animals while approximately 80 percent of participants whose households 
experience livestock predation also have negative feelings towards wild animals.   
Table 4-15: Affect by household experiences of livestock predation 
Negative affect (hatred and 
anger) 
Household experiences of livestock predation 
No  Yes  Total  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
0 58 41.13 55 21.32 113 28.32 
1 83 58.87 203 78.68 286 71.68 
Total 141 100 258 100 399 100 
Pearson chi2(1) =  17.638   Pr = 0.000 - Source: Survey data December 2015 
 
The hypothesis that household encounters with wild animal determine the feelings that people 
develop was tested using the logistic regression procedure. The dependent variable ‘affect’ 
coded as 1 for having negative feelings towards wild animals and 0 otherwise. The explanatory 
variables expected to influence the development of the feelings are (1) whether the household 
had at least a member who was attacked by wild animals, (2) whether the participant’s 
household experienced crop raids and (3) livestock predation by wild animals. The other 




education level and whether the participant lives in a CAMPFIRE or non-CAMPFIRE 
community. The model results are presented in Table 4-16 together with the model test results.   
Table 4-16: Affect model 
Predictor variables Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Household Member 
Attacked 2.999  1.096 2.74 0.006 0.852 5.147 
Crop raid 3.288 0.418 7.86 0.000 2.468 4.107 
Livestock predation 0.313 0.326 0.96 0.337 -0.326 0.953 
Campfire 0.461 0.343 1.34 0.179 -0.211 1.133 
Household size -0.074 0.072 -1.04 0.3 -0.214 0.066 
Resident period 0.015 0.008 1.82 0.069 -0.001 0.032 
Male 0.179 0.613 0.29 0.771 -1.023 1.380 
Married -0.189 0.623 -0.3 0.762 -1.410 1.0332 
Secondary education -0.560 0.333 -1.68 0.092 -1.211 0.092 
Cattle  0.030 0.023 1.31 0.191 -0.015 0.075 
Donkeys  0.181 0.254 0.71 0.475 -0.316 0.678 
Shoats  0.011 0.016 0.68 0.496 -0.020 0.0413 
Poultry  0.007 0.014 0.51 0.612 -0.021 0.035 
_cons -2.182 0.764 -2.86 0.004 -3.678 -0.685 
 Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Household Member 
Attacked 20.075 21.992 2.74 0.006 2.345 171.867 
Crop raid 26.779 11.197 7.86 0.000 11.800 60.773 
Livestock predation 1.368 0.446 0.96 0.337 0.722 2.592 
Campfire 1.585 0.544 1.34 0.179 0.809 3.106 
Household size 0.928 0.067 -1.04 0.300 0.807 1.068 
Resident period 1.015 0.009 1.82 0.069 0.999 1.032 
Male 1.196 0.733 0.29 0.771 0.360 3.976 
Married 0.828 0.516 -0.3 0.762 0.244 2.810 
Secondary education 0.571441 0.190044 -1.68 0.092 0.297774 1.096617 
Cattle  1.030322 0.023523 1.31 0.191 0.985234 1.077472 
Donkeys  1.198547 0.304062 0.71 0.475 0.728974 1.970597 
Shoats  1.010694 0.015784 0.68 0.496 0.980226 1.042109 
Poultry  1.007299 0.014427 0.51 0.612 0.979415 1.035977 
Logistic regression model test results Number of obs = 399 
 LR chi2(9) = 168.57 
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -155.54155 Pseudo R2 = 0.3545 
Source: Survey data December 2015 
The model is robust in explaining variation of negative affect within the sample; p=0.0000 and 
explains approximately 35 percent of negative affect variations. Encounter with wild animals 
is a significant factor in explaining variation in affect. In addition, resident period is a 
statistically significant factor in determining negative affect development. Results show that if 




developing increases 17 times more than the log odds of developing tolerance towards wild 
animals. The log odds or the ratio of the odds are much higher if there is a unity increase in 
crop raids, which triggers an odds ratio of approximately 27 times more than if the subjects do 
not experience crop raids. Results show that experiences of predation trigger less change in 
negative affect and is not statistically significant. The result might be so as the majority of 
subjects in communities with wildlife do not own livestock.  
Table 4-17 and Figure 10 show that resource degrading behaviour is correlated with negative 
affect.  





No Yes Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
No 107 94.69 119 41.61 226 56.64 
Yes 6 5.31 167 58.39 173 43.36 
Total 113 100 286 100 399 100 
Pearson chi2(1) = 92.930   Pr = 0.000 - Source: Survey data December 2015 
 
Figure 10: Predicted resource degrading behaviour and affect - Source: Survey data December 2015 
People’s behaviour towards wild animals is thus partly explained by reference to negative 
feelings that people have towards wild animals as a result of negative encounters. A unit 
increase in negative affect increases the likelihood of revenge killing and poaching (resource 
degrading behaviour) by subjects in spite of expected utility (Table 4-18).    
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Table 4-18: Logistic regression model 
Response variable: Resource degrading behaviour 
Independent variables Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Negative affect 3.230 0.436 7.38 0 2.365 4.075 
_cons -2.881 0.420 -6.87 0 -3.703 -2.059 
       
 Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Negative affect 25.027 10.920 7.38 0 10.641 58.861 
Prob > chi2     =     0.000, Pseudo R2       =     0.203 - Source: Survey data December 2015 
Table 4-19 shows that there are four factors which are important in explaining variation in 
people’s behaviour towards wild animals. Negative feelings are the strongest factor in 
determining resource degrading behaviour. Being male reduces the likely revenge killing 
behaviour, meanwhile owning donkeys, having secondary level education and being married 


















Table 4-19: Logistic and logit full models 
Response variable: Resource degrading behaviour 
Logit model 
Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Negative affect 3.385 0.459 7.38 0.000 2.486 4.284 
Household size -0.095 0.059 -1.62 0.105 -0.210 0.020 
Resident period 0.002 0.007 0.34 0.734 -0.011 0.015 
Male participant -1.406 0.515 -2.73 0.006 -2.415 -0.397 
Married 0.937 0.534 1.75 0.079 -0.110 1.984 
Secondary education 0.473 0.283 1.67 0.094 -0.081 1.027 
Cattle  -0.008 0.020 -0.39 0.695 -0.047 0.031 
Donkeys  0.404 0.219 1.85 0.065 -0.025 0.832 
Shoats  0.0129 0.012 1.09 0.274 -0.010 0.036 
Poultry  0.00484 0.011 0.44 0.658 -0.017 0.026 
Campfire  -0.17521 0.284 -0.62 0.537 -0.732 0.381 
_cons -2.47177 0.706 -3.5 0 -3.856 -1.087 
Logistic model        
Explanatory variables Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Negative affect 29.519 13.539 7.38 0.000 12.014 72.530 
Household size 0.909 0.053 -1.62 0.105 0.811 1.020 
Resident period 1.002 0.007 0.34 0.734 0.990 1.015 
Male participant 0.245 0.126 -2.73 0.006 0.089 0.673 
Married 2.553 1.364 1.75 0.079 0.896 7.274 
Secondary education 1.606 0.454 1.67 0.094 0.923 2.794 
Cattle  0.992 0.020 -0.39 0.695 0.954 1.032 
Donkeys  1.497 0.328 1.85 0.065 0.975 2.299 
Shoats  1.013 0.012 1.09 0.274 0.989 1.037 
Poultry  1.005 0.011 0.44 0.658 0.984 1.0266 
Campfire  0.839 0.238 -0.62 0.537 0.481 1.464 
Logistic regression test Number of obs = 399 
 LR chi2(11) = 131.43 
 Prob > chi2 = 0 
Log likelihood = -207.31985 Pseudo R2 = 0.2407 
Source: Survey data December 2015 
 
4.9.1  Preference of wildlife programmes 
 
Participants from CAMPFIRE communities were asked whether they would choose to 
implement CAMPFIRE if they were given the choice to choose between implementing and not 
implementing the programme. Table 108 appendix C show that subjects’ perceptions of 
education and health benefits, as well as employment in the wildlife industry are statistically 




Table 108 appendix shows that a unity increase in perceived education benefits and 
employment in the wildlife industry increases the log. odds or ratio of the odds of choosing the 
programme. In other words, there is an increase in the likelihood of subjects preferring the 
CAMPFIRE programme over not having the programme. On the other hand, a unity change of 
subjects to perceiving themselves as able to access and fund better health services without the 
CAMPFIRE programme decreases the log. odds or ratio of the odds; there is a decrease in 
preference for CAMPFIRE programme. The model is able to explain approximately 43 percent 
of variation in the subjects’ choice of whether to choose to implement the CAMPFIRE 
programme or not, given the chance (Table 4-20). The reduced model is able to explain only 
approximately 16 percent of variation in the subjects’ choices (Table 8-1 Appendix C). 
Table 4-20: Programme choice model test results 
Logistic regression Number of obs = 116 
 LR chi2(18) = 65.2 
 Prob > chi2 = 0 
Log likelihood = -43.334851 Pseudo R2 = 0.4293 
Source: Survey data December 2015 
Table 4-21 presents the marginal effect or probability of positive outcome by specified 
covariates. Affect has no effect on the programme choice. The results show that ethnicity has 
the largest marginal effect. Being of the Doma origin has the highest effect in the likelihood of 
choosing the programme followed by remittances and employment in the wildlife industry 
respectively. Thus households receiving remittances and with a member who is employed in 












Table 4-21: model on whether subjects would choose to implement the programme given the option 
Variable                                                                 dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [    95% C.I.   ] X 
affect 0.015872 0.14057 0.11 0.91 -0.25964 0.291379 0.784483 
cattle -0.04247 0.03122 -1.36 0.174 -0.10366 0.018714 2.12931 
shoats -0.00444 0.00586 -0.76 0.449 -0.01593 0.007059 9.85345 
poultry 0.01062 0.0059 1.8 0.072 -0.00094 0.022177 11.7414 
Wildlife employment 0.531786 0.14611 3.64 0 0.245409 0.818163 0.215517 
Remittances 0.5983 0.20302 2.95 0.003 0.200394 0.996206 0.068966 
Illness  -0.00808 0.12271 -0.07 0.947 -0.24859 0.23242 0.62069 
Committee member 0.37796 0.26923 1.4 0.16 -0.14973 0.90565 0.068966 
Korekore 0.416801 0.11033 3.78 0 0.200565 0.633038 0.681034 
Doma 0.753833 0.0839 8.99 0 0.5894 0.918266 0.086207 
Zezuru 0.064316 0.39645 0.16 0.871 -0.7127 0.841336 0.043103 
Married -0.08312 0.22863 -0.36 0.716 -0.53123 0.364996 0.862069 
Secondary education 0.224232 0.1651 1.36 0.174 -0.09937 0.54783 0.25 
Prefer education benefit 0.371926 0.15564 2.39 0.017 0.066886 0.676965 0.310345 
Prefer cash to education subsidy -0.46605 0.13221 -3.53 0 -0.72518 -0.20692 0.396552 
Prefer cash to health subsidy 0.230737 0.16182 1.43 0.154 -0.08643 0.547901 0.413793 
Better education without campfire 0.088787 0.15248 0.58 0.56 -0.21007 0.38764 0.637931 
Better health without campfire -0.44172 0.16142 -2.74 0.006 -0.75811 -0.12534 0.612069 
 Source: Survey data December 2015 
Households that receive remittances probably are less affected by wildlife and are therefore 
less likely to reject the programme. While households with a member employed in the wildlife 
industry see the direct benefit of having the programme and therefore are more likely to choose 
the programme if given the choice to do so. The Korekore ethnicity has a higher probability of 
choosing the programme as well as those households whose members are in the programme 
committee. On the other end having livestock increases the probability of not preferring the 
programme. This is likely as the livestock are targets of predation by wild animals and therefore 
livestock owners see the loss compared to households without livestock.  
 
4.9.2  Can stated preference explain self-reported resource degrading 
behaviour? 
We further interrogated whether stated preference influence self-reported resource degrading 
behaviour such as killing wild animals in revenge or poaching. Results show that there is no 





Table 4-22: Resource degrading behaviour programme preference model 
Resource degrading 
behaviour Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
Programme preference 0.515 0.318 1.62 0.105 -0.108 1.138 
_cons -0.377 0.265 -1.42 0.155 -0.897 0.142 
Source: Survey data December 2015 
Preferring the programme for example, does not guarantee that people will not be involved in 
poaching or in revenge killing. Cases of self-reported resource degrading behaviour is driven 
more by negative experiences that trigger negative affect and ultimately revenge killing. This 
result confirms our earlier result that affect does not influence programme preference but self-
reported revenge killing and poaching. This explains the complexity of human behaviour and 
the seemingly inconsistence that seem to violate utility theory.   
      
4.10  Conclusion and policy implication  
 
In most of southern Africa wildlife is one of the focus for rural development. Policy makers at 
international, national and local level are all out lobbying for wildlife conservation and 
advocate for the active participation of the rural constituencies. During the initial stages of 
wildlife programmes in communal areas in Zimbabwe there has been massive support of the 
intervention from producer communities (Tchakatumba  et al. 2019, Taylor 2009, Murphree 
2009, Hutton et al. 2005). However, there has been reported cases of communities preferring 
to discard the programme, in other cases there are documented cases of increase in poaching 
and revenge killing of wild animals by members of the producer communities (Rihoy 2007). 
In addition, during the scoping stage of this study there were observed serious inconsistencies 
between benefits from the conservation programme and people’s behaviours, perceptions and 
preferences of the programme, diverging from the classical utility theory. Therefore, the 
objective of this paper is to attempt using the heuristic theory to explain the divergence between 
benefits, and behaviour, perceptions and preferences. The key argument is that people’s 
encounters with wild animals may explain some of the observed inconsistences through 
generating feeling of resentment which triggers anti-conservation behaviour, perceptions and 
preferences. I try to demonstrate the complexity in economic decision making and that there 
are other factors other than expected utility, in this case psychological, that determine people’s 




The study argues that heuristic theory can be used to explain some of the observed or stated 
human behaviour and stated preferences in communities implementing wildlife based 
programmes (Schulan 2019). The paper aims to determine whether subjects’ past encounters 
with wild animals influence negative affect; and whether the negative affect leads subjects (1) 
to engage in self-reported behaviours such as poaching and killing of wild animals and (2) 
stated preferences towards community based wildlife programmes. Building on earlier work 
on heuristics, I develop an ‘encounter-affect-behaviour-preference’ model and apply it to 
subjects in Community Based Wildlife Management context in Zimbabwe. The premise is that 
subjects in wildlife areas experience negative encounters with wild animals which are likely to 
trigger emotions or negative affect that influence stated or observed behaviour, and stated or 
revealed preferences for wildlife-based programmes. The argument is that affect, anchoring 
and availability heuristics interact to influence people’s preferences of programmes and their 
behaviour towards wild animal resources in their area. 
In trying to understand the complexity in economic decision making the study used the logistic 
regression on randomly sampled households in Mbire district. The study demonstrates the 
complexity in wildlife conservation especially understanding people’s behaviours and 
preferences. The study explains the seemingly inconsistencies that may be difficult to explain 
from a purely expected utility theory. The sample experience a wide range of wildlife 
encounters such as attacks by wild animals, crop raids and livestock predation. The sample 
benefit from wildlife conservation through the public infrastructure such as school and health 
facilities and the associated support system. The results show that encounters trigger affect 
which in turn trigger how people perceive wildlife programmes. However, affect does not 
explain variation in stated preferences. Expected utility tend to be a significant explanatory 
variable for stated programme preference.   
Heuristics can therefore compliment the understanding of some decision patterns and 
behaviours that are inconsistent with economic theories of logic and probability. I therefore 
propose that working towards generating positive markers or anchors about wildlife among 
subjects can increase tolerance of wildlife; which can be achieved for example by instituting 
wildlife management systems that cater for problem animal control to reduce negative 
encounters, reducing evocation of affect and the associated resource degrading behaviours. 
Furthermore, improving benefits or perceptions of benefits can increase preference or 




to lessen the negative impacts generated by encounters, for example problem animal control 







5. Chapter 5: Conclusion and policy implications 
5.1 Findings 
 
The study has examined the effects of the CAMPFIRE programme on education production 
and household adaptive capacity. It further explored the intricacies of decision making 
processes with regards stated behaviour and stated preferences. The thesis behind the 
investigation is that the design of the campfire programme allows rural development in a more 
flexible and sustainable way. It has the potential to address poverty and improve the adaptive 
capacities of marginal communities participating in wildlife conservation. The investigation 
was conducted against a backdrop that previous assessments of the programme has produced 
results that indicate that the programme has not led to expected improvements in livelihoods, 
except improving biodiversity (Taylor 2009, Murphree 2009, Hutton et al. 2005). Indications 
show poverty prevalence remaining high in marginal communities participating in similar 
programmes across southern Africa (UNICEF 2015, Rihoy 2007, Jones   2007, Muchapondwa 
2003). However, this thesis argues that the assessments did not recognise that the investment 
configurations of wildlife incomes are skewed towards public infrastructure (Tchakatumba et 
al. 2019, Chigonda 2018, Jones   2007). It would be prudent therefore to appraise the 
programme from that angle. Thus, one would expect positive impact of the programme on 
components that are directly linked to public infrastructure development such as education, 
health and communication. In addition, the thesis also envision the programme to have the 
potential to improve adaptation as it can address some of the critical components of adaptation. 
Lastly, the study demonstrated how the programme can influence people’s preferences and 
behaviours, and how the programme can be modelled to address some of the preference and 
behaviour issues. The thesis concludes that the campfire programme is an invaluable rural 
development tool that requires constant reconfiguration to address recurrent critical issues. It 
has for example survived the economic crisis in the country demonstrating its robustness or 
resilience to changing conditions (Tchakatumba et al. 2019).         
Results from the study show that the programme reinvested a larger proportion of the 
conservation income into public goods provisioning confirming findings by Jone   (2007). -
Most notable were investments in education, health and road infrastructure. As such, the study 
finds out that welfare dimensions that are closely related to public infrastructure development 
improved as a result of programme implementation, than if they were not implementing the 




cent compared than  if the programme was not implemented. Children were observed to transit 
at the right age-for-grade if under the programme than if they were not because there are no 
economic barriers to enrollment. However, there are more facets to education production than 
participation, but it is the first step to ensuring access to education before we could include the 
other education production measures.   
However, results from education production function show that socio-economic inputs or 
characteristics are significant factors in explaining variation in education production in 
CAMPFIRE implementing areas than in non-programme implementing areas. In other words, 
children of the better resourced household tend to have higher education production that less 
resourced households. The expectation was that the provision of public provision of education 
through infrastructure development and support system would reduce the influence of 
household inputs on education production. Children for example would transit equally in 
school irrespective of their household resource status. The results show that this is not true. 
Therefore, while public investments of the programme improve education production, it needs 
to be configured to address skewedness between the less and better resourced households. 
Generally, the programme remains a relevant instrument that can be used to influence different 
welfare dimensions depending on the objective function of the policy makers at the different 
levels. Results that show that conservation programmes have not improved livelihoods need to 
start from the where the conservation income is re-invested.   
This is also further illustrated by the results of paper 2, which shows that there is positive 
potential outcome means for households’ physical capacity than all the other household 
adaptive capacity dimensions. Social capital, economic capital and human capital potential 
outcomes under the programme are negative than if the households were not implementing the 
programme. The average social capital index for example is 0.011 or 1.1 per cent less for 
CAMPFIRE households than the average of 0.061 or 6.1 per cent that would have occurred if 
these households were not implementing the programme. The human capital capacity index for 
programme implementing households is 0.006 less than 0.076 if they were not implementing 
the programme. The economic capacity index is 0.008 less when treated than the average of 
0.068 that would have occurred if the programme implementing households were not under the 
programme. However, on physical capacity the potential outcome would be 0.038 higher than 
0.183 if the programme implementing households were not implementing. On the overall 
household adaptive capacity index, the potential outcome is 0.012 higher than 0.388 that would 




In summary, to have positive impact on the different aspects of household adaptive capacity, 
income from the conservation programme should be directed towards improving the conditions 
that enables the realisation of the relevant welfare dimension or household adaptive capacity 
component. One would not expect all welfare dimensions or adaptive capacity dimensions to 
be positively influenced by the conservation programme if there is no significant investment 
of the income towards each of the relevant dimensions. The results show that the direction of 
the investment would be the direction of the positive welfare or adaptive capacity outcome.  
Results of Cobb-Douglas or education production function confirm that the CAMPFIRE 
programme variably affects the individual components of adaptive capacity; negatively on 
household social, economic capacities, and positively on household physical capacity with no 
significant effect on human capacity and overall household adaptive capacity. The results also 
show that there are other covariates that have significant influence on household capacities, 
such as having a household member out of the country, or in an urban area, being a widow, or 
some ethnicity such as being Karanga and traditional religion. Having a household member in 
the diaspora for example improves household economic and human capacity, while traditional 
religion tends to have negative effect on all household adaptive capacities. 
The study further realises that the economic decision process under community wildlife based 
programmes is complex. Logistic regression results point to encounters with wild animals 
being statistically significant predictors of negative affect; which in turn is a key determinant 
of resource degrading behaviours such as poaching and killing of wild animals. The killings 
are emotional responses to revenge for or deter wild animals from destroying fields, livestock, 
killing or injuring people. On the other hand, the thesis finds perceptions of benefit, and 
employment in the wildlife industry to influence preference for wildlife-based programmes; 
and not the negative affect. The conclusion is therefore that a considerable fraction of decisions 
by subjects in Community Wildlife-Based programmes can be attributed to heuristics; negative 
wildlife encounters and associated feelings. However, negative affect does not influence 
preferences for wildlife-based programmes but expected utility. Heuristics can therefore 
compliment the understanding of some decision patterns and behaviours that are seemingly 
inconsistent with classical economic theories of logic and probability.  
Results from the three papers show how programme design can affect specific components of 
systems. Programme impact assessments should be designed with a clear understanding of the 




were initiated with a wide range of objectives some of which were not achieved due the manner 
in which the implementation is done (Mudzengi 2020, Shereni 2020, Tchakatumba et al. 2019, 
Chigonda 2018). In the case under study, the original design did not spell out specific 
configuration of wildlife income. During implementation, it became prudent to invest a larger 
proportion of income in public infrastructure when household dividend approach became 
untenable (Jone B. T. 2007). The programme ended up having less impact on household 
economics, poverty and other social aspects. Impacts that are more positive were realised on 
livelihoods aspect bound to public goods provision such as education and physical household 
capacity.   
Furthermore, the results demonstrated the need to select impact assessment procedures that 
allow for comparison of different treatment regimes. The use of treatment-effect procedures 
allow for in-depth understanding of programmes or interventions impacts. This further 
improves understanding the implication of the design on beneficiaries programme preference 
and behaviours. Because less benefits accrue directly to households, it has less effect 
cognitively. The more cognitively available exemplars of wildlife programmes are the negative 
encounters with wild animals. Thus the slow analytical processes compete with fast heuristic 
processes, and will also interfere with quick assessment which may yield results that are at 
variance with people’s aspirations. There is need to ground our assessments, design them well 
and not hurry them. For example, people tend to weigh their judgments heavily toward more 
recent information, making new opinions biased toward latest news or any information that can 
quickly be recalled such as unpleasant encounters (Dreman et al., 2010).          
5.2 Policy implication of the results 
A number of policy implications can be drawn from results of this study. At the onset 
community based wildlife programmes are demonstrably important in the livelihoods of the 
respective communities. However, programme impact can be enhanced for specific livelihoods 
or economic components if there is a deliberate effort to direct the investment in the direction 
of the intended components. For example, an improvement in education production is a result 
of deliberate investment towards education infrastructure and support system thereof. The same 
result was obtained with reference to adaptive capacity. The programme demonstrably 
improved household physical capacity, which shows results of deliberately investing in public 
capital or infrastructure. The local authority instituted a policy for a larger proportion of income 
to be invested in public infrastructure. The policy has yielded positive results in relation to the 




programme towards the components are low, 30 per cent is devoted to all the other components. 
Therefore, policy decisions about how income from wildlife business is utilised has 
implications on specific livelihoods components thereof. This demonstrates that policy makers 
can make deliberate decisions to influence specific livelihoods and economic components 
through structuring wildlife programmes investment portfolios. In this case, the policy makers 
can deliberately reconfigure conservation income investment portfolio towards human capacity 
development, for example by putting more resources to vocational trainings and adult literacy. 
Policy implications for paper 3 relates how issues beyond economics can be relevant in 
improving economic outcomes. The study therefore proposes that working towards generating 
positive markers or anchors about wildlife among beneficiary subjects can increase tolerance 
of wildlife. This can be achieved for example by instituting wildlife management systems that 
cater for problem animal control to reduce negative encounters, reducing evocation of affect 
and the associated resource degrading behaviours. People resort to revenge killing because they 
have had negative encounters with wildlife. Therefore, by reducing the likelihood of such 
encounters it would also reduce the likelihood of subjects engaging in acts that are not 
conservation friendly. Furthermore, improving benefits or perceptions of benefits can increase 
preference or willingness to accept wildlife-based programmes. Beneficiary subjects need to 
be actively involved and informed so that they realise the benefit stream accruing to the 
community that they are a part of. A larger proportion of subjects who were interviewed for 
example were not even aware of how much their communities were realising from conservation 
programme.  
 
5.3 Future research direction 
 
Results from this research suggest that ‘we can only reap where we sow’. One could not expect 
positive effects of conservation programmes if they do not invest in the relevant objective 
functions. As such there is need for further evidence to demonstrate the assertion. There in need 
to find different contexts where conservation income has been used differently from the case 
under this study. For example, where larger proportions of income have been invested in 
improving human capacity or economic assets and examine whether the same positive impact 
on the components is obtain. This would enhance the ability of policy makers and beneficiary 




The study further proposes that there is need for more studies around the role of non-economic 
factors in determining economic outcomes. The role of heuristics for example has been 
demonstrated to be significant in explaining some of the seemingly inconsistent human 
behaviour and stated preferences. However, more studies need to be done to buttress this claim, 
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6. Appendix A for paper 1  
Table 6-1: The five internally homogeneous groups or blocks identifiable into which 428 observations were assigned   
Inferior of block of 
propensity score Control Treatment Total 
0.0828849 32 8 40 
0.2 99 42 141 
0.4 38 23 61 
0.6 25 68 93 
0.8 10 83 93 
Total 204 224 428 
Source: Survey data December 2015 
 
Table 6-2: Propensity score model 
Estimation of the propensity score              
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -300.60003 
  
          
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -231.85148 
  
          
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -228.19675 
  
          
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -227.98653 
  
          
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -227.98277 
  
          
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -227.98277 
  
          
              
Probit regression Number of obs = 434 
Log likelihood = -227.98277 LR chi2(8) = 145.23 
  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 








Campfire Coefficient Standard error z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Sex of child 0.102 0.136 0.75 0.456 -0.166 0.369 
Cross wildlife area 0.775 0.151 5.14 0 0.479 1.070 
Doma 0.317 0.265 1.2 0.232 -0.203 0.837 
Number of goats/sheep owned -0.012 0.008 -1.53 0.126 -0.027 0.003 
Number of poultry owned -0.001 0.010 -0.06 0.955 -0.021 0.020 
Employed in wildlife industry 2.140 0.530 4.03 0 1.100 3.179 
Distance to school  0.000 0.000 -4.51 0 0.000 0.000 
Cross a river  1.066 0.152 7.03 0 0.769 1.364 
Constant -4.288 0.668 -6.42 0 -5.598 -2.978 






Table 6-3: Matched groups characteristics 
 Matched groups     
Household characteristics 1 2 3 4 5 Matched sample average 
 Mean 
Participation rate in education 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.69 0.74 0.75 
Number of cattle 3.85 3.23 2.95 1.08 0.97 2.29 
Number of donkeys 0.40 0.03 0.30 0.18 0.16 0.16 
Number of goats/sheep 8.00 4.12 4.57 2.12 4.17 4.12 
Number of poultry 7.98 4.94 5.79 3.71 6.69 5.46 
Child age (years) 11.55 11.29 11.84 9.96 10.27 10.88 
Distance to school (km) 5,088 2,639 4,526 3,684 2,506 3,335 
Education expenditure (USD) 46.13 30.41 40.38 14.72 18.29 27.24 
Residence period (years) 19.70 22.61 23.74 45.10 22.99 27.36 
Household size 5.83 5.43 5.87 6.27 5.49 5.72 
Head Years In School 5.54 6.73 6.18 5.91 6.60 6.33 
 Proportion 
Girls  62.50 53.19 62.30 53.76 38.71 52.34 
Orphan 5.00 6.30 6.60 3.20 2.15 4.67 
Education assistance 14.29 6.79 6.67 12.22 19.78 11.46 
Diaspora 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 
Urban 17.50 21.28 16.39 12.90 30.11 20.33 
Head sex: female 35.00 24.11 13.11 9.68 13.98 18.22 
Doma 0.00 3.55 3.28 17.20 12.90 8.18 
Karanga 5.00 12.77 9.84 2.15 4.30 7.48 
Korekore 70.00 47.52 60.66 50.54 64.52 55.84 
Zezuru 15.00 15.60 16.39 8.60 1.08 10.98 
Apostolic 62.50 33.33 24.59 22.58 23.66 30.37 
Christian gatherings 0.00 1.42 0.00 7.53 13.98 5.14 
No religion 2.50 13.48 9.84 5.38 3.23 7.94 
Pentecostal 12.50 9.22 21.31 9.68 15.05 12.62 
Roman Catholic 0.00 0.71 1.64 3.23 2.15 1.64 
Traditional religion 7.50 19.15 31.15 36.56 27.96 25.47 
Wildlife wage labour 7.50 6.38 3.28 10.75 20.43 10.05 
Non-Agricultural wage labour 40.00 25.71 42.62 32.97 44.09 35.06 
Cross river  10.00 10.64 78.69 97.85 86.02 55.61 
Cross wildlife area 7.50 17.73 32.79 54.84 80.65 40.65 







Table 6-4: Inputs in the production of education outputs; children participation in education 1 Source: Survey data 
December 2015 
 
Education production input Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
t P>t Beta 
CAMPFIRE (=1) 0.103 0.031 3.32 0.001 0.258 


























Child sex (0=female 1=male) 
Child’s age -0.009 0.003 -3.14 0.002 -0.147 
Orphan (=1) -0.024 0.092 -0.26 0.794 -0.026 
Double orphan (=1) 0.083 0.104 0.79 0.428 0.079 
Household resident period -3.205 9.431 -0.34 0.738 -0.015 
Household size -0.006 0.005 -1.08 0.279 -0.053 
Household head sex (1=female 2=male) -0.007 0.027 -0.24 0.809 -0.013 
Household head years in school  0.010 0.003 3.55 0.000 0.189 










Karanga 0.140 0.046 3.06 0.002 0.190 
Korekore 0.104 0.033 3.1 0.002 0.258 
Zezuru 0.108 0.043 2.51 0.012 0.175 
Foreigners 0.086 0.045 1.93 0.054 0.123 
Religion 
-0.029 0.072 -0.41 0.685 -0.068 
Apostolic 
Christian gatherings -0.109 0.081 -1.34 0.181 -0.121 
Muslim 0.095 0.093 1.02 0.308 0.075 
No religion -0.008 0.077 -0.1 0.919 -0.010 
Pentecostal 0.076 0.074 1.02 0.308 0.126 
Protestant 0.033 0.074 0.44 0.657 0.057 
Traditional -0.003 0.072 -0.04 0.968 -0.006 










Donkeys 0.006 0.014 0.44 0.664 0.020 
Goats/sheep 0.002 0.001 1.97 0.05 0.149 
Poultry 0.004 0.001 3.06 0.002 0.153 
School inputs     
Primary school fees 0.004 0.003          1.2               0.230                  0.094 
Secondary school fees 0.000 0.001 -0.42 0.675 -0.030 
Cross river to school -0.019 0.022 -0.85 0.397 -0.046 
Distance to school 7.970 4.210 1.9 0.059 0.105 
Cross wildlife area to school -0.108 0.021 -5.01 0 -0.267 
Constant 0.929 0.111 8.35 0 . 
Education output: children participation rate in education 




Table 6-5: Inputs in the production of education outputs; children participation in education  
Participation in education Coefficient Standard  error t P>t Beta 
Socioeconomic inputs 
Socio-demographic inputs 
Child sex  -0.036 0.017 -2.06 0.040 -0.090 
Child age -0.010 0.003 -3.52 0.000 -0.160 
Orphan -0.030 0.090 -0.33 0.738 -0.032 
Double orphan 0.083 0.101 0.82 0.415 0.079 
Household resident period -5.751 9.151 -0.62 0.537 -0.028 
Household size -0.005 0.005 -0.92 0.360 -0.043 
Household head sex 0.010 0.027 0.37 0.713 0.0191 
Household head years in school 0.011 0.003 3.94 0.000 0.205 
Ethnicity 
Doma 0.047 0.044 1.07 0.287 0.062 
Karanga 0.113 0.045 2.55 0.011 0.154 
Korekore 0.105 0.033 3.25 0.001 0.262 
Zezuru 0.084 0.042 2.02 0.044 0.137 
Religion  
Foreigners 0.066 0.043 1.51 0.131 0.094 
Apostolic 0.003 0.070 0.05 0.963 0.006 
Christian gatherings -0.065 0.079 -0.82 0.411 -0.072 
Muslim 0.080 0.090 0.88 0.378 0.063 
No religion 0.015 0.075 0.2 0.838 0.020 
Pentecostal 0.086 0.072 1.2 0.232 0.143 
Protestant 0.038 0.072 0.53 0.596 0.066 
Traditional religion 0.023 0.070 0.33 0.741 0.049 
Assets 
Number of Cattle -0.003 0.003 -1.31 0.19 -0.103 
Number of donkeys 0.0133 0.013 1 0.317 0.045 
Number of goats 0.003 0.001 2.61 0.009 0.192 
Number of poultry 0.004 0.001 2.8 0.005 0.138 
School inputs 
Primary fees 0.022 0.012 1.85 0.065 0.590 
Secondary fees 0.001 0.001 2.03 0.043 0.157 
Cross river to school -0.022 0.022 -1 0.317 -0.054 
Distance to school 1.132 4.121 2.74 0.007 0.149 
Cross wildlife area to school -0.088 0.021 -4.17 0.000 -0.219 
Masoka (CAMPFIRE) 0.482 0.188 2.57 0.011 0.998 
Angwa (CAMPFIRE) 0.296 0.067 4.43 0.000 0.672 
Hambe/Majongwe (comparison) 0.264 0.070 3.78 0.000 0.554 
Intercept 0.418 0.211 1.98 0.049 . 
Education output: children participation rate in education 
R-square = 0.316, Adjusted R-square =0.260  n=425 




7. Appendix B for paper 2 
The table below shows the potential outcomes for the treatments.  
Table 7-1: Potential Outcomes by treatment and covariates in the regression model 
Adaptive Capacity Index Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
POmeans       
campfire       
Non-CAMPFIRE 0.392884 0.009625 40.82 0 0.374019 0.411749 
CAMPFIRE 0.410646 0.00903 45.48 0 0.392948 0.428344 
OME0       
Member in diaspora 0.085169 0.034296 2.48 0.013 0.017949 0.152388 
Member in urban 0.011923 0.023984 0.5 0.619 -0.03509 0.058931 
Married 0.07774 0.025321 3.07 0.002 0.028112 0.127369 
Divorced 0.088521 0.037148 2.38 0.017 0.015713 0.161329 
Never married 0.075667 0.050553 1.5 0.134 -0.02341 0.174748 
Household Head Sex 0.027213 0.027024 1.01 0.314 -0.02575 0.080178 
Buja 0.010359 0.04265 0.24 0.808 -0.07323 0.093952 
Doma -0.07041 0.076759 -0.92 0.359 -0.22086 0.080033 
Foreigners -0.03956 0.042148 -0.94 0.348 -0.12217 0.043045 
Karanga -0.01229 0.028398 -0.43 0.665 -0.06795 0.043369 
Korekore -0.0337 0.025402 -1.33 0.185 -0.08349 0.016084 
Zezuru -0.01906 0.031317 -0.61 0.543 -0.08045 0.042316 
Apostolic 0.00166 0.027369 0.06 0.952 -0.05198 0.055302 
Christian gathering -0.05263 0.030484 -1.73 0.084 -0.11237 0.007122 
Muslim  0.091665 0.040905 2.24 0.025 0.011493 0.171837 
No religion 0.068796 0.031567 2.18 0.029 0.006926 0.130666 
Pentecostal 0.043744 0.028797 1.52 0.129 -0.0127 0.100184 
Protestant 0.098409 0.033823 2.91 0.004 0.032118 0.1647 
Roman catholic 0.013682 0.063607 0.22 0.83 -0.11099 0.138349 
_cons 0.302853 0.035698 8.48 0 0.232886 0.37282 
OME1        
Member diaspora 0.032743 0.021765 1.5 0.132 -0.00992 0.075401 
Member urban 0.05957 0.013201 4.51 0 0.033697 0.085443 
Married  0.086049 0.031675 2.72 0.007 0.023968 0.148131 
Divorced  0.028526 0.037655 0.76 0.449 -0.04528 0.102329 
Never married 0.043007 0.04944 0.87 0.384 -0.05389 0.139909 
HOH Sex -0.00294 0.020296 -0.14 0.885 -0.04272 0.036841 
Doma -0.02954 0.021414 -1.38 0.168 -0.07151 0.012428 
Foreigners  0.02497 0.027621 0.9 0.366 -0.02917 0.079106 
Karanga  0.104987 0.031855 3.3 0.001 0.042552 0.167421 
Korekore  0.016849 0.015652 1.08 0.282 -0.01383 0.047526 
Zezuru  0.029875 0.034328 0.87 0.384 -0.03741 0.097156 
Apostolic  0.058665 0.021294 2.75 0.006 0.016929 0.1004 




No religion 0.001032 0.022156 0.05 0.963 -0.04239 0.044457 
Pentecostal  0.058538 0.018019 3.25 0.001 0.023222 0.093854 
Protestant  0.033332 0.01965 1.7 0.09 -0.00518 0.071845 
Roman catholic 0.183967 0.017643 10.43 0 0.149388 0.218545 
_cons 0.272562 0.028789 9.47 0 0.216137 0.328987 

























8. Appendix C for paper 3 
Table 8-1: Determinants of programme preference 
campfire choice Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
affect 0.082 0.739 0.11 0.911 -1.366 1.531 
cattle -0.218 0.172 -1.27 0.204 -0.554 0.119 
shoats -0.023 0.030 -0.76 0.446 -0.081 0.036 
poultry 0.054 0.030 1.81 0.071 -0.005 0.114 
Wildlife employment 2.428 0.775 3.13 0.002 0.908 3.947 
Remittances 2.782 1.390 2 0.045 0.056 5.507 
Illness  -0.041 0.626 -0.07 0.947 -1.269 1.186 
Committee member 1.629 1.168 1.39 0.163 -0.660 3.918 
Korekore 2.790 0.867 3.22 0.001 1.090 4.490 
Doma 4.389 1.256 3.5 0 1.928 6.850 
Zezuru 0.310 1.810 0.17 0.864 -3.238 3.858 
Married -0.401 1.040 -0.39 0.7 -2.439 1.637 
participan~c 1.046 0.740 1.41 0.157 -0.404 2.496 
Prefer education benefit 1.742 0.733 2.38 0.017 0.305 3.179 
Prefer cash to education subsidy -2.841 1.061 -2.68 0.007 -4.920 -0.761 
Prefer cash to health subsidy 1.146 0.817 1.4 0.161 -0.456 2.748 
Better education without 
campfire 0.470 0.833 0.56 0.572 -1.161 2.102 
Better health without campfire -2.167 0.828 -2.62 0.009 -3.790 -0.544 
_cons -2.905 1.521 -1.91 0.056 -5.886 0.075 
       
Logistic regression 
Number of 
obs 116    
  LR chi2(18) 65.2    
  Prob > chi2 0    
Log likelihood = -43.334851 Pseudo R2 0.4293    











Table 8-2: Reduced model of campfire preference 
Dependent variable: campfire programme choice =1 
Predictors Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Education benefit 1.059 0.430 2.46 0.014 0.216 1.903 
Can have better access 
to health without 
campfire  -1.128 0.415 -2.72 0.007 -1.942 -0.314 
Employed in 
wildlife industry 1.206 0.477 2.53 0.011 0.271107 2.141 
_cons -0.685 0.354 -1.94 0.053 -1.378 0.008 
 Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Education benefit 2.883955 1.241039 2.46 0.014 1.24078 6.7032 
Can have better 
access to health 
without campfire 0.323615 0.134363 -2.72 0.007 0.143421 0.730202 
Employed in 
wildlife industry 3.339439 1.59256 2.53 0.011 1.311415 8.50368 
Logistic regression model test results Number of obs = 128 
 LR chi2(3) = 25.53 
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -69.600344 Pseudo R2 = 0.155 





9. Appendix D: Household questionnaire: 
 
 
CBNRM Public investments, access to services, adaptation to environmental 
risks and perceptions on CBNRM 
Consent  
Purpose: We are conducting an academic survey to learn about the impact of public investments on 
household access to education and health, household ability to deal with environmental risks and 
people’s perception of the CAMPFIRE programme. This research has been approved by the Commerce 
Faculty Ethics in Research Committee. 
Selection: Your household has been randomly selected to participate in an interview that includes 
questions on topics such as your family background, household expenditures, food consumption and 
assets, experiences with shocks and wildlife. Your responses will be combined with responses from 
approximately 400 other households from the district. Benefits and compensation: We cannot and do 
not guarantee or promise that you will receive any benefits from this study. No compensation, monetary 
or otherwise, can be offered for your participation as this may be seen as coercing your participation.  
Confidentiality: If you are willing to participate in this study and give your verbal consent, we will not 
disclose your household’s information to any other entity not directly related to this academic research.  
Voluntary participation: Participation in this study is voluntary. If you decide not to participate in this 
study, your decision will not affect your future relations with the research institutions or its personnel. 
If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw your consent and to discontinue participation at 
any time without penalty. The interview would take approximately one hour.   
Contacts: Should you have any questions regarding the research please feel free to contact the 




A Location   
A1 Ward number   
A2 Ward name  
A3 Enumeration Area  
A4 Village name  
A5 Name of nearest primary school  
A6 Distance to nearest primary school ________Km     ___hr     ____minutes  
-8=Don’t Know (DK) -9=Refused 
A7 Primary school user charges School fees USD _________________ 
A8 School levy USD _________________ 
A9 Name of nearest secondary school  
A10 Distance to nearest secondary school ________Km     ___hr     ____minutes 
-8=Don’t Know (DK) -9=Refused 
A11 Secondary school user charges School fees USD _________________ 
A12 School levy USD _________________ 
A13 Name of nearest health centre  
A14 Distance to nearest health centre  ________Km     ___hr     ____minutes 
-8=Don’t Know (DK) -9=Refused 
A15 Health fees Under 5 years USD _________________ 
A16  Children 5-12 USD _________________ 
A17  Children 13 -17 USD _________________ 
A18  Adults USD _________________ 
B CAMPFIRE STATUS  
B1 Is the ward implementing CAMPFIRE? 0=No 1=Yes -8=DK -9=Refused 
B2 If yes when did it start? (Year) _______________ 
-8=DK -9=Refused 
B3 Is the village implementing CAMPFIRE? _______________ 
-8=DK -9=Refused 
B4 If yes average yearly income since 2009? Ward level USD ____________  
-8=DK -9=Refused 
B5 Is the household affiliated to/a member of CAMPFIRE? 0=No 1=Yes -8=DK -9=Refused 
B6 How much dividends did you get last year/season? 0=No 1=Yes -8=DK -9=Refused 
B7 Are you or any member of your household in the CAMPFIRE 
committee? 
0=No 1=Yes -8=DK -9=Refused 
B8 Current position of any household member in the CAMPFIRE  0=None 1=chairperson 2=vice chairperson 
3=treasurer 4=resource monitor 5=committee 




B9 Where you or any member of your household in the CAMPFIRE 
committee before? 
0=No 1=Yes -8=DK -9=Refused 
B10 Position of any household member in the CAMPFIRE before. 0=None 1=chairperson 2=vice chairperson 
3=treasurer 4=resource monitor 5=committee 
member -8=DK -9=Refused 
C Household demographic information  
C1 How many years has household lived in the area? -8=DK -9=Refused 
C2 Household size (Number of household members) -8=DK -9=Refused 
C3 Are there any members of the household in the Diaspora? 1=Yes 0=No 
C4 Are there any members of the household in an urban area? 1=Yes 0=No 
C5 Household head name  -8=DK -9=Refused 
C6 Household head gender  1=Male 2=Female 






C8 Household ethnicity 1=Korekore 2= Doma 3= Zengeretsi 
4=Foreigners (Zambia/Moza) 5=Zezuru 6. 
Karanga -8=DK -9=Refused 
C9 What is the religion of the head of household head?  0= None 1=Roman Catholic 2=Protestant 
3=Pentecostal 4=Apostolic sect  5=ZCC 
6=Christians gatherings 7=Muslim/Islam 
8=Traditional 9=Other  -8=DK -9=Refused 
C10 Household head education level (years in school) 0=Never Attended 1=Primary 1, 2=Primary 2 
3=Primary 3, 4=Primary 4, 5=Primary 5,  
6=Primary 6, 7=Primary 7, 8=Form 1 
9=Form 2, 10=Form 3, 11=Form 4  
12=Form 5 13=Form 6 
14 = some college/university -8=DK  
-9=Refused 
Household member roaster [repeat for each member] 
C11 Name of household member   
 Relationship to head of household 1= Spouse  
 2=Son/daughter of head and spouse 
 3=Son /daughter of head 
4= Son/daughter of spouse 
 5=Mother/father of head/ spouse 
 6=Sister/brother of head/spouse 




 8=Grand child 




C12 Sex 1=Male 2=Female -8=DK -9=Refused 
C13 Age (birthday and month for U18) ____________years  -8=DK -9=Refused 
C14 If below 18 year, Is …’s father alive  0=No 1=Yes -8=DK -9=Refused 
C15 If below 18 year, Is …’s mother alive 0=No 1=Yes -8=DK -9=Refused 
D Education  
D1 Has (NAME) ever been to school? 0=No 1=Yes -8=DK -9=Refused if no skip 
to C18 
D2 What are the years spent in school if (NAME) above 17/education 
level 
1=Primary 1, 2=Primary 2 
3=Primary 3, 4=Primary 4, 5=Primary 5,  
6=Primary 6, 7=Primary 7, 8=Form 1 
9=Form 2, 10=Form 3, 11=Form 4  
12=Form 5 13=Form 6 
14 = some college/university -8=DK  
-9=Refused 
D3 If (NAME) above 17 but did not complete what was the reason? 1=no school fees 2=no school uniform 3=no 
stationery 4=ill 5=no food 6=river flooded 
7=family tragedy 8=family events 9=school 
too far 10=had no interest 11=to help with 
domestic work 12=no teachers 13=poor 
performance 14=other 
D4 If above 5 and never been to school can …. read and write? 0=No 1=Yes -8=DK -9=Refused 
D5 Why is (NAME) not attending school? (multiple)  1=no school fees 2=no school uniform 3=no 
stationery 4=ill 5=no food 6=river flooded 
7=family tragedy 8=family events 9=school 
too far 10=had no interest 11=to help with 
domestic work 12=no teachers 13=poor 
performance 14=wild animals 15=other  
 If 5-17 is (NAME)  attending school (2015) 0=No 1=Yes -8=DK -9=Refused 
D6 If no can (NAME)  Read and write Skip 0=No 1=Yes -8=DK -9=Refused 
D7 Which level was (NAME) this 2015?   0=Primary 0, 1=Primary 1, 2=Primary 2 
3=Primary 3, 4=Primary 4, 5=Primary 5,  
6=Primary 6, 7=Primary 7, 8=Form 1 
9=Form 2, 10=Form 3, 11=Form 4  
12=Form 5 13=Form 6 14=Tertiary 
D8 Which level was (NAME)  in, last school year 2014? 0=Primary 0, 1=Primary 1, 2=Primary 2 
3=Primary 3, 4=Primary 4, 5=Primary 5,  




9=Form 2, 10=Form 3, 11=Form 4  
12=Form 5 13=Form 6 14=Tertiary 15=not in 
school 
D9 Had (NAME)  skipped school in 2015? 0=No 1=Yes -8=DK -9=Refused 
D10 How often did (NAME)  skip school? 1= every week 2=every month  3=every term 
4=once a year 
D11 If (NAME)  skipped school what were the reasons? multiple 1=no school fees 2=no school uniform 3=no 
stationery 4=ill 5=no food 6=river flooded 
7=family tragedy 8=family events 9=school 
too far 10=had no interest 11=to help with 
domestic work 12=no teachers 13=poor 
performance 14=wild animals 15=other 
D12 Which school was/is (NAME) attending?  -8=DK -9=Refused 
D13 How far is the school that (NAME) is attending /attended? ________Km     ___hr     ____minutes 
D14 If different from nearest school why is (NAME) not attending the 
nearest school? 
1=was refused 2=expensive 3=river 
4=wildlife 5=poor service 6=no teachers 
-8=DK -9=Refused 
D15 If 5-17 does (NAME)cross a river to get to school? 1=Yes 0=No -8=DK -9=Refused 
D16 If 5-17 does (NAME) cross wildlife area to get to school? 1=Yes 0=No -8=DK -9=Refused 
D17 If 5-17 how much did you spent on education last year for (NAME)? -8=DK -9=Refused 
D18 If (NAME) 5-17 School fees + levies (include owing) USD ____________-8=DK -9=Refused 
D19 If (NAME) 5-17 School fees amount owing USD ____________-8=DK -9=Refused 
D20 If (NAME) 5-17 School uniforms  USD ____________-8=DK -9=Refused 
D21 If (NAME) 5-17 School stationery USD ____________-8=DK -9=Refused 
D22 If CAMPFIRE ward, what direct assistance did (NAME)got from 
CAMPFIRE 2015? 
0=None 1=fees  USD___, 2=stationery 
USD___ 3=uniform USD___  4=exam fees 
USD___ 
 -8=DK -9=Refused 
D23 If 5-17 Has (NAME) got education assistance from other 
programmes (other than CAMPFIRE)? 
0=None 1=fees  USD___, 2=stationery 
USD___ 3=uniform USD___  4=exam fees 
USD___ 
 -8=DK -9=Refused 
D23 If 5-17 what was (NAME)’s mark/no. subjects passed last term? (no. 
passed/total subjects) 
            
E Health   
E1 Has (NAME)  suffered any illness in the past 12 months 1=Yes 0=No -8=DK -9=Refused  
E2 If yes, how many times has (NAME)  been ill in the last 12 months?  
E3 How many times has (NAME)  visited the local clinic in the last 12 
months 
 
E4 If no visits or visits less than number of illnesses for (NAME) what 
were the reasons for not seeking medical treatment from the local 
clinic? 
1=Financial(user fees) 2=Financial 
(drugs/prescriptions) 3=Financial (transport 
cost) 4=Not my choice 5=Staff not hospitable 
6=Facility had no drugs 7=Facility had 
no/inadequate staff 8=No information about 
services -8=DK -9=Refused 




E6 Cost/out of pocket payments   
E7 What were the direct – total user fees (12 months) for (NAME) USD ____________ 
E8 Direct – drug cost/other (12 months) for (NAME) USD ____________ 
E9 Indirect – transport cost (12 months) (NAME) USD ____________ 
E10 If reported ill in the last 12 months Has (NAME)  suffered diarrhoea 
in the past two weeks 
1=Yes 0=No -8=DK -9=Refused 
E11 Did (NAME)  receive medical treatment for the diarrhoea? 1=Yes 0=No -8=DK -9=Refused 
E12 Stunting/wasting (under 5) for (NAME) Height: ____________-8=DK -9=Refused 
E12 Weight:____________ -8=DK -9=Refused 
END OF ROASTER 
F ADAPTATION: Asset index   
F1 How many of the following does your household own?  
F2 Cattle _______________-8=DK -9=Refused 
F3 Donkeys _______________-8=DK -9=Refused 
F4 Goats/sheep _______________-8=DK -9=Refused 
F5 Chickens  _______________-8=DK -9=Refused 
F6 Hoes and axes _______________-8=DK -9=Refused 
F7 Ploughs and cultivators _______________-8=DK -9=Refused 
F8 Type of dwellings 1=Brick and thatch 2=Brick and 
iron/asbestos sheets 3=pole, dagga and 
thatch 
 
G ADAPTATION: Livelihood sources (livelihoods diversity index) 




months  4= season 
5=12months 
G1 What is the household’s primary/main livelihood? (CODE Page 6)   
 Other livelihoods 
Do you or any of your household engage in any of the following?  
G2 Own crop production/sales  0=No     1=Yes  
G3 Own livestock production/sales  0=No     1=Yes  
G4 Agricultural wage labour (casual, temporary, seasonal, contract) 0=No     1=Yes  
G5 Non-agricultural wage labour (casual, temporary, seasonal, contract) 0=No     1=Yes  
G6 Salaried, permanent (agricultural) 0=No     1=Yes  
G7 Salaried, permanent (non-agricultural) 0=No     1=Yes  
G8 Sale of wild/bush products (e.g., honey, game meat) 0=No     1=Yes  
G9 Handicrafts 0=No     1=Yes  




G11 Informal trader (agricultural products) 0=No     1=Yes  
G12 Informal trader (non-agricultural products) 0=No     1=Yes  
G13 Remittances 0=No     1=Yes  
G14 Begging 0=No     1=Yes  
G15 Retired with pension  0=No     1=Yes  
G16 Other (specify) 0=No     1=Yes  
H Adaptation [adaptive capacity]   
H1 Have you noticed any significant changes in weather patterns between 
the decades 1980s/1990s/2000s decades?   
0=no 1=yes 
 
H2 If yes what changes have you observed?  Select all that apply.  1= Increased no. of seasons without enough 
rainfall 
2= Rainfall starts late and ends early 
3= Rains come earlier than they normally 
should 
4= Increased floods 
5= Extremes in temperature (very cold/hot) 
H3 What do you think are their causes?  
[multiple]  
1=climate change 2=deforestation, 3=bad 
farming methods, 4=not following tradition, 
5=other (specify) -8=don’t know 
H4 Shocks, Stresses and Response   
H5 In the past 12 months did your household experience (shock/stress)?   How did you cope? 
Enter from code list 
all that apply (page 
7) 
H6 Floods 0=No         1=Yes  
H7 Dry spells/variable rainfall 0=No         1=Yes  
H8 Drought 0=No         1=Yes  
H9 Deforestation 0=No         1=Yes  
H10 Livestock diseases  0=No         1=Yes  
H11 Crop diseases and pests 0=No         1=Yes  
H12 Reduced soil productivity 0=No         1=Yes  
H13 livestock predation 0=No         1=Yes  
H14 Crop raids 0=No         1=Yes  
H15 Attack by wild animals 0=No         1=Yes  
H16 Food price fluctuation 0=No         1=Yes  
H17 HIV/AIDS 0=No         1=Yes  
H18 Diarrheal outbreaks 0=No         1=Yes  
H19 Chronic illness (malaria, TB) 0=No         1=Yes  
H20 Migration of main income earner 0=No         1=Yes  




H22 Death of main income earner  0=No         1=Yes  
H23 Other shock/stress 0=No         1=Yes  
 
 Codes for Q E1 
1 Own crop production/sales (communal/resettlement) 
2 Own livestock production/sales (communal/resettlement) 
3 Agricultural wage labor (casual, temporary, seasonal, contract) 
4 Non-agricultural wage labor (casual, temporary, seasonal, contract) 
5 Salaried, permanent (agricultural) 
6 Salaried, permanent (non-agricultural) 
7 Sale of wild/bush products (e.g., honey, charcoal) 
8 Handicrafts 
9 Homemaker/housewife (unpaid) 
 
10 Childcare/domestic work (paid) 
 
11 Other self-employment/own business (non-agricultural) 
12 Informal trader (agricultural products) 
13 Informal trader (non-agricultural products) 
14 Remittances 
15 Unable to work due to illness/handicap 
 16 Unemployed 
17 Retired with pension  
18 Retired without pension 
19 Child/student 
 









 G4-21 Coping Strategies 
 LIVESTOCK, CROPS AND LAND HOLDINGS  TO GET MORE FOOD OR MONEY 
1 Send livestock in search of pasture 17 Take up new wage labour 
2 Sell livestock 18 Sell household items (e.g., radio, bed) 
3 Slaughter livestock 19 Sell productive assets (e.g., plough, water pump) 
4 Lease out land 20 Take out a loan from an NGO 
 Crop related 21 Take out an loan from a bank 




6 Irrigate  23 Take out a loan from friends or relatives 
7 Grow small grains/drought resistant 24 Send children to work for money (e.g., domestic service)  
8 Stopped cultivating some years 25 Receive money or food from family members within 
community 9 Contract farming 26 Joined round tables 
 MIGRATION 27 Receive food aid from the government 
10 Migrate (only some family members)  28 Receive food aid from an NGO 
11 Migrate (the whole family) 29
3 
Participate in cash-for-work 
12 Send boys to stay with relatives or other HH 30 Participate in food-for-work  
13  Send girls to stay with relatives or other HH 31 Use money from savings 
 COPING STRATEGIES TO REDUCE 
CURRENT EXPENDITURE 
32 Receive money from a relative from  outside of 
community 14  Take children out of school 33 Hunting 
15 Move to less expensive housing  FAITH BASED RESPONSE 
16 Reduce food consumption 34 Joined a church 
  35 Changed church 
-8 DK 36 Moved out of church 
-9 Refused 37 Consulted traditional healers 
0 Nothing  38 Bought good luck charms 
  39 Other (specify) 
 
 Adaptiveness KG 
H22 Household weekly cereal consumption in a bad year (kg)  
H23 Household normal weekly cereal requirement (kg) Adaptiveness   
H24 Calculate yearly cereal requirement per capita (kg) Adaptiveness  
H25 Cereal production in a good rainfall year(kg) Adaptiveness  
H26 Amount from other sources in a good rainfall year (kg) Adaptiveness  
H27 Cereal production in a bad rainfall year(kg) eg 2014/5 Adaptiveness  
H28 Amount from other sources in a bad year(kg) eg 2014/5 Adaptiveness  
 
I IMPROVED LIVELIHOOD PRACTICES (Capacity building) 
I1 
Have you or anyone in your household ever received any 
vocational (job) or skill training? 
1.  Yes 




Who provided the vocational skills training? 
 
Select all that apply 
1.  Government  
2. Council 
3.  NGO 
4. CAMPFIRE 
5.  Private sector 
6.  Religious Organization 







Have you or anyone in your household ever received any 
business development training? 
1.  Yes 




Who provided the business development training? 
 
Select all that apply 
1.  Government  
2. Council 
3.  NGO 
4. CAMPFIRE 
5.  Private sector 
6.  Religious Organization 




Have you or anyone in your household ever received any 
natural resource management training? 
1.  Yes 




Who provided the natural resource management training? 
 
Select all that apply 
1.  Government  
2. Council 
3.  NGO 
4. CAMPFIRE 
5.  Private sector 
6.  Religious Organization 




Have you or anyone in your household ever received 
agriculture inputs (seed, fertiliser)? 
1.  Yes 




Who did you receive the agriculture inputs from? 
 
Select all that apply 
1.  Government  
2. Council 
3.  NGO 
4. CAMPFIRE 
5.  Private sector 
6.  Religious Organization 




Have you or anyone in your household ever received adult 
education (literacy or numeracy or financial education)? 
1.  Yes 
2.  No (Skip to I11) 
-8 DK 
-9 Refused 





Select all that apply 
2. Council 
3.  NGO 
4. CAMPFIRE 
5.  Private sector 
6.  Religious Organization 





In the past 12 months, have you or any member of your 
household worked with others in your village to do something 
for the benefit of the community? 
1.  Yes 




What activities did you participate in to benefit the 
community? 
[SELECT ALL THAT APPLY] 
[PROBE] 
1. Protecting crop land from flooding  
2. Protecting structures from flooding/landslides 
3. Soil conservation (terracing, gully improvement, 
bunds) 
4. Reforestation 
5. Improving access to drinking water 
6. Improving access to electricity 
7. Improving access to health services 
8. Improving road quality 
9. Forming cooperative 
10. Promoting tourism to improve local economy 
11. Other (specify) 
-8 DK 
-9 Refused 
FORMAL SOURCES OF SOCIAL SUPPORT 
I13 Has your household received any kind of assistance from the 
government, an NGO, company, or religious/ or any 
organization during the last 12 months? 
1. Yes 
2.  No (Skip to I16) 
-8 DK 
-9 Refused I14 
Who provided the assistance? Select all that apply 
1.  Government  
2. Council 
3.  NGO 
4. CAMPFIRE 
5.  Private sector 
6.  Religious Organization 
7. Others (specify) 
-8 DK 
-9 Refused 
I15 What types of support were received? (Read list) – match the 
assistance to organisations 
 
 
1.  Food aid 
2.  Food-for-work 
3.  Cash-for-work 




Select all that apply  5.  Ag/livestock inputs 
6.  Installed water points 
7.  Install latrine 
8.  School fees  
9.  Unconditional cash transfer 
10.  Other (specify)  
-8 DK 
-9 Refused  
INFORMAL SOURCES OF SOCIAL SUPPORT 
I16 
If your household had a problem and needed money or food 
urgently, who WITHIN THIS COMMUNITY could you turn to 
for assistance? 
Select all that apply 
1. Close family member [ordinary] 
2. Family member [in CAMPFIRE 
committee] 
3. Family member [employed 
safari/campfire]  
4. Extended family  
5. Non-relative in your ethnic group 
6. Non-relative in a different ethnic group 
7. Nobody 
-8  DNK 
 -9  Refused 
I17 
If your household had a problem and needed money or food 
urgently, who OUTSIDE THIS COMMUNITY could you turn 
to for assistance? 
Select all that apply 
1. Close family member [ordinary] 
2. Family member [in CAMPFIRE 
committee] 
3. Family member [employed 
safari/campfire]  
4. Extended family  
5. Non-relative in your ethnic group 
6. Non-relative in a different ethnic group 
7. Nobody 
-8  DNK 
 -9  Refused 
I18 
Who WITHIN THIS COMMUNITY would you help if they 
needed food or money urgently? 
Select all that apply 
1. Close family member [ordinary] 
2. Family member [in CAMPFIRE 
committee] 
3. Family member [employed 
safari/campfire]  
4. Extended family  
5. Non-relative in your ethnic group 
6. Non-relative in a different ethnic group 
7. Nobody 
-8  DNK 
 -9  Refused 
I19 Who OUTSIDE THIS COMMUNITY would you help if they 
needed food or money urgently ?Select all that apply 




2. Family member [CAMPFIRE 
committee] 
3. Family member [employed 
safari/campfire]  
4. Extended family  
5. Non-relative in your ethnic group 
6. Non-relative in a different ethnic group 
7. Nobody 
-8  DNK 
 -9  Refused 
I20 
In the past 12 months, have you helped anyone IN THIS 
COMMUNITY to recover after a shock? 
1 Yes 




In the past 12 months, who IN THIS COMMUNITY have you 
helped to recover after a shock, such as by sharing or giving 
food, money, supplies/materials, livestock, or labour?   
1. Close family member [ordinary] 
2. Family member [CAMPFIRE 
committee] 
3. Family member [employed 
safari/campfire]  
4. Extended family  
5. Non-relative in your ethnic group 
6. Non-relative in a different ethnic group 
7. Nobody 
-8  DNK 
 -9  Refused 
I22 
In the past 12 months, have you helped anyone OUTSIDE OF 
THIS COMMUNITY to recover after a shock? 
1 Yes 




In the past 12 months, who OUTSIDE OF THIS 
COMMUNITY have you helped to recover after a shock, such 
as by sharing or giving food, money, supplies/materials, 
livestock, or labour?   
1. Close family member [ordinary] 
2. Family member [CAMPFIRE 
committee] 
3. Family member [employed 
safari/campfire]  
4. Extended family  
5. Non-relative in your ethnic group 
6. Non-relative in a different ethnic group 
7. Nobody 
-8  DNK 
 -9  Refused 
I24 
In the past 12 months, has anyone IN THIS COMMUNITY 
helped you with food, money, supplies/materials, livestock, or 
labour? 
1 Yes 







In the past 12 months, who IN THIS COMMUNITY has 
helped you with food, money, supplies/materials, livestock, or 
labour?  
1. Close family member [ordinary] 
2. Family member [CAMPFIRE 
committee] 
3. Family member [employed 
safari/campfire]  
4. Extended family  
5. Non-relative in your ethnic group 
6. Non-relative in a different ethnic group 
7. Nobody 
-8  DNK 
 -9  Refused 
I26 
In the past 12 months, has anyone OUTSIDE THIS 
COMMUNITY helped you with food, money, 
supplies/materials, livestock, or labor? 
1 Yes 




In the past 12 months, who OUTSIDE THIS COMMUNITY 
has helped you with food, money, supplies/materials, livestock, 
or labor? 
1. Close family member [ordinary] 
2. Family member [CAMPFIRE 
committee] 
3. Family member [employed 
safari/campfire]  
4. Extended family  
5. Non-relative in your ethnic group 
6. Non-relative in a different ethnic group 
7. Nobody 
-8  DNK 
 -9  Refused 
I28 
Do you or does anyone else in your household know a staff 
member of an NGO? 
1.  Yes 




How do you (or another household member) know the NGO 
staff member?  Is he or she a… 







Could you ask the NGO staff member to help your family or 
community if help was needed? 
1.  Yes 









Participation in Community Decision making 
 
Are any of the following 
groups active in your 
community? 
READ EACH GROUP 
OUT LOUD 
 
1. Yes  
2. No  
-8     DK 
-9     Refused 
 
{if not=1 skip to next 
group} 
Are you or any 
members of your 
household 
participating in this 
group?   
 
1. Yes  
2. No  
-8     DK 
-9     Refused 
{if not=1 skip to 
next group} 
How actively do you or 








 J1 J2 J3 
a. Farmer groups (crops)    
b. Livestock production groups    
c. Savings / credit groups     
d. Community forest and rangeland users group          
e. Disaster Risk Reduction/Climate Change Adaptation committee          
 
f. Water users· group         
 
g. Trade or business associations        
  
h. Area land committee  
  
i. Charitable group (helping others)        
  
j. Mutual Help group (burial society)    
k. Civic group (“improving community”)    
l. Religious group       
  
m. Women’s group       
  
n. Youth group    
  








K Dietary diversity scoring tool – food security/adaptiveness 
 In the past 24 hours and 7days how many times have you or any of your household members eaten the following 
foods?   Group variety 
score  
Food group Tick if consumed Frequency Weighted contribution of each 
food (for office use only)   24 hrs 7days 24 hrs 7days 24 hrs 7days 
 A. Cereals    
3 1. Sorghum       
2. Maize       
3. Rice        
 B. Roots    
2 4. Cultivated       
5. Wild        
 C. Leaves    
2 6. Cultivated        
7. Wild       
 D. Cucurbits     
1 8. (manhanga)       
 E. Legumes    
2 9. Cultivated        
10. Wild        
 F. Fruits    
2 11. Cultivated        
12. Wild       
 G. Animal protein    
6 13. Domestic        
14. Game meat       
15. Fish        
16. Insect        
17. Dairy/milk       
18. Eggs        





L Encounters: Wild animal attacks  
L1 Have you or any member of your households been attacked by 
a wild animal?  
0=No 1=Yes 
L2 Which animals? 1=Lions 2=Hyena3=Leopard/cheetah 4=Baboons 
5=Jackal 6=Crocodiles 7=Hippopotamus 8=Snakes 
Other (Specify) _____ 
L3 If yes who was attacked? 1=self 2=wife 3=child 4=brother 5=sister 6=father 
7=mother 8=non-relative 9=other 
L4 When did this happen? (years)   
L5 Where did this happen? 1=fields 2=at home 3=way to service centre  
4=Other (specify) ___ 
L6 What were the results of the attack? 1=injury 2=death 3=escaped without injury 
4=Other (specify) ___ 
L7 To whom did you report the incident? 0=did not report 1=PAC 2=RDC 3=National Parks 
4=Police 5=Traditional leaders (Chief/village head) 
6=Other (specify) ___ 
L8 What help did you get? 0=None 1=Burial assistance 2=Medical fees 
3=Transport expenses 4=Compensation (food) 
5=Compensation (money) 6=other (specify) 
_________ 
L9 What do you feel towards the people you reported to? 1=hatred 2=angry 3=sorry 4=fear 5=nothing 
6=other (Specify) 
L10 If you did not report what was the reason? 0=no particular reason 1=no need to 2=are not 
helpful 3=Other (specify) ____ 
L11 What were your feelings towards animals after the attack/s? 1=hatred 2=angry 3=sorry 4=fear 5=nothing 
6=other (Specify)  
L12 What do you feel now towards the animals when you think or 
see them?  
1=hatred 2=angry 3=sorry 4=fear 5=nothing 
6=other (Specify) 
L13 What things do at times do that you think are caused by the 
wild animal attacks that you or your household members 
encountered? 
1=revenge killing 2=poaching 3=assisting poachers 
4=non-participation in NRM 5=other (specify) 
____ 
 
M Encounters: Crop raids  
M1 Have you experienced crop raids by wild animals?  0=No 1=Yes 
M2 Which animals? 1=Elephants 2=Buffaloes 3=Baboons/monkeys 
4=Elands/zebra/ 
5=Birds 
6=wild pigs 7=Hippopotamus 
8=Others (Specify)  
M3 When did this happen? (years)   
M4 How serious were the crop raids? 0=not serious 1=serious 2=very serious  
M5 What were the results of the crop raids? 1=not enough food 2=not enough cash  3=incurred 




M6 To whom did you report the incidents? 0=did not report 1=PAC 2=RDC 3=National Parks 
4=Police 5=Traditional leaders (Chief/village head) 
6=Other (specify) ___ 
M7 What help did you get? 0=None 1=Compensation (food) 2=Compensation 
(money) 3=other (specify) _________ 
M8 What do you feel towards the people you reported to? 1=hatred 2=angry 3=sorry 4=fear 5=nothing 
6=other (Specify) 
M9 If you did not report what was the reason? 0=no particular reason 1=no need to 2=are not 
helpful 3=Other (specify) ____ 
M10 What were your feelings towards animals after the crop raids? 1=hatred 2=angry 3=sorry 4=fear 5=nothing 
6=other (Specify)  
M11 What do you feel now towards the animals when you think or 
see them?  
1=hatred 2=angry 3=sorry 4=fear 5=nothing 
6=other (Specify) 
L12 What things do you at times do that you think are caused by 
the crop raids that you experienced? 
1=revenge killing 2=poaching 3=assisting poachers 




N Encounters: Livestock predation   
 Have you experienced livestock predation?  0=No 1=Yes 
N1 Which animals? 1=Lions 2=Hyena3=Leopard/cheetah 4=Baboons 
5=Jackal 6=Crocodiles 7=Hippopotamus 8=Snakes 
8=Other (Specify) _____ 
N2 When did this happen? (years)   
N3 Where did this happen? 1=fields 2=at home 3=Grazing area  4=Other 
(specify) ___ 
N4 What were the results of the attack? 1=livestock injury 2=death 3=escaped without 
injury 4=Other (specify) ___ 
N5 To whom did you report the incident? 0=did not report 1=PAC 2=RDC 3=National Parks 
4=Police 5=Traditional leaders (Chief/village head) 
6=Other (specify) ___ 
N6 What help did you get? 0=None 1=Compensation (food) 2=Compensation 
(money) 3=other (specify) _________ 
N7 What do you feel towards the people you reported to? 1=hatred 2=angry 3=sorry 4=fear 5=nothing 
6=other (Specify) 
N8 If you did not report what was the reason? 0=no particular reason 1=no need to 2=are not 
helpful 3=Other (specify) ____ 
N9 What were your feelings towards animals after the livestock 
predation/s? 
1=hatred 2=angry 3=sorry 4=fear 5=nothing 
6=other (Specify)  
N10 What do you feel now towards the animals when you think or 
see them?  





N11 What things do you at times do that you think are caused by 
the livestock predation you experienced? 
1=revenge killing 2=poaching 3=assisting poachers 
4=non-participation in nrm 5=other (specify) ____ 
 
O Do the following happen in your community/village? 0=No 1=Yes How often? 
1=every day 
2=within a week 
3=within a month 
4=each growing 
season 5=within a 
year 
O1 Crop raids    
O2 Livestock predation   
O3 Human attacks by wild animals (Injury)   











10. Appendix E: KII guide 
Question Guides for in-depth interview 
 
Purpose: We are conducting an academic survey to learn about the impact of public investments on 
household access to education and health, household ability to deal with environmental risks and people’s 
perception of the CAMPFIRE programme. This research has been approved by the Commerce Faculty 
Ethics in Research Committee. 
Selection: Your household has been randomly selected to participate in an interview that includes questions 
on topics such as your family background, household expenditures, food consumption and assets, 
experiences with shocks and wildlife. Your responses will be combined with responses from approximately 
400 other households from the district.  
Benefits and compensation: We cannot and do not guarantee or promise that you will receive any benefits 
from this study. No compensation, monetary or otherwise, can be offered for your participation as this may 
be seen as coercing your participation.  
Confidentiality: If you are willing to participate in this study and give your verbal consent, we will not 
disclose your household’s information to any other entity not directly related to this academic research.  
Voluntary participation: Participation in this study is voluntary. If you decide not to participate in this 
study, your decision will not affect your future relations with the research institutions or its personnel. If 
you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw your consent and to discontinue participation at any time 
without penalty. The interview would take approximately one hour.   
Contacts: Should you have any questions regarding the research please feel free to contact the researcher 
on:  Collen Matema; +263 776 800 287 0R +277 631 387 093 
 
A. Livelihoods/practices (allow participants to narrate their stories-detailed) 
 Life history – where born, parents/family livelihoods pursuits – livelihoods changes over the years, 




- Current livelihoods - sources of income and food (agriculture, hunting, gathering, tree harvesting 
(commercial or subsistence), other non-timber - where, how, with what results-sustainability,  
 – Which one is the main for income and for food?  
– What are the main challenges/shocks you face earning a living? Why? Probe for as many as the 
interviewee can remember 
       – How are you addressing each of the challenges? Is it helping? Why/why not? Probe for CAMPFIRE 
programme related responses to challenges. 
B. Quick questions (do not allow much time – will be repeated at the end of the interview) 
CAMPFIRE is good 1= Yes 0= No  
CAMPFIRE should be stopped 0=No 1=Yes 
 
C. Experiences/encounters 
 Wildlife encounters (crop raids/livestock predation/human attack [communities for experts – probe for 
as many encounters – for each encounter probe: 
o How it happened – narratives of the incidences - [where -when -the process –who were 
involved -  
o With what results on households – injuries, deaths, crop destruction, etc  
o What did they do after each incident – report to who? Initial reaction –narratives-what exactly 
was said?   
o With what results – feelings (then) towards 1. Animals 2. People etc 
General feelings developed during each of the encounters described above.  
General feelings now after the encounters 
What first comes into mind when you think of (name of animal/Parks/council/CAMPFIRE 
[HEURETICS] – feelings that come without having to reason – feeling of pain, hatred, fear, 
joy, appreciation/thankful, etc 
o What is the frequency of crop raids/predation/deaths/injury in the community? 
 
D. Encounters with: (Probe for emerging relations (good/bad)) – either after a hwc or other platforms – 
meetings-social- etc  
a. Parks – Narratives 
b. Council – Narratives  




General feelings developed during each of the encounters.  
General feeling now after the encounters 
What first comes into mind when you hear the word – Parks/council/CAMPFIRE 
[HEURETICS] – feelings that come without having to reason – feeling of pain, hatred, fear, 
joy, appreciative, thankful, etc 
 
E. Benefit stream from CAMPFIRE: probe for benefits and how they are framed /perceived 
Ask – and allow detailed narratives 
-what is CAMPFIRE? 
-How did it start/when? Probe for a detailed description of the process 
-who started it and how were the communities involved –was s/he involved - probe whether they were 
consulted, and the processes involved in the consultation – their evaluation of the consultation – was it 
adequate in their view – who then made the decision to start its implementation? 
-how is the programme run – who makes decisions and on what?  
-as an individual/household how do you participate in the programme? Are you satisfied that you are 
contributing as much as you would have wanted to – are there any hindrances to your wanting to 
contribute  
-how do you benefit from the programme [direct/indirect] – cite and narrate all the incidences that you 
benefited – and feelings associated each benefit episode (anger, fear, appreciative, disgruntled etc) – 
are the feelings persistent and why?  
-are you satisfied with the benefits you are getting from the programme – if not what do you think 
should be done to meet your specific needs  
 
F. Divergent economic behaviours 
[-Can be extracted from livelihoods activities interrogated earlier] 
G. Repeat these questions at the end of the interview 
CAMPFIRE is good 1= Yes 0= No  
CAMPFIRE should be stopped 0=No 1=Yes 
What is good performance in relation to CAMPFIRE? Allow the explanation to be as detailed as the 
possible [probe for more explanations – examples etc] 
